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Chapter 1
Introduction and Outline
‘What can Labor do for itself? The answer is not difficult. Labor can organize, it can unify; it
can consolidate its forces. This done, it can demand and command’.
–Eugene V. Debs
1.1 Introduction
Somewhere in the middle of October 2015, a lively discussion ensued between my colleague,
Rutger Kaput, and me. The discussion was about my claim that powerful unions can poten-
tially play a destabilizing role in the economy. Mr. Kaput, who was a former policy advisor
to the municipal sector of the Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (FNV)1, was of the view
that people often ignore the constructive roles that unions play in the economy and society as a
whole. He cited the case of the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet as an example.2 He drew
my attention to the fact that about half of the quartet were representatives of trade (labour) and
employers unions. Mr. Kaput’s position is similar to the views advanced by proponents of neo-
1The FNV is the largest labour union in the Netherlands
2The quartet was awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize in recognition for its role in Tunisia’s transition to
democracy in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution on the Friday prior to the time of the discussion.
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corporatism.3 This theory implies that a highly centralized bargaining system better internalizes
the macroeconomic consequences of the actions of negotiating parties than a decentralized bar-
gaining system. Thus, settlements to negotiations reached are better aligned with the interests
of economic policy makers.
After several minutes of arguments, we converged on a common position regarding two very
interrelated motivations for union behaviour: first, union behaviour is mainly motivated by the
quest for survival and for justification of its existence. It is indeed this basic motivation that
forces unions into national politics. Thus, one may posit that unions find their raison d’eˆtre in a
political atmosphere characterized by protracted uncertainty. This conjecture, if true, might ex-
plain the involvement of union representatives in the National Dialogue Quartet of Tunisia. The
second motivation entails safeguarding the economic interests of the employers or the employ-
ees that the unions represent. The range of activities that can be regarded as emanating from the
second motivation include bargaining for wages and employment conditions. Western (1995)
identifies increased global competition and worldwide recession as some factors contributing to
the decline of union coverage. Perhaps, the increasing interconnectedness leading to increasing
risks of crisis contagion limits the ability of unions to insulate their members from the adverse
effects of economic crises. Therefore, unions are seen as not being able to secure the interests
of their members when the economy is often subjected to external shocks. This might explain
why the decline of union coverages in the majority of OECD member countries coincides with
increased globalization.
The interest of this dissertation lies in one particular union behaviour stemming from the
latter of the aforementioned motivations: wage indexation. Wage indexation can be seen as a
form of wage setting that allows automatic adjustment to the evolution or future realizations of
some particular factors. Aizenman (2008) defines wage indexation as :
‘... mechanism designed to adjust wages to information that cannot be foreseen
3Schmitter (1974) defines (neo)corporatism as ‘...a system of interest representation in which the constituent
units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports’.
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when the wage contract is negotiated. A wage contract with indexation clauses will
specify the wage base (that is, the money wage applicable in the absence of new
information), the indexation formula that will be used to update wages, and how
often updating will occur...’.
The definition above does not preclude wages from being indexed to factors other than inflation,
such as productivity. However, it is observed in Caju et al. (2008) that inflation remains the
most important variable influencing wage (indexation) negotiations in practice. Furthermore, it
is plausible to assume that informational lags tend to place significant constraints on the ability
of unions to include the inflation rate as a basis for wage negotiations. These constraints are not
as binding when it comes to including productivity as a basis for wage negotiations. This might
explain why most indexation clauses are based on inflation or price level, rather than output or
productivity. Following these observations, I therefore define wage indexation as the elasticity of
wages to prices or lags of prices for the purposes of this dissertation. In the subsequent chapters,
I use the terms wage indexation and the degree of wage indexation interchangeably.
1.2 Time-varying degree of wage indexation
The institutional settings within which wage (indexation) negotiations take place vary across
countries. It is therefore plausible that the wage indexation outcomes also vary across countries.
Furthermore, there is substantial evidence in support of time variations in these institutional
settings. This coupled with the observation that the frequency of wage bargaining is influenced
by business cycles strongly suggests time variation in the degree of wage indexation. In contrast
to these observations, studies on wage indexation generally assume a time-invariant degree of
wage indexation. The practice of assuming a constant degree of wage indexation is mostly done
out of convenience rather than out of the attempt to mimic reality. This might be due to the
difficulty faced with measuring wage indexation. The few works that include time variation
of wage indexation in their analysis normally rely on US data. These works include Holland
(1986), Ascari et al. (2011), and Hofmann et al. (2010). A readily available proxy variable for
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measuring wage indexation makes it easier to work with US data.4 Comparable data for other
countries are difficult to come by. Other works on time-varying wage indexation are mostly
theoretical (see Carrillo et al. (2014) for example). One study that deserves special mention is
that of Schryder et al. (2014). The authors use a panel estimation methodology to show that
wage indexation varies according to the presence or absence of an inflation targeting regime.
Having gone through the scant literature on time-varying wage indexation, I have identified
the following gaps. First, only a few studies explain the processes that lead to wage indexation
as a random (time-varying) bargaining outcome between unions. Establishing wage indexation
as a random bargaining outcome permits one to draw additional inferences on the effects of
union behaviour on macroeconomic stability. Second, no study has attempted so far to produce
country specific estimates of the wage indexation variable. Not knowing the cross-country vari-
ations in wage indexation limits our understanding of the factors that explain these variations.
Also, it may be difficult to empirically test existing theoretical implications regarding wage in-
dexation. In an attempt to close these existing gaps, this dissertation investigates the causes and
the macroeconomic implications of time and cross country variations in wage indexation. Both
theoretical and empirical methodologies are employed in this dissertation. The next section
describes the outline and the research questions addressed in each of the subsequent chapters.
1.3 Outline and research questions
The remainder of this dissertation consists of four chapters which are based on studies mostly
written with co-authors. The chapters are organized around specific research questions related to
the causes and consequences of time variations in wage indexation and an be read independently.
The outline below details the research questions addressed, the methodologies employed, and
the summary of the chapters’ results.
Chapter 2 is based on my Job Market Paper titled ‘Time-Varying Degree of Wage Indexation
and the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve’. The main contribution of this chapter to general
4Proportion of cost-of-living-adjusted contracts (COLA) is usually used as a proxy variable for wage indexation.
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literature lies in the new estimation methodology proposed to measure time-varying wage index-
ation. The chapter addresses these three main research questions. First, can one find evidence
for time variation in the existing estimates of the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve? Sec-
ond, is there a way of estimating time-varying wage indexation using available data? Finally,
what macroeconomic or other variables explain variations in the degree of wage indexation?
In order to answer these questions, this chapter draws on the structural New Keynesian Wage
Phillips Curve (NKWPC) developed by Gali (2011). This model assumes a constant degree of
wage indexation. A rolling window regression based on the NKWPC is run to provide prelimi-
nary evidence in support of the time-varying nature of wage indexation. Also, diagnostics tests
performed on the estimated NKWPC reveal an instability in the parameters that are linked to
wage indexation. Subsequently, the chapter derives another version of the NKWPC with time-
varying wage indexation. The resulting model is labeled the ‘Time-Varying New Keynesian
Wage Phillips Curve’ (TV-NKWPC). The TV-NKWPC is then estimated with quarterly data of
US and 10 other OECD countries using a state-space estimation methodology. The resulting es-
timates of wage indexation for the US are closer to the generally accepted proxy of this variable
than the estimates from any other methodology. Finally, the chapter investigates the variables
that explain the time variations in wage indexation. The results suggest a strong evidence for the
positive effects of trend inflation. There is some evidence in support of the negative effects of
the variance of productivity shocks (as predicted by Gray (1976)).
Chapter 3 is partly based on Attey and de Vries (2011) and Attey and de Vries (2013) In
a way, it can be seen as complementary to the previous chapter in that it also seeks to explain
the origin of the randomness of wage indexation. While the previous chapter links variation in
wage indexation to macroeconomic variables, this chapter theoretically models it as a random
bargaining outcome between unions. To this end, the chapter considers two settings under which
wage indexation bargaining takes place. The first setting is a bargaining process in the presence
of arbitration while the other setting is a ‘war of attrition’ type of bargaining between unions. It
is shown that the bargaining outcome regarding wage indexation is random. In the case of the
former setting, the distribution of wage indexation is bounded while the distribution in the latter
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case is unbounded from below. The chapter subsequently shows that the distribution of equi-
librium inflation under optimal monetary policy exhibits fat-tailed characteristics when wages
are indexed to current inflation. The random wage indexation exacerbates the effects of extreme
realizations of other shocks in the model, thereby producing the fat tails in the distribution of
equilibrium inflation. This property implies that one sees more extreme values of inflation more
frequently than what would be predicted by current models based on a constant wage indexation.
However, this fat-tailed property does not extend to the output gap. This is due to the fact that
the equilibrium output gap under optimal monetary policy is simply normally distributed under
the assumptions made in the model.
Chapter 4 is based on Attey and de Vries (2013). This chapter continues the analysis con-
tained in the second part of the previous chapter by theoretically examining the implications of
random wage indexation for the conduct of monetary policy. The model employed is similar in
many ways to the one used in the previous chapter. The only difference is the assumption made
with regards to how wages are indexed: wages are indexed to the lag of inflation rather than
current inflation. This assumption appears plausible since informational lags regarding inflation
make it difficult for wage setters to index their wages to the prevailing inflation rate. Under this
model, inflation and the output gap tend to have a similar behaviours in their distributions. The
equilibrium inflation under optimal monetary policy is shown to be an autoregressive (AR) pro-
cess with a random coefficient due to the random wage indexation. It is subsequently shown that
under some conditions, the unconditional distribution of the interest rate, equilibrium inflation,
and output gap do exhibit heavy-tailed properties. These properties do not apply to the condi-
tional distributions of the aforementioned three macroeconomic variables. Finally, it is shown
that a Taylor rule which allows the interest rate to react to current inflation performs better than
the one under which the interest rate reacts to the lag of inflation.
Chapter 5 is based on Attey and Kouame (2015). The main research question addressed in
this chapter is as follows: what are the effects of the behaviour of unions on inflation volatility?
Addressing this research question can be seen as a partial attempt to investigating the effects
of organized union behaviour on macroeconomic stability. This chapter focuses on inflation
1.3 Outline and research questions 7
volatility due to the often conflicting predictions regarding the effect of union behaviour on this
variable. Proponents of neocorporatism usually point to the cases of Scandinavian countries
to showcase the positive effects of a highly centralized bargaining system on inflation stability.
Other studies meanwhile claim that decentralizing the wage bargaining process leads to more
restrained wage changes. Theoretical studies backing the latter claim are difficult to come by.
Herein lies the novelty of this chapter: it begins with the simple model presented in Chapter 3
and derives unambiguous testable implications regarding the effect of the number of independent
wage indexation negotiations on inflation volatility. In particular, the model predicts a negative
relationship between number of independent negotiations and inflation volatility. The intuition
behind this prediction follows from a simple law of large numbers logic: a higher number of
independent negotiations results in a smaller variance of aggregate wage indexation which then
leads to a lower volatility of inflation. This prediction can be made only if one considers a time-
varying wage indexation as a bargaining outcome. Thus, one may view testing this prediction as
an indirect test of the assumption made in Chapter 3 when deriving the random wage indexation
outcome.
The hypothesis is tested using a panel data estimation methodology. The panel consists of
15 OECD countries. Estimation results do indeed indicate a negative relationship between inde-
pendence of negotiations and the volatility of inflation. They also indicate a positive relationship
between bargaining power of negotiating unions and inflation volatility. Thus, concerning the
question as to whether bargaining should be centralized or not, the message is simple: ‘Decen-
tralization is better, in the absence of which powerful and centralized unions should not be left
to their own devices!’
8 Introduction and Outline
Chapter 2
Estimating Time-Varying Wage Indexation
‘In our lust for measurement, we frequently measure that which we can rather than that which
we wish to measure... and forget that there is a difference’.
–George Udny Yule
2.1 Introduction
The proportion of wage contracts with cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) clauses in the US has
been observed to vary between 20% and 62% since the 1950s. This can be construed as evidence
for time variation in the degree of wage indexation since this percentage of COLA coverage is a
widely accepted proxy for the degree of wage indexation in the US.1 In spite of this evidence, a
substantial proportion of theoretical research on the topic typically assumes a constant degree of
wage indexation. Furthermore, some recent empirical studies devoted to estimating the degree
of wage indexation give a time invariant estimate to this parameter.2
The COLA coverage figures suggest that models regarding wage indexation should incorpo-
1Figure 2.5a contains a time plot of COLA coverage in the US for the period spanning 1955 to 1995 after which
it was discontinued
2Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the Euro area.
The estimate for the degree of wage indexation has a posterior mean of 0.728. More recently, Gali (2011) and
Muto and Shintani (2014) estimate a New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve for the US and Japan respectively. The
estimates for the degree of wage indexation in both are statistically significant estimates.
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rate the time-varying nature of wage indexation. In addition to this, there are other motivations
as to why wage indexation models should consider incorporating the time-varying nature of
wage indexation. We outline three of such motivations in the subsequent paragraphs.
First, the time-varying nature of wage indexation has implications for the unconditional dis-
tributions of macroeconomic variables. Current models work under the assumption of a constant
degree of wage indexation. A consequence of this assumption is that macroeconomic variables
are normally distributed. However, empirical evidence as documented in Chang (2012), for
instance, supports the existence of fat tails in the distribution of inflation. Attey and de Vries
(2011) provide a possible theoretical explanation for this empirical observation. This explana-
tion is linked to the time-varying nature of wage indexation. The aforementioned study derives
a new Classical Phillips curve under the assumption of random wage indexation and solves for
equilibrium inflation in a version of the Barro-Gordon model. It is subsequently shown that
under this model, an unconditional distribution of inflation exists and is fat tailed. The intu-
ition behind this result is that shocks to the degree of wage indexation may act as multiplicative
shocks rather than additive shocks. Therefore, these multiplicative shocks exacerbate the effects
of any extreme realizations of other (additive) shocks to inflation, thus producing the fat tail.
Second, incorporating time variation in the degree of wage indexation into models enables
one to gain additional insights into factors explaining the volatility of macroeconomic variables.
For instance, it is conceivable that the distribution of the degree wage of indexation is determined
,at least in part, by labour market institutional variables such as bargaining power of unions. One
can exploit this link to investigate the relationship between labour market institutional factors
and the volatility of inflation since the latter variable depends on the distribution of the time-
varying degree of wage indexation. Attey and Kouame (2015) confirm that the correlations
between inflation volatility and labour market institutional variables are often significant. This
correlation would not have been obvious if wage indexation models abstract from the time-
varying nature of wage indexation.
Finally, the preceding two motivations imply that the presence of a time variation in the
degree of wage indexation does have some implications for the conduct of monetary policy.
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A monetary policy conducted by a Taylor rule, for instance, necessitates the response of the
interest rate to shocks stemming from the degree of wage indexation. Also, the determinacy
of a system associated with a policy rule depends on the degree of wage indexation. Ascari
et al. (2011) show how the probability of determinacy of a system characterized by a Taylor rule
depends on the level of wage indexation. In particular, the study finds that a higher degree of
wage indexation increases the probability of a system being determinate. Thus, the response of
macroeconomic indicators to monetary policy in the US during the period spanning the mid-
1970s to early 1980s when wage indexation was relatively higher might differ from the response
in other periods when wage indexation was lower, given the same Taylor rule parameters.
It stands to reason that the descriptive and prescriptive performances of wage indexation
models would be greatly improved by incorporating a time-varying degree of wage indexation.
However the unobservable nature of this variable limits the accuracy of this class of models.
The main purpose of this paper is to develop an estimation methodology for the time-varying
degree of indexation. The model employed in this study augments that of Gali (2011) with a
time-varying degree of indexation and productivity growth. The resulting reduced-form expres-
sion which is labeled the time-varying New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve (TV-NKWPC) is
estimated using a state-space methodology. This methodology permits one to capture the time
variations in the degree of wage indexation. The estimation is done using data of US and 10
other OECD countries, namely: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden and the UK.
This study further investigates the factors that explain the time variation in wage indexation.
In order to do this, the study performs country specific OLS estimations of wage indexation
equations with trend inflation, (time-varying) variance of productivity shocks and other labour
market institutional variables as explanatory variables. Given the findings in numerous studies
indicating a positive relationship between inflation uncertainty (which is positively correlated
with trend inflation) and wage indexation, it is expected that trend inflation will have a significant
effect.
The variance of productivity shocks is included in the list of regressors in order to have an
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ad hoc test of the empirical validity of a hypothesis derived from Gray (1976), which predicts
a negative relationship between the degree of wage indexation and productivity shocks. The
test might best be described as ad hoc since the original hypothesis relies on the assumption
that wage indexation is a policy instrument used by a policy maker. This study makes no such
assumption. The labour market institutional variables are included to control for the bargaining
power of unions and other variables that might explain the time variation in wage indexation.
Our study is not the only attempt at estimating time variations in the degree of wage index-
ation. Ascari et al. (2011) and Hofmann et al. (2010) have also attempted to estimate the time
variations in the degree of wage indexation. The former study employs a methodology based
on a rolling-window OLS regression of wage inflation on its lags and lags of price inflation.
The latter study adopts a methodology based on a Bayesian VAR approach with time-varying
coefficients. The estimates of the time-varying degree of wage indexation in the two studies
are consistent with the general belief that wage indexation continuously fell during and after
the great moderation. However, the specific values of the estimates do sometimes deviate from
wage indexation figures suggested by the proportion of COLA covered contracts. For instance,
estimates provided by Ascari et al. (2011) peaked around 0.9 during the ‘Great Inflation’ period
while COLA figures suggest 0.61 as the highest value for wage indexation during this period.
Also, the estimates by Hofmann et al. (2010) are less than 0.5 throughout the whole sample pe-
riod. Furthermore, the methodology adopted in this paper is simpler than those of Ascari et al.
(2011) and Hofmann et al. (2010).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The time-varying New Keynesian
Phillips Curve is derived in Section 2.2, where the NKWPC is shown to be a special case of
the more general TV-NKWPC. The first part of Section 2.3 includes some diagnostic tests on
an estimated NKWPC using US data in order to provide evidence for the presence of time vari-
ation in the degree of wage indexation. The second part develops and estimates the state-space
regression model of the TV-NKWPC. Section 2.4 provides country-specific estimates of the
TV-NKWPC for 11 OECD countries and also estimates for the OLS regression of the wage
indexation equation. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 The New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve
Gali (2011) derives a New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve (NKWPC) based on the assumption
of staggered wage setting by the representative household. We extend this model by incorpo-
rating a time-varying degree of wage indexation. The resulting expression is designated as the
Time-Varying New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve (TV-NKWPC). This section briefly explains
the theoretical derivation of the TV-NKWPC and shows how the NKWPC is a special case of
the more general TV-NKWPC.
Consider a representative household with members who can be represented by the unit
square and indexed by a pair (i, j) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], with the first dimension i representing
labour type and the second dimension determining their disutility from work. Let the disutility
from supplying labour type j be χtjϕ where the variable χt denotes the exogenous labour supply
shock. Assume that consumption (Ct) enters utility function in a loglinear manner. This implies
the following expression for the utility function:
U(Ct, Nt(i), χt) = logCt − χt
∫ 1
0
∫ Nt(i)
0
jϕdj di
= logCt − χt
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
di.
Further assume each household member supplies specialized labour which is an imperfect sub-
stitute to other members’ labour supply. The aggregate labour index by the household has the
following Dixit-Stiglitz form:
Nt ≡
[∫ 1
0
Nt(i)
1− 1
 di
] 
−1
,
whereby  denotes the elasticity of substitution between the different labour types. An intratem-
poral problem of cost minimization given a wage rate Wt(i) by the members of the household
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yields the following expression for labour supply of type i:
Nt(i) =
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)−
Nt.
The variable Wt denotes the aggregate wage index with its expression implicitly given as fol-
lows:
Wt ≡
[∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
1−di
] 1
1−
The representative household seeks to maximize its lifetime utility subject to its budget con-
straint. The objective function of the household and the budget constraint are respectively given
below:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt(i)) (2.1)
PtCt +QtBt ≤ Bt−1 +
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)Nt(i)di+ Υt. (2.2)
The variable Pt represents the price level whileBt represents one-period riskless bond purchased
at priceQt. The variable Υt denotes the lump-sum component of income. The constraint in (2.2)
is supplemented by the usual transversality conditions to prevent bubble solutions.
2.2.1 Time-varying wage indexation
In each period, a worker resets their nominal wage with probability 1− θ. Workers who do not
get the opportunity to reset have their wages automatically indexed according to the following
indexation rule:
Wt+k|t = W ∗t Xt+k|t, (2.3)
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where W ∗t is the optimal nominal wage level prevailing at time t for a worker who resets
their wages in that period. The Xt+k is generally a function of inflation and other variables
to which wages are indexed. Similar to the indexation rule found in the studies of Fischer
(1983) and Jadresic (2002), it is assumed that workers index to both productivity and inflation.3
Let Xt+k|t = exp(xt+k|t). The following expression for log indexation (xt+k|t) is proposed:
xt+k|t =

0 k = 0
k−1∑
s=0
(
γt+s+1p¯i
p
t+s + (1− γt+s+1)pip + φpizt+s+1 + (1− φ)piz
)
k ≥ 1.
(2.4)
where p¯ipt and pip denote the inflation rate (or its moving average) implied by the indexation
agreement and the steady-state inflation rate respectively. The variables pizt and pi
z denote the
growth in productivity and its steady-state value respectively.
While the general features of the wage indexation rules found in the literature allow for
log wages (wt) to react in a deterministic manner to an inflation measure (p¯i
p
t ) and productivity
growth (pizt ), our indexation rule additionally allows for the possibility of time variation in the
degree of wage indexation to inflation, γt. Empirical estimates such as those found in Holland
(1986), Ascari et al. (2011) can be interpreted as evidence for the time-varying nature of wage
indexation to inflation. For this reason, we time index γ while assuming that the influence of
productivity growth on the indexed part of wages is time invariant.4 The variation in wage
indexation might reflect, for instance, the varying bargaining power of unions. Also, a time-
varying γt is more compatible with the observation that wage indexation is higher in the presence
of a higher level of (trend) inflation.
As will be shown later in this section, the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve (NKWPC)
derived under the assumption of time-varying degree of wage indexation exhibits time-varying
parameters. The expression for aggregate wages (Wt) implied by the indexation expression (2.4)
3While the indexation rules used in the literature cited imply that wages are indexed to output and inflation, it is
assumed here that wages are indexed to productivity instead of output.
4While this assumption may seem arbitrary, estimations provided in Table 2.12 do not reject this assumption.
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is given as follows:
Wt =
[
θ
(
Wt−1Xt|t−1
)1−
+ (1− θ)(W ∗t )1−
] 1
1−
. (2.5)
2.2.2 Staggered wage setting and the NKWPC
Similar to the wage setting mechanism in Erceg et al. (2000), it is assumed that a worker
resets their nominal wages with probability 1 − θ. A worker that resets their wages in period t
chooses nominal wages to maximize their lifetime utility given by the equation (2.1) subject to
the constraint implied by the demand for their labour. The first order condition for the household
is given as follows:
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
[
Nt+k|tUc(·)
(
W ∗t Xt+k|t
Pt+k
−MMRSt+k|t
)]
= 0, (2.6)
where MRSt denotes the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour,M ≡
/( − 1) denotes the wage mark-up under flexible prices and β denotes the discount factor.
The specification of the utility function implies that the expression for marginal rate of substi-
tution can be derived as follows: MRSt+k|t = Ct+kN
ϕ
t+k|t. We loglinearize the expression (2.5)
around a deterministic steady state. Substituting the resulting expression as well as (2.4) into a
loglinearized version of (2.6) results in the following expression:
piwt − νt = βEt(piwt+1 − νt+1)− λ(µt − µ), (2.7)
where νt = xt|t−1 and λ = [(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)]/[(1 + ϕ)θ]. The variable piwt indicates the
growth rate (defined as log-difference) of wages. The variable µt denotes the average markup
defined as the difference between the log of real wages and the marginal rate of substitution.
The expression of µt is given below:
µt = wt − pt − [ct + ϕnt + log(χt)]. (2.8)
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In the flexible price steady state, log markup only consists of the distortion caused by the pres-
ence of monopolistic competition. It can be shown from household’s optimizing conditions that
the steady-state markup is:5
µ ≡ log(M) = w − p−mrs. (2.9)
In giving an intuition behind a version of (2.7) without indexation νt, Gali (2008) notes the fol-
lowing: ‘When the average wage in the economy is below the level consistent with maintaining
(on average) the desired markup, households readjusting nominal wage will tend to increase the
latter, thus generating positive wage inflation’. A similar intuition lies behind (2.7). We first
note that average wage inflation exclusive of indexation (piwt − νt) is identical to wage inflation
as defined by Gali (2008). Thus, the intuition behind the expression (2.7) is as follows: when the
perceived markup gap is bigger, wage setting household members see less incentive to increase
nominal wages, thus resulting in less wage inflation.
Unemployment is introduced into the model in a way identical to that by Gali (2011). Let
lt(i) be the log labour supply of individual i in the absence of real and nominal distortions. The
expression for the log of individual labour supply in this case is given by the following first order
condition:
wt − pt = ct + ϕlt + log(χt), (2.10)
where lt =
∫ 1
0
lt(i)di. It should be noted once again that the presence of risk sharing among
individuals in a household implies that the marginal utility of consumption is equal across all
individuals, further implying that ct = ct(i). We note that the unemployment associated with
labour supply lt(i) is voluntary unemployment. Also, nt ≡ log(Nt) is the effective log labour
demand under monopolistic wage setting. Using these two observations, we can define the
5See Appendix 2.B.1 for a detailed derivation.
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unemployment rate as follows:
ut = lt − nt. (2.11)
Substitute (2.10), and (2.11) into the definition of average wage markup in (2.8) to obtain the
following:
µt = ϕut. (2.12)
It follows from (2.12) that the natural rate of unemployment is defined as follows: un = (1/ϕ)µ.
In other words, the natural rate of unemployment in a flexible price equilibrium is solely a
function of wage markup.
Finally a substitution of the expressions for unemployment and its natural rate into (2.7)
permits us to derive the NKWPC as follows:
piwt − νt = βEt(piwt+1 − νt+1)− λϕ(ut − un). (2.13)
In order to derive a reduced-form version of the expression in (2.13) it is assumed that the
unemployment gap follows the following autoregressive process of order 2 (AR(2)):6
uˆt = ut − un = φ1uˆt−1 + φ2uˆt−2 + ηt.
Following Gali (2011), we suggest this process for unemployment because it seems to describe
the US data quite well. Substituting this AR representation for unemployment into (2.13) and
solving the resulting difference equation after assuming rational expectations yields the follow-
6It may be argued that this AR(2) process for unemployment seems rather ad hoc. Nevertheless, this study
adopts this process in order to facilitate comparison with Gali (2011). Table 2.7 gives the results of the estimated
process.
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ing time-varying New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve expression:
piwt = α
′
t + γtp¯i
p
t−1 + φpi
z
t + ψ0ut + ψ1ut−1 + ξt, (2.14a)
where
α′t ≡ (1− γt)pip + (1− φ)piz − (ψ0 + ψ1)un
ψ0 ≡ − λϕ
1− β(φ1 + βφ2)
ψ1 ≡ − λϕβφ2
1− β(φ1 + βφ2) .
The random variable ξt is assumed to be measurement error 7 which is uncorrelated to all the
other independent variables and could possibly be an autocorrelated process. It is worth noting
that the sum γtp¯i
p
t−1 + φpi
z
t and the function of the time-varying parameter, α
′
t, are included in
TV-NKWPC due to the presence of the indexed part of wages νt = xt|t−1.
We note that αt and γt are negatively correlated. This property will later prove important
in supporting our claim for the time-varying nature of the degree of wage indexation. The
expression (2.14a) is a more general version of the NKWPC in that it also takes into account
the time variation in the degree of wage indexation. Estimating the dynamics of wage inflation
has the advantage of combining the microfounded nature of the model by Gali (2011) with the
additional benefit of estimating the time variation in wage indexation. The TV-NKWPC nests the
specification employed in Gali (2011) and Muto and Shintani (2014) as a special case in which
the degree of wage indexation γ is assumed constant and there is no indexation to productivity
(i.e. γt = γ and φ = 0). In this case, the specific form that (2.14a) assumes is the following
expression:
piwt = α
′ + γp¯ipt−1 + ψ0ut + ψ1ut−1 + ξt, (2.14b)
where α′ = (1− γ)pip − (ψ0 + ψ1)un.
7It has been suggested by Gali (2011) that the error term could also capture the time variation in the desired
wage mark-up.
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2.3 Estimating the TV-NKWPC
The empirical fit of the TV-NKWPC is investigated in this section. First, baseline estimations
of the standard NKWPC are performed using US data. Diagnostic tests are then conducted
on these estimations in order to look for possible evidences supporting the instability of the
estimated constant term and the coefficient of inflation(α′ and γ). The basic idea behind the
tests is as follows: the estimates of α′ and γ will not exhibit any instability if indeed the degree
of wage indexation is constant. The diagnostic tests conducted can therefore be seen as indirect
tests as to whether there is time variation in the degree of wage indexation. The final part of
this section demonstrates the empirical fit of TV-NKWPC when estimates are conducted using
US data. Not only does the use of US data facilitate comparison of the two methodologies (Gali
(2011) and our study), but also it permits one to easily compare the time-varying degree of wage
indexation obtained from the TV-NKWPC estimation to corresponding figures suggested by the
extent of COLA coverage.
2.3.1 Data and preliminary evidence
This study uses quarterly data spanning the period from 1948Q1 to 2012Q4 obtained from the
Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS).8 For the measure of inflation, Consumer Price Index (CPI)
inflation is used. Wages are measured using compensation data.9 We make use of the compensa-
tion based measure of wages in order to take advantage of its relatively longer time span. Also,
according to Gali (2011), both measures yield remarkably similar results. The index of output
per hour is used as a proxy for labour productivity.
Table 2.1 presents the results of the estimation. The first two columns of the baseline es-
timation represent a model in which wages are indexed to lagged inflation (p¯ipt−1 = pit−1) and
a model in which wages are indexed to a moving average of lags of inflation (p¯ipt−1 = pi
(4)
t−1 =(∑4
k=1 pit−k
)
/4). A preliminary diagnostic test run on the residuals suggests that including pro-
8Gali (2011) uses unemployment data obtained from the Haver Database.
9Gali (2011) makes use of earnings data in the main part of the study due to the possibility of the presence of
measurement errors in compensation data.
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ductivity growth adds some explanatory power to the baseline equation.10 The regressions in the
last two columns therefore include productivity growth in the list of regressors. It is theoretically
possible that productivity enters the model by means of wage indexation, i.e. wages are indexed
to lags of inflation and current productivity. It can be seen from the values of the R2 that the
fit of the model is improved when productivity growth is introduced into the model. Also, the
residuals from estimations in the cases of all models shown in Table 2.1 display a significant
level (1%) of autocorrelation.11
Ascari et al. (2011) document how wage indexation rises when trend inflation increases and
falls when trend inflation decreases. This observation suggests the existence of instability in the
NKWPC when wages are indexed to inflation. Guided by this observation, we conduct further
diagnostic tests on the residuals from the regressions in Table 2.1 by including a nonlinear term,
namely: the product of trend inflation and the measure of inflation indexed to, i.e. piτt−1pit−1 or
piτt−1pi
4
t−1. Trend inflation is obtained by means of applying the HP filter to the quarterly inflation
series. Results from Table (2.2) indicate a strong effect of a nonlinear term in both cases of wage
indexation considered. We interpret this finding as evidence in support of our claim concerning
the improved fit of the TV-NKWPC.
Finally a rolling window regression on (2.14a) is performed in order to obtain an idea of
the time-varying parameters αt and γt. This is done using the following procedure. First, the
constant parameters in the expression contained in (2.14b) are estimated. A rolling regression
is subsequently performed in order to obtain rough estimates on the parameters in the following
expression:
xt = αt + γtp¯i
p
t−1 + t,
where xt ≡ piwt − ψˆ0uˆt − ψˆ1uˆt−1 and t is an independent and identically distributed (iid) zero
mean normally random distributed error term. The results under the two assumptions regarding
wage indexation considered are respectively presented in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. In both
10Formal causality tests indicate that productivity growth Granger causes unemployment
11This is reported in Table 2.9 in the appendix
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figures, the estimated time-varying degree of wage indexation first rises to a point, after which
it falls. Again, it is interesting to note that the later periods’ values of wage indexation do not
significantly differ from zero. This is generally in line with empirical evidence that the degree of
wage indexation initially rose to high levels during the 1970s and diminished thereafter. Also,
the time-varying wage indexation parameter varies between 0 and 1 in both cases. It is worth
noting that the correlation between αˆt and γˆt estimated under this rolling regression technique
is negative (see Table 2.8 in the appendix). This is expected if one holds the assumption that
the reduced form specification in (2.14a) describes the dynamics between output and unemploy-
ment.
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Figure 2.1: Rolling regression estimates for p¯ipt = pit−1
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Figure 2.2: Rolling regressions estimates for p¯ipt = pi
(4)
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2.3.2 Estimation results
In order to estimate the expression contained in (2.14a), we propose a state-space methodology
with the time-varying degree of wage indexation (γt) and the measurement error (ξt) as the
unobserved state variables. This estimation method requires one to give the law of motion for the
time-varying wage indexation. As noted earlier, empirical findings suggest that wage indexation
is positively correlated to trend inflation. If one assumes a simple linear relationship between
wage indexation and trend inflation, it is possible to propose a highly persistent process for the
wage indexation parameter.12 It is therefore assumed that wage indexation behaves as if it were
a random walk process over the sample period in consideration. Given that no restrictions are
placed a priori with regards to the autocorrelation structure of the random process ξt, a stationary
AR(1) process is assumed for this variable. We estimate the following empirical model:
piwt = ϕ1ut + ϕ2ut−1 + ϕ3pi
z
t + µt + ϕ4γt + γtp¯i
p
t−1
µt = (1− ρξ)ϕ5 + ρξµt−1 + εt
γt = γt−1 + ηt
. (2.15)
where µt = ϕ5 +ξt , εt ∼ iidN(0, σ2ε) and ηt ∼ iidN(0, σ2η). A definition of all the coefficients
contained in expression (2.15) above in terms of the structural parameters in the previous section
is given in Table 2.3 below:
Table 2.3: Definition of coefficients
coef definition coef definition
ϕ1 − λϕ1−β(φ1+βφ2) ϕ4 −pip
ϕ2 βφ2ϕ1 ϕ5 (1− φ)piz + pip − (ϕ1 + ϕ2)un
ϕ3 φ
12 Formal unit-root tests run on trend inflation do not statistically reject the existence of a unit-root.
We acknowledge that this specification may come off as economically implausible. An alternative specification
might suggest a highly persistent but stationary process (e.g. with AR(1) coefficient 0.99). We nevertheless stick to
the random walk assumptions due to the following reasons: First, there is very little difference in results between
a random walk specification and the persistent AR(1) specification. Secondly, it is common practice in recent
literature to assume a random walk process for trend inflation.
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Following Gali (2011), the TV-NKWPC is first estimated under two assumptions with re-
gards to price inflation: that wages are indexed to a quarter lag of price inflation (pit−1) and that
wages are indexed to an average inflation over the last four quarters (pi(4)t−1). Additional estimates
of the TV-NKWPC are then made under the assumption that µt ( or ξt) is autocorrelated, and
subsequently under the assumption that µt (or ξt) is iid normal distributed. Finally, the TV-
NKWPC is estimated under the assumption that there is no autocorrelation in ξt (ρξ = 0) and
the coefficient of lag of unemployment is zero (ϕ2 = 0).
The estimations of all versions of Equation 2.15 were performed using 7th edition of the
EVIEWS statistical package. The same package was used for all other estimations in this study
except for the rolling regressions which were done in MATLAB. The results from the six esti-
mations are presented in Table 2.4. There are some observations worth noting concerning the
estimates of the various versions of TV-NKWPC. First, results obtained from the estimations of
the various versions of the TV-NKWPC show rather striking similarities to those obtained from
estimations of the NKWPC in Table 2.1. In most cases, the values of the constant terms (ϕ5
in (2.15)) imply that the coefficients of unemployment and the coefficients of productivity are
roughly similar under the various specifications.13 An implication of these similarities could be
that the error term ξt in the NKWPC posited to be measurement error in wage inflation by Gali
(2011) is most likely explained by variations in the trend inflation (as can be seen from Table
2.2). Estimates for ξt under the various TV-NKWPC models are independent of the time-varying
wage indexation and are not autocorrelated (see Figure 2.4). Also, estimates for the linear effect
of the time-varying degree of wage indexation (ϕ4 or the coefficient of γ in the table) are either
not statistically significant or significantly negative as predicted by the expression (2.14a). 14
Finally, as indicated by the AIC values, all the versions of TV-NKWPC estimated in the table
above outperform the estimation of all the versions of the NKWPC contained in Table 2.1. One
can interpret these observations as evidence in support of the relatively better empirical fit of the
TV-NKWPC to US data.
13This similarity only holds to the extent that wages are indexed similarly under the various specifications.
14The identity of the coefficient ϕ4 as contained in Table 2.3 implies that ϕ4 ≤ 0 for pip ≥ 0
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Table 2.4: Estimated TV-NKWPC (piwt )
ρξ 6= 0 ρξ = 0 ρξ = 0, ϕ2 = 0
pit−1 pi
(4)
t−1 pit−1 pi
(4)
t−1 pit−1 pi
(4)
t−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ut -0.194 -0.302** -0.194 -0.309** -0.114** -0.158**
(0.107) (0.097) (0.106) (0.090) (0.037) (0.0249)
ut−1 0.085 0.151 0.085 0.157
(0.106) (0.100) (0.105) (0.094)
pizt 0.157** 0.139** 0.158** 0.142** 0.166** 0.157**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.387) (0.037) (0.039)
γt 0.484 -0.365* 0.434 -0.365* 0.539 -0.304**
(0.625) (0.145) (0.585) (0.128) (0.596) (0.108)
ϕ5 1.265** 1.739** 1.282** 1.744** 1.269** 1.763**
(0.302) (0.167) (0.290) (1.156) (0.299) (0.155)
ρξ 0 0.062
(0.054) (0.051)
ln(σ2ε) -1.264** -1.235** -1.264** -1.236** -1.261** -1.226**
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071)
ln(σ2η) -7.016** -5.862** -6.972 -5.840** -7.079** -5.884**
(1.06) (0.857) (1.031) (0.821) (0.962) (0.773)
AIC 1.782 1.787 1.774 1.782 1.770 1.786
1 Estimation of the various versions of the TV-NKWPC in Equation (2.15).
2 Standard errors of estimates are indicated in parenthesis
3 * p > 0.05, **p > 0.01
Furthermore, after taking into account the time variation in the degree of wage indexation
when estimating the TV-NKWPC, the lag of unemployment plays no significant role in explain-
ing wage inflation under all the versions of the TV-NKWPC estimated. This is possibly due to
the fact that the persistence in wage inflation is mostly accounted for by changes in the degree
of wage indexation(which is in itself a persistent process).15 This result and the fact that ξt is
not an autocorrelated process (ρξ = 0 is not rejected at 10% significance level) imply that the
TV-NKWPC models (5) and (6) should be preferred to the others.
The estimates for ϕ4 under the aforementioned two versions of the TV-NKWPC imply two
15This is similar to the findings of Cogley and Sbordone (2008) who argue that taking into account the variation
of trend inflation makes the NKPC purely forward looking, with no need for an ad hoc backwards price indexation
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different values for non-varying steady-state inflation. In model (5), ϕ4 (i.e. the coefficient of
γt) is not statistically significant. This implies that after taking into account the effect of time-
varying degree of wage indexation, the constant steady-state value of inflation is not statistically
different from 0. In contrast, the estimate of ϕ4 in model (5) implies that the constant steady-
state value of inflation is 0.304. When one considers (as will be shown later) that the degree of
wage indexation is a function of trend inflation, it is easy to see why ϕ4 = 0 is more plausible.
In other words, it makes sense that the constant steady-state value of detrended inflation should
be 0. Also, comparing the AIC values of models (5) and (6) suggests that one should opt for
the former. Finally, the estimated time-varying degrees of wage indexation obtained under the
former version of the TV-NKWPC (Figure 2.3) are more comparable to those suggested by
COLA coverage figures. Given the result just mentioned, the next section of this study only
estimates the model (5) version of the TV-NKWPC for various countries.
2.3.3 Time-varying degree of wage indexation
If the dynamics of wage inflation are indeed described by the reduced form equation (2.15),
one would expect the state variable γt to effectively capture the time-varying degree of wage
indexation. The estimated log variance of the γt’s disturbance term (ln(σ2η)) is significant at
1% under all estimated versions of TV-NKWPC. This can be interpreted as evidence in support
of the time-varying nature of the degree of wage indexation. Figure 2.3 gives the values of the
time-varying degrees of wage indexation as indicated by the smoothed estimates for γt under the
models (5) and (6) in Table 2.4. The two sets of estimates for γt reveal a general story: the degree
of wage indexation rose during the period of the Great Inflation and fell during the period of the
Great Moderation, a story consistent with other empirical investigations. One main difference
however exists between the two models. The magnitudes of the estimates for γt under model
(6) slightly exceed those suggested by the proportion of workers under COLA16 contracts. This
suggests that model (5) better describes the dynamics of wage inflation.
16The COLA coverage figures are obtained from the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) and Weiner (1996).
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Figure 2.3: Smoothed estimates for γt
(a) Model (5) (b) COLA coverage
(c) Model (6) (d) COLA coverage
Our study is not the first attempt at estimating the time-varying degree of wage indexation. A
comparison with other approaches found in existing literature reveals that our estimates for the
time-varying degree of wage indexation are the closest to the figures suggested by the percentage
of COLA coverage. Hofmann et al. (2010) and Ascari et al. (2011) provide estimates for the
time-varying degree of wage indexation. While the estimates from their approaches produce
reasonable measures for the time-varying degree of wage indexation, our approach is relatively
simple, but nonetheless effectively measures this variable. Estimates for time-varying degree of
wage indexation obtained in the two works just cited are compared to estimates obtained under
TV-NKWPC and COLA coverage figures in Figure 2.5. It can be seen from this figure that the
approach that best reproduces the estimates for the degree of wage indexation (γt) as suggested
by COLA contracts coverage is the TV-NKWPC estimation. Similar to the figures suggested
by COLA coverage, estimates for γt under the TV-NKWPC peaked at over 60% during the late
1970s and decreased to around 20% afterward. Thus, the subsequent part of this work will focus
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Figure 2.4: Smoothed estimates for µt
(a) Model (5) (b) Model (6)
on estimating the model (5) of TV-NKWPC for selected OECD countries.
To recap, the analysis performed in this section indicates that there is indeed an empirical
support for instability of the NKWPC. This instability stems from the time-varying nature of
the degree of wage indexation. In particular, estimates for the time-varying degree of wage
indexation (obtained from estimating the TV-NKWPC derived in the previous section) yield
results strikingly similar to the percentage of COLA coverage. The latter variable is generally
accepted as the proxy for the degree of wage indexation regarding US data. The estimates for
the coefficients of productivity growth and unemployment under the NKWPC in Table (2.1) and
under the TV-NKWPC in Table (2.4) are similar.
2.4 The TV-NKWPC in selected OECD countries
This section estimates the TV-NKWPC for 10 OECD countries and subsequently investigates
the possible reasons for the time variations in the degrees of wage indexation. The countries
are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. These countries are selected based solely on the availability of relevant data
spanning a relatively long time period. For the sake of comparability, the analysis period is
restricted to the period between 1970 and 2011. This is done because the data pertaining to
some countries only begins from 1970.
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Figure 2.5: Various estimates for γt
(a) COLA Coverage(BLS and Weiner (1996)) (b) TV-NKWPC
(c) Ascari et al 2011 (d) Hofmann et al, 2010
The main variables used for the estimations performed are in most ways identical to those
used in the previous section. For instance, inflation is measured by the quarter-on-quarter change
in the log of CPI, while union density and union strike variables (when available) are included
in the analysis as proxies for bargaining power.
However, there are some minor differences. First, hourly earnings in the manufacturing sec-
tor rather than compensation based data is used as proxy variable to measure wages. There is a
possibility that this variable might not actually reflect wages in an economy dominated by the
service sector. However this is the best option available as data on other potential proxy vari-
ables is scant, or in some cases, non-existent for most of the countries. Secondly, one of the
following three types of unemployment data was used for the case of each country: the unem-
ployment rate of the labour force over 15 years old, the registered unemployment rate, and the
harmonized unemployment rate. Our choice of the particular type of unemployment variable
for each country is motivated by the duration of the data available. It is not expected that this
will qualitatively affect our result as all types of unemployment are highly correlated. Further-
more, the use of country specific OLS estimation does not require a consistent measurement
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of unemployment rate across countries, as a panel regression estimation would for instance.
Data on unemployment rate and wages are obtained from the OECD Main Economic Indicators
database. Finally, quarterly data for GDP per hour is used as the proxy for labour productivity.
Data for this variable is obtainable in annual frequency from the economic data published on
the website of St Louis Federal Reserve Bank. A spline interpolation is used to obtain quarterly
data from available annual data.
2.4.1 Impressions from data
The original Phillips curve relation posits a negative relationship between wage inflation and
unemployment rate. The unstable nature of the Phillips curve has often been noted by authors.
Gali (2011) for instance documents this instability, especially during the period from 1970 to
1985. As a result, the correlation between wage inflation and unemployment becomes weaker
when the sample period is extended to cover the period from the 1960s to the 2010s.
In order to get a crude test of the stability of the negative correlation between unemployment
and wage inflation, we plot scatter diagrams depicting the relationships for each of the 10 coun-
tries. The plots in Figure 2.9 reveal that in most of the countries, there is at least a reasonable
amount of correlation between wage inflation and unemployment. From the figure, the mag-
nitude of the correlations between the two aforementioned variables are generally higher than
0.5. The exceptions are in the cases of Netherlands, Canada and the UK in which relatively low
correlations are reported. The lowest two correlations occur in Canada and the UK. This obser-
vation could potentially hint at the poor empirical fit of the TV-NKWPC to the data of these two
countries.
2.4.2 Results
This section presents the results obtained from the country specific estimations of the TV-
NKWPC. The result for the US is included to facilitate comparison. The specific version of
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the TV-NKWPC estimated is repeated below:
piwt = ϕ1ut + ϕ3pi
z
t + µt + ϕ4γt + γtp¯i
p
t−1
µt = ϕ5 + εt
γt = γt−1 + ηt.
(2.16)
The version of the TV-NKWPC in (2.16) above implies that after taking into account the per-
sistence in wage inflation accounted for by time-varying wage indexation, the possible effects
of lagged unemployment are negligible. The TV-NKWPC estimated in order to investigate the
robustness of our estimation excludes lagged unemployment as an explanatory variable given
its low explanatory power. Table 2.5 gives the estimated coefficients of the TV-NKWPC for the
OECD countries considered in this study.
With the exception of the UK, the estimates for the coefficients of unemployment (ut) are
significant at 1% or 5% in all countries. The magnitudes of these estimates are lowest for
Sweden, Finland, the US and the UK. This may suggest the presence of a relatively higher
degree of nominal wage rigidity in these countries than the others in this study. This finding is
partially corroborated by Dickens et al. (2007) who find that the degree of nominal wage rigidity
is indeed higher in Sweden, Finland, and the US. Also, estimates for Austria, Japan and Norway
suggest that unemployment in these countries are relatively less responsive to changes in wage
inflation than in the others.
There is generally no conclusive evidence in support of the explanatory role of productivity
growth in the TV-NKWPC from the estimation results. For Finland, including this variable re-
sulted in estimates for the TV-NKWPC which are difficult to explain, hence the removal of pro-
ductivity growth from the list of regressors. With the exception of Belgium, Germany, Norway
and the US, country specific estimates for the coefficients of productivity growth (pizt ) imply that
wages are generally more indexed to inflation than productivity growth. This still holds even
when available proxies for productivity other than real GDP per hour are used. Remarkably,
all the country specific estimates for the variance of the shock to the wage indexation process
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Table 2.5: Estimated TV-NKWPC (piwt )
Estimated Coefficients
ut pi
z
t γt ϕ5 ln(σ
2
ε) ln(σ
2
η) AIC
Austria -0.416** 0.226 -0.663** 3.888** 0.541** -4.352** 3.619
(0.088) (0.21) (0.136) (0.477) (0.091) (1.135)
Belgium -0.274** -0.067** 0.582 3.543** -0.258* -4.595** 2.938
(0.074) (0.159) (0.414) (0.717) (0.115) (0.642)
Canada -0.267* 0.2325 1.648* 2.814** 0.274 ** -5.707** 3.438
(0.106) (0.393) (0.723) (0.910) (0.096) (0.768)
Finland -0.151* 1.47 2.68* 0.803** -5.703** 3.99
(0.076) (1.184) (1.272) (0.064) (0.975)
Germany -0.214** 0.355** -0.427** 2.912** -0.664** -3.292** 2.50
(0.031) (0.1) (0.158) (0.268) (0.094) (0.492)
Japan -0.659** 0.193 0.158 2.954** 0.872** -2.433** 4.092
(0.164) (0.292) (0.196) (0.687) (0.098) (0.552)
Netherlands -0.390** 0.091 6.268 5.563** -0.255** -5.97** 3.19
(0.147) (0.233) (4.024) (1.429) (0.132) (1.075)
Norway -0.709* 0.768* 1.053 5.054** 0.988** -3.344** 4.268
(0.314) (0.379) (0.581) (1.008) (0.1) (0.454)
Sweden -0.194* 0.027 2.702 3.305** 0.013 -0.168** 3.272
(0.094) (0.326) (2,108) (0.785) (0.134) (1.326)
UK -0.177 0.399 2.744* 5.368** 0.342* -4.323** 3.77
(0.147) (0.363) (1.091) (0.944) (0.158) (0.578)
the US -0.1** 0.135* 0.765 1.213** -1.134** -7.187** 2.046
(0.043) (0.06) (0.92) (0.398) (0.096) (1.227)
1 The EVIEWS package used for the state-space estimation converged to two sets of estimates for the
UK.The selected output shown in the table has a lower AIC value and has estimates similar to those of
the model used for the robustness checks.
2 Productivity growth was omitted from the list of regressors for Finland since including them yields unin-
tuitive estimates for the coefficient of unemployment.
3 Standard errors of estimates are indicated in parenthesis.
4 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
(ln(σ2η)) are statistically significant at 1% . This result gives credence to the assertion that the
degree of wage indexation is indeed time-varying. Furthermore, the time-varying wage index-
ation expression given in (2.4) requires the following condition to hold for the coefficient ϕ4 in
the presence of positive steady-state inflation: ϕ4 ≤ 0. This condition is due to the following
identity: ϕ4 = −p¯ip. It can be seen from Table 2.5 that with the exception of the UK, all country
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specific estimates for ϕ4 (the coefficient of γt) are either significantly negative or not statistically
significant.
The constant term (ϕ5) is remarkably significant and positive for all countries. In order to
explain this result we recall the following definition, ϕ5 = (1 − φ)piz + pip − (ϕ1 + ϕ2)un. In
other words, ϕ5 is the sum of linear functions of steady-state productivity, steady-state inflation
and steady-state unemployment rate.17 Thus, a significantly positive estimate for ϕ5 in each of
the countries results from the presence of positive steady-state figures for the unemployment
rates and the productivity growth rates in these countries.18
The results indicate a good empirical fit of the TV-NKWPC to the data of the OECD coun-
tries , with the exception being the case of the UK. This is not entirely surprising as it has already
been demonstrated that the correlation between wage inflation and unemployment is lowest for
the UK. In spite of the poor empirical fit of the TV-NKWPC to UK data, the time-varying wage
indexation estimates obtained do follow the reasonable pattern of peaking in the late 1970s and
falling thereafter due to fall in trend inflation since the 1970s.
2.4.3 Explaining the time variation in wage indexation in OECD countries
The results obtained from estimating the TV-NKWPC as presented in Table 2.5 support the case
for time-varying wage indexation in each of the OECD countries: the estimated log variance of
the shocks to time-varying wage indexation (ln(σ2η)) is significant at 1% level for each country.
The estimated time-varying indexation (γˆt) for each the OECD countries is presented in Figure
2.6. While one can be reasonably certain that the estimated degrees of wage indexation for the
US do come close to the figures suggested by the generally accepted proxy for wage indexation,
a similar conclusion is hard to reach for the other countries.19 However, it can be seen from the
estimations that the degree of wage indexation has been falling in the majority of these countries
17Note that by definition −(ϕ1 + ϕ2) > 0
18steady-state inflation (p¯ip) estimates are not statistically significant in most countries as seen from the estimates
for ϕ4 = −p¯ip.
19Most countries in our panel do not keep data on wage indexation. Even though data for percentage COLA
coverage is available for Canada, no study has established its usefulness as a proxy for wage indexation to the best
of our knowledge.
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Figure 2.6: Smoothed estimates for γt
(a) Austria (b) Belgium (c) Canada
(d) Finland (e) Germany (f) Japan
(g) Netherlands (h) Norway (i) Sweden
(j) UK (k) US
since the 1970s. This observation coupled with the observation that the trend inflation rates
in these countries have been falling during the same period lends credence to the estimates.20
20 Theory predicts a positive correlation between trend inflation and the degree of wage indexation.
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For most of the sample period considered, the estimates for the time-varying degree of wage
indexation for Austria, Germany, Japan, Norway and the UK are not statistically significant
at 5%. The highest degree of wage indexation during the high inflation episode of the 1970s
occurred in Belgium.21 This result is not surprising, as this country has an automatic wage
indexation policy which is applicable to all of its workers.
Having established that the estimated degrees of wage indexation (γt) under the TV-NKWPC
do reasonably capture the degree of wage indexation, we now investigate the economic and in-
stitutional variables that explain the evolution of the degree of wage indexation. Gray (1976),
Ragan and Bratsberg (2000), and Attey and de Vries (2011), among others, posit a number of
variables as the factors influencing the level and distribution of the degree of wage indexation.
Some of these variables are the following: real (productivity) shocks, monetary shocks (infla-
tion uncertainty), bargaining power of unions and the number of independent unions involved in
collective bargaining. In particular, the readily available estimates for time-varying wage index-
ation permit one to derive a test of the ‘Gray hypothesis’ (after Gray (1976)) which is captured
in the following equation:
γt = f(σ
2
m, σ
2
z)
∂f
∂σ2m
> 0,
∂f
∂σ2z
< 0, (2.17)
where σ2m denotes the variance of monetary shocks and σ
2
z denotes the variance of real (pro-
ductivity) shocks. The intuition behind this hypothesis lies in the fact that wage indexation
insulates an economy from the effects of monetary shocks, while exacerbating those of real
shocks. An optimal degree of indexation should therefore be close to a full indexation when
monetary shocks are relatively dominant and close to zero when real shocks are relatively dom-
inant. The aforementioned test of the Gray hypothesis can best be described as ad hoc since the
original result on which the hypothesis is based describes the relationship between wage index-
21There is a general misconception that the Belgian wage legislation implies γt = 1 for all the time periods.
However, one has to bear in mind that this full indexation represents the minimum extent of wage adjustment
which cannot be undercut. Thus, it is possible to have a degree of wage indexation above 1 as observed in the late
1970s. Also, legislation put in place in 1989 imposed a maximum wage increase to be around the level of wage
increase in Belgium’s largest trading partners,(see Mongourdin-Denoix and Wolf (2010)). This might explain the
general declining trend in wage indexation in Netherlands, Germany and France since the 1990s.
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ation under optimal monetary policy and the variances of monetary and real shocks. Therefore,
any formal test of the hypothesis requires the assumption on the use of wage indexation as a
policy tool in the conduct of monetary policy. However, the estimations performed in order to
obtain the time-varying degrees of wage indexation variables require no such assumption. This
implies that the observed time variation in wage indexation could either result from the actions
of a policy maker or be an optimal outcome from bargaining between agents (for example the
employers and workers unions as described in Attey and de Vries (2013)).
The wage indexation regression employs four sets of explanatory variables, namely: vari-
ances of monetary policy shocks, variances of productivity shocks, variables indicating the bar-
gaining power of unions, and variables indicating the independence of unions. The quarter-on-
quarter change in trend inflation is used as a proxy variable for the variance monetary shocks.22
The data for quarterly trend inflation is obtained by applying the HP filter on quarterly inflation
data. In order to obtain a proxy variable for the variance of productivity shocks, a GARCH(1,1)
estimation is performed on the quarterly growth in output per hour with the mean equation mod-
eled as an AR(4) process.
The variables employed as proxies for bargaining power are the quarterly changes in union
density (∆unden) and the quarterly growth rate of the number of strikes (∆unstr). Finally, to
get a rough gauge of the independence of unions engaged in a wage bargaining process, we use
three institutional variables namely: coordination of wage setting (crd), the predominant level
at which wage bargaining occurs (lvl), and the mandatory extension of collective agreements by
law to non-organized labour (ext). A high coordination of wage setting among unions, a central-
ized level of wage bargaining nationwide and an existence of a mandatory extension of collective
agreement in one sector to other sectors generally reflect higher levels of interdependence (or
lower levels of independence) among unions.
Annual data on union density and strike variables were obtained from the OECD and ILO
22 The motivation behind the use of this variable stems from the observation that higher levels of trend inflation
are generally associated with higher inflation volatility (variance). Also, the use of trend inflation permits the test
of whether variations in trend inflation affect the negotiations with regards to wage indexation. Finally, the use of
trend inflation as a proxy for the variance of monetary policy shocks enables us to sidestep the problem of common
monetary policy in Eurozone member countries.
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statistics databases respectively. The annual union density data spans the period from 1960 to
2013 while the annual strike data (when available for a specific country) spans the period from
early 1970s to 2013. In order to convert these to quarterly data, it is assumed that the annual
data figures correspond to the last quarter of each year. We then obtain the figures for the other
three quarters by the use of spline interpolation. Finally the three institutional variables used as
proxies for independence of union are available from the ICTWSS database in annual frequency
spanning the period from 1960 to 2011. In order to convert these variables to quarterly data, it
is again assumed that the annual variables correspond to the last quarter of each year and the
same figure is repeated for the previous quarters in the year. This is not only convenient but also
reasonable given the fact institutional variables do not change much over time.
The country specific regression equation estimated is given below:
∆γˆt = α0 + α1∆pi
τ
t−1 + α2σ
2
z,t−1 +
p∑
i=1
βibargi,t−1 +
q∑
j=1
θjindj,t + γt, (2.18)
where γt ∼ N(0, σ2γ). The variables ∆γˆt and σ2z are the quarterly changes in degree of wage
indexation and quarterly variance of productivity shocks. The sets of variables denoted by bargi
and indj represent proxies for the bargaining power of unions and independence of unions re-
spectively. With the exception of variables used as proxies for independence of unions, all
explanatory variables introduced in equation (2.18) are lagged. This is to account for the in-
formational constraints faced by either policy makers or other optimizing agents (unions) when
deciding the wage indexation outcome. However, these constraints do not apply to the labour
market instutional variables employed in this regression due to their considerable lack of time
variation.
It is expected that there is a positive relationship between trend inflation and wage indexa-
tion irrespective of whether wage indexation is derived from the conduct of optimal monetary
policy or is an outcome determined by bargaining agents. This posited relationship is implied in
equation (2.17). The aforementioned equation also predicts a negative relationship between the
variance of productivity shocks and wage indexation.
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In the latter case wherein wage indexation is a bargaining outcome, it is conceivable that
workers index their wages to inflation in order to correct for any perceived erosion in the values
of their real wages that inflation might cause. A rising trend inflation therefore increases the
incidences and the extent of wage indexation. The bargaining power of unions is expected to
have a positive effect on wage indexation. The independence of unions engaged in bargaining
(or independence of negotiations) regarding wage indexation can have both positive and negative
effects on the wage indexation outcome. For instance, the presence of mandatory extension of
negotiated outcomes to all other unions might result in lower aggregate wage indexation if one
bargaining process results in a lower wage indexation outcome when compared to aggregate
wage indexation resulting from independent bargaining processes.
The following table gives a summary definition of the explanatory variables and the expected
signs of their coefficients:
Table 2.6: Expected signs of coefficients
∆piτ change in trend inflation +
σ2z variance of productivity shocks -
bargaining power
∆unden change in union density +
∆unstri growth rate of union strikes +
independence of unions
ext mandatory extension of settlement terms to other sectors +/-
lvl predominant level at which collective bargaining takes place +/-
crd presence of coordination in collective wage bargaining +/-
Table (2.10) in the appendix contains the results of the country specific estimations of equa-
tion (2.18). The table indicates that in most cases, variations in the proxies for independence of
unions do not explains variations in wage indexation. The only exceptions to this result are in
the cases of Austria and Finland whereby coordination between negotiating unions significantly
explains variations in wage indexation. The table also shows that generally, bargaining power
of unions does not significantly influence the degree of wage indexation. The exceptions are the
cases of Finland and Norway, in which the effects of bargaining power of unions are statistically
significant in the hypothesized direction. The estimates for Belgium indicate a significant cor-
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relation between union bargaining power (as measured by union density) and wage indexation
but in a direction contrary to that hypothesized.
The table provides evidence, albeit a weak one, in support of the Gray hypothesis, imply-
ing that wage indexation is decreasing in the variance of productivity shocks. The estimates
have correct signs in a majority of the countries. For Austria, Canada and Finland, variance of
productivity has a significant negative effect on wage indexation. In the case of Belgium and
the US, however, the variance of productivity shocks have significant positive effects on wage
indexation. The fact that wage indexation is automatic (given high levels of inflation resulting
from stagflation or inflationary gaps) may account for the positive correlation between the lag
of the variance of productivity shocks and wage indexation.
The estimated coefficient for lagged variance of productivity is significant and positive, al-
beit of a negligible magnitude for the US. Among all the variables consequential to explaining
the time variation in wage indexation considered, variations in trend inflation is the most sig-
nificant explanatory factor. The coefficients are mostly positive with the exception of those of
the Netherlands and Norway. The results in the case of the Netherlands can be explained by the
‘Wassenaar Agreement’, which in effect moderated wages during the early 1980s when inflation
was observed to be historically high. This explains the negative correlation between the lag of
inflation and the degree of wage indexation.
In this section, the TV-NKWPC was estimated for 11 OECD countries. There is evidence in
support of the existence of a time-varying wage indexation. The country-specific time-varying
degrees of wage indexation estimated indicate the prevalence of high levels of wage indexation
from the 1970s to early 1980s, and a steady decline thereafter. It can also be concluded from
the estimates that variations in trend inflation significantly affect the variations in time-varying
wage indexation. While there is weak evidence in support of the hypothesis that the degree of
wage indexation is decreasing in the variance of productivity shocks in some countries, there
is no conclusive evidence supporting the significance of labour market institutional variables
in explaining wage indexation. The next section includes tests on the robustness of the results
obtained to alternative specifications.
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2.4.4 Robustness: alternative specifications to wage indexation
The relatively better empirical fit of the TV-NKWPC contained in Equation (2.14a) has been
established by the estimations performed so far. However, this specification of the TV-NKWPC
relies on the rather simple assumption of constant indexation to productivity. In order to in-
vestigate how robust the findings in the previous section are to alternative specifications, we
investigate the empirical fit of the TV-NKWPC under two alternative rules for wage indexation
below:
xt+k|t =

0 k = 0
k−1∑
s=0
(
γt+s+1(p¯i
p
t+s + pi
z
t+s+1) + (1− γt+s+1)(pip + piz)
)
k ≥ 1
(2.19a)
xt+k|t =

0 k = 0
k−1∑
s=0
(
γt+s+1p¯i
p
t+s + (1− γt+s+1)pip + φt+s+1pizt+s+1 + (1− φt+s+1)piz
)
k ≥ 1.
(2.19b)
The first indexation rule suggests that wages are indexed at time-varying degrees to the sum
of inflation and productivity growth, while the second indexation rule implies that wages are
indexed to both inflation and productivity growth at their respective time-varying degrees (γt
and φt). The TV-NKWPC in the case of each of the wage indexation rules presented are derived
in the same manner as those in the earlier sections of this paper. The reduced-form TV-NKWPC
in the case of the indexation Equation (2.19a) is given below:
piwt = α
′
t + γt(p¯i
p
t−1 + pi
z
t ) + ψ0ut + ψ1ut−1 + ξt, (2.20a)
where α′t ≡ (1−γt)(pip +piz)− (ψ0 +ψ1)un and all the other parameters retain their definitions
as in the TV-NKWPC expression (2.14a) in the main derivation. The TV-NKWPC associated
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with the indexation rule (2.19b) is:
piwt = α
′
t + γtp¯i
p
t−1 + φtpi
z
t + ψ0ut + ψ1ut−1 + ξt, (2.20b)
where α′t ≡ (1 − γt)pip + (1 − φt)piz − (ψ0 + ψ1)un and all other coefficients retain their
definitions as under (2.14a). In expressing the TV-NKWPC contained in (2.20) in its state-
space form , we assume that the random variable ξt is an iid random variable. This reflects the
findings in the previous section that reject the hypothesis that ξ is an AR process. The time-
varying degree of wage indexation is again assumed to behave like a random walk process in
both cases of wage indexation expressions in (2.19). Estimating the equation (2.20b) requires
one to specify the process for the time-varying degree of indexation of wages to productivity
growth (i.e. φt). Whereas a number of studies exist that lend credence to the assertion that the
degree of indexed wages to inflation (γt) is a function of a random walk process (for instance
trend inflation), nothing in any of the available studies suggests the random walk process for
the degree of wage indexation to productivity growth. Furthermore, suggesting a random walk
process for φt requires one to economically justify why this variable might be non-stationary.
An AR(1) process with a non-zero stationary value is therefore suggested for φt. Thus, the
state-space versions of 2.20 are given in the following two equations:

piwt = ϕ1ut + µt + ϕ2γt + γt(p¯i
p
t−1 + pi
z
t )
µt = ϕ4 + ξt
γt = γt−1 + ηt
(2.21a)

piwt = ϕ1ut + µt + ϕ2γt + ϕ3φt + γtp¯i
p
t−1 + φtpi
z
t
µt = ϕ4 + ξt
γt = γt−1 + ηt
φt = (1− ρφ)φ+ ρφφt−1 + vt.
(2.21b)
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where ξt ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ), ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η), and vt ∼ N(0, σ2v). The variable ut−1 is omitted
among the list of regressors due to its lack of significance in explaining wage inflation as seen
from Table 2.4. Thus, the second AR coefficient in the unemployment equation is set to zero
(φ2 = 0). Also, we only consider the case where p¯i
p
t−1 = pit−1 due to the better plausibility of the
estimated degree of wage indexation under this assumption compared to p¯ipt−1 = pi
(4)
t−1. Finally,
the following definition for the other coefficients in (2.21) in terms of the structural parameters
contained in Section 2.2 are given as follows:
ϕ1 = − λϕ
1− βφ1
ϕ2 = −pip
ϕ3 = −piz
ϕ4 = pi
p + piz − ϕ1un.
The estimates of the two versions of the TV-NKWPC indicated in equation (2.21a) and equa-
tion (2.21b) are respectively presented in Table 2.11 and Table 2.12. Comparing the estimates
obtained in Table 2.5 to those obtained in the two aforementioned tables reveal similarities of the
AIC values of the three versions of the TV-NKWPC. This implies that the relative fit of the three
versions of the TV-NKWPC to data are not considerably dissimilar. Furthermore, the country
specific coefficients of unemployment tend to be roughly similar under the three versions of the
TV-NKWPC. Finally, the figures (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) do reveal generally similar trends in the
variations in wage indexation.
However, it can be seen from comparing the tables (2.5), (2.11) and (2.12) that the AIC val-
ues given in the second of the aforementioned tables are the highest in a majority of the coun-
tries. Additionally, the magnitude of the time-varying wage estimates under the TV-NKWPC
in (2.20a) as shown in Figure 2.7 differ from those under the other two models as presented in
Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.8. For the US, the estimated time-varying degree of wage indexation
under equation (2.21a) at its peak is less than half the estimates obtained under the other ver-
sions (equation (2.16) and equation (2.21b)). It should be noted that the estimates for the degree
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of wage indexation are closer to the figures suggested by percentage COLA coverage under the
latter two models than the first model. The version of the TV-NKWPC in Equation (2.20a) and
its estimated output will therefore be dropped from further analysis in the subsequent part of this
section due to the preceding observations given in this paragraph.
Table 2.12 shows that incorporating a time-varying indexation to productivity growth damp-
ens the evidence that supports the existence of time variation in wage indexation to inflation for
Sweden and the UK. Moreover, the estimates in this table suggest that in the majority of the
countries, the log variance of shocks to the wage indexation to productivity growth is not sig-
nificant at 5% level, implying an absence of evidence for a time-varying process for indexation
to productivity. The estimated coefficients of the time-varying process of wage indexation to
productivity growth are statistically significant (not shown). One can therefore conclude that
the specification of the TV-NKWPC captured in equation (2.16) does adequately describe the
dynamics of wage inflation as well as the time-varying wage indexation process.
2.5 Conclusion and discussion
This study seeks to answer three main research questions. First, is there empirical evidence sup-
porting the existence of time variation in wage indexation and second? Second,is there a way
of estimating time-varying wage indexation using available data? Finally, what variables best
explain the time variations in the degree of wage indexation? In response to the first question,
this study provides ample empirical evidence to back the claim of time variation in the degree
of wage indexation in 11 OECD countries. To this end, it first demonstrates the possible exis-
tence of a specification bias in the estimations carried out in Gali (2011) which are based on the
assumption of a constant degree of wage indexation. A structural model incorporating time vari-
ation in the degree of wage indexation (the TV-NKWPC) is then used to estimate the degree of
wage indexation. The time-varying degree of wage indexation estimates derived for the US are
very similar to estimates suggested by the percentage of COLA coverage figures, a widely ac-
cepted proxy for the time variation in wage indexation. The estimates also show a common trend
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of higher levels of indexation from the 1970s to early 1980s and a steady decline afterwards in
the OECD countries. Furthermore, there is evidence backing the presence of ‘over-indexation’,
i.e. when the degree of wage indexation exceeds 1, in some of the countries during the 1970s .
Subsequent analysis in the study suggests that variations in trend inflation significantly ex-
plain the variations in wage indexation in all countries. This finding is supported by Ascari et al.
(2011), among others. The theoretical prediction in Attey and de Vries (2013) suggests the im-
portance of labour market institutional variables such as independence of unions and bargaining
power in explaining the level of aggregate wage indexation. However, this study yields no ev-
idence in support of this claim in most of the countries. The estimated time-varying degree of
wage indexation obtained provides us with ample opportunity to test the Gray-hypothesis (af-
ter Gray (1976)) that wage indexation is negatively correlated with the variance of productivity
shocks. We uncover some evidence in support of this hypothesis. Given that no assumptions
have been made concerning the derivation of wage indexation, one can interpret this result as
evidence for wage indexation as possibly being the result of some optimization process which
takes the stochastic structure of the economy into account.
While ours is not the first attempt to estimate the time variation in the degree of wage indexa-
tion, our estimates are more similar to the percentage COLA coverage figures than the estimates
found in existing studies. The results obtained in this paper also contrasts with those obtained in
Holland (1986). That paper models wage indexation as an AR(1) process.23 The results obtained
in this study imply that time variations in wage indexation are explained by variations in trend
inflation. The fact that trend inflation is often empirically modeled as a random walk process
supports the process proposed for wage indexation adopted in this study.
Given the empirical documentation of the time variation in wage indexation for at least the
past three decades, one may wonder why the assumption of constant wage indexation seems to
be the norm in macro modeling. Perhaps, the decline in trend inflation over the past two decades,
and the consequent decline in the degree of wage indexation has led the attention of policy
makers away from the consequences of the time variation in the degree of wage indexation. It
23The AR coefficient was estimated at 0.62 for annual data. This should translate to about 0.88 for quarterly data.
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is however still puzzling that current models that investigate the effects of rising trend inflation
neglect rising levels of wage indexation since the two are often observed together. Furthermore,
recent inflationary demand side policies engaged by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
FED imply that the time variation in wage indexation as a result of these policies may become
of importance once again..
The TV-NKWPC model derived and estimated in this study is by no means perfect. It is
possible that variations in trend inflation might not only affect the degree of wage indexation,
but also how wage inflation reacts to unemployment. A possible extension of this model might
adopt an approach similar to that used in Cogley and Sbordone (2008) to derive a version of
NKWPC with all parameters being functions of trend inflation. With such a model, one may be
able to better describe the wage dynamics in OECD countries.
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2.A Intratemporal decision by household members
Given the wage rate Wt(i), a household member i maximizes labour income subject to the
constraint implied by the aggregate labour. The Lagrangian formulation of this intratemporal
problem is given as follows:
max
Nt(i)
Wt(i)Nt(i)di− λ
(
Nt −
[∫ 1
0
Nt(i)
1− 1
 di
] 
−1
)
. (2.22)
We note that λ is a constant since this is a simple intratemporal (static) optimization problem.
Noting that the constraint implied by the aggregate labour is binding permits one to write the
first order conditions associated with this problem in addition to other implied derivations as in
the following expressions:
Wt(i) = λNt(i)
− 1
N
1

t
Wt(j) = λNt(j)
− 1
N
1

t
Wt(i)
Wt(j)
=
(
Nt(i)
Nt(j)
)− 1

.
The final expression is derived by dividing the first expression by the second. Assuming that
Nt(j) = Nt, then Wt(j) = Wt. Noting this allows one to derive the demand for individual
labour type as follows:
Nt(i) =
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)−
Nt. (2.23)
As an intermediate step, both sides of the expression (2.23) are raised to the power 
−1 . The
expression for aggregate wages Wt is then derived in the following expressions:
Nt(i)
−1
 = N
−1

t W
−1
t Wt(i)
1−∫ 1
0
Nt(i)
1− 1
 di = N
−1

t W
−1
t
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
1−di.
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To proceed further, we begin by making the following substitution as implied by the aggregate
labour index: N
−1

t =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)
1− 1
 di. This permits us to derive the following expression for
aggregate wages.
W 1−t =
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
1−di.
The final expression can be rearranged to give the definition for aggregate wages Wt as follows:
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
1−di
] 1
1−
. (2.24)
2.B The Time-Varying New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve
2.B.1 Deriving the structural TV-NKWPC
The problem of a worker optimizing in the current period is to choose the optimal wage rate
(W ∗t ) in order to maximize their utility subject to their budget constraints and their labour de-
mand schedules. In algebraic terms, the problem of the re-optmizing household is to maximize:
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kU(Ct+k|t, Nt+k|k)
]
(2.25)
subject to the aggregate labour demand constraint and the budget constraint given respectively
below:
Nt+k|t =
(
W ∗t Xt+k|t
Wt+k
)−
Nt+k (2.26)
Pt+kCt+k|t + Et+k{Qt+k,t+k+1Bt+k+1|t ≤ Bt+k|t +W ∗t Xt+k|tNt+k|t − Tt+k. (2.27)
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Noting that Ct+k|t and Nt+k|k are both functions of W ∗t , one can derive the first order condition
associated with this problem as follows:
0 =Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
(
∂U
∂Ct+k|t
∂Ct+k|t
∂W ∗t
+
∂U
∂Nt+k|t
∂Nt+k|t
∂W ∗t
)]
=Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
(
(1− )Nt+k|tUC(·)
Xt+k|t
Pt+k
− Nt+k|tUN(·) 1
W ∗t
)]
=Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kNt+k|tUC(·)
(
W ∗t
Xt+k|t
Pt+k
− 
1− 
UN
UC
)]
.
Let the marginal rate of substitution for any household member that resets its wages in time t be
defined as MRSt+k|t = −UN/UC , and letM = /(− 1). The last expression then becomes:
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
[
Nt+k|tUc(·)
(
W ∗t Xt+k|t
Pt+k
−MMRSt+k|t
)]
= 0. (2.28)
There are a couple of points worth noting about the non stochastic steady state version of 2.28
which will be useful for the derivation of the loglinearized version of this equation.
• While prices (P ) and wages (W ) may be non stationary even in the steady state, real
wages (W/P ) are stationary since consumption (C) and labour (N) are stationary in the
non-stochastic steady state. This further implies that the marginal rate of substitution is
also stationary.
• The steady-state value of the indexed part of wages isXt+1|t is 1. Also the definition of the
steady state (absence of any form of nominal rigidity) implies that there is no indexation
(X = 1or x = 0).
• The non-stochastic steady-state version of this equation implies that the following holds:
W
P
=MMRS
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Let µ = logM. In terms of log variables the last expression can be written as follows:
w − p = µ+mrs
µ = w − p−mrs.
One can then loglinearize equation (2.28) as shown in the following steps.
0 =
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
(
W
P
(w∗t − w) +
W
P
xt+k|t − W
P
(pt+k − p)−MMRS(mrst+k|t −mrs)
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
(
W
P
(w∗t − w) +
W
P
xt+k|t − W
P
(pt+k − p)− W
P
(mrst+k|t −mrs)
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
(
(w∗t − w) + xt+k|t − (pt+k − p)− (mrst+k|t −mrs)
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
(
w∗t + xt+k|t − pt+k −mrst+k|t − (w + p−mrs)
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
(
w∗t + xt+k|t − pt+k −mrst+k|t − µ
)
=w∗t /(1− βθ) +
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
(
xt+k|t − pt+k −mrst+k|t − µ
)
.
The final expression implies the following expression for optimal wages set by members of the
household who have the opportunity to set wages:
w∗t =(1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
(
mrst+k|k + pt+k − xt+k|t + µ
)
.
The next step is to express marginal rate of substitution in terms of wages and the indexed part
of wages. We begin by noting that due to perfect risk sharing by members of the household, all
members have identical marginal utility hence identical consumption Ct+k = Ct+k|k. Let the
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utility function of a representative household be:
U(Ct, Nt(i), χt) = logCt − χt
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
di.
The derivation of the expression of marginal rate of substitution of a household member in
period t + k given that they last set their optimal wage rate in period t is given in the following
steps:
MRSt+k|t = −UN/UC
= χt+kCt+k|tN
ϕ
t+k|t
= χt+kCt+kN
ϕ
t+k|t
mrst+k|t = log(χ) + ct+k + ϕnt+k|t
= log(χ) + ct+k + ϕnt+k + (ϕnt+k|t − ϕnt+k)
= mrst+k + ϕ(nt+k|t − nt+k).
The loglinearized version of (2.26) implies ϕ(nt+k|t−nt+k) = −ϕ(w∗t +xt+k|t−wt+k). Making
this substitution permits the last expression for mrst+k|t to be written as follows:
mrst+k|t = mrst+k − ϕ(w∗t + xt+k|t − wt+k). (2.29)
We proceed further by expressing optimal wages by wage setting household members as a func-
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tion of aggregate marginal rate of substitution and other variables.
w∗t =(1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
[
mrst+k|k + pt+k − xt+k|t + µ
]
=(1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
[
mrst+k − ϕ(w∗t + xt+k|t − wt+k) + pt+k − xt+k|t + µ
]
=− ϕw∗t + (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
[
mrst+k − wt+k + pt+k + µ+ (1 + ϕ)(wt+k − xt+k|t)
]
w∗t = (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
[
(mrst+k − wt+k + pt+k + µ)/(1 + ϕ) + wt+k − xt+k|t
]
.
Let wt − pt −mrst = µt and µt − µ = µˆt. Then
w∗t = (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
(
wt+k − xt+k|t − 1
1 + ϕ
µˆt+k
)
. (2.30)
Noting that w∗t = wt|t and that xt+1|t = (xt+k+1|t − xt+k+1|t+1), a step by step derivation of an
intermediate version of the structural NKWPC can be given as follows:
wt+1|t+1 =(1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt+1
(
wt+k+1 − xt+k+1|t − 1
1 + ϕ
µˆt+k+1 + (xt+k+1|t − xt+k+1|t+1)
)
=(1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt+1
(
wt+k+1 − xt+k+1|t − 1
1 + ϕ
µˆt+k+1
)
+ (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kνt+1
=(1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt+1
(
wt+k+1 − xt+k+1|t − 1
1 + ϕ
µˆt+k+1
)
+ νt+1,
where νt+1 = xt+1|t. Multiplying both sides of the last expression by βθ and subsequently taking
expectation conditional on information available at time t, we get the following:
(βθ)w∗t+1 =(1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k+1Et+1
(
wt+k+1 − xt+k+1|t − 1
1 + ϕ
µˆt+k+1
)
+ (βθ)νt+1
(βθ)Etw
∗
t+1 =(1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k+1Et
(
wt+k+1 − xt+k+1|t − 1
1 + ϕ
µˆt+k+1
)
+ (βθ)Etνt+1.
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Next, we replace the time index by making the substitution s = k+ 1. This implies the previous
expression can be alternatively rendered as:
(βθ)Etw
∗
t+1 = (1− βθ)
∞∑
s=1
(βθ)sEt
(
wt+s − xt+s|t − 1
1 + ϕ
µˆt+s
)
+ (βθ)Etνt+1.
Finally, the equation for optimal wages for wage setting household members at time t given in
(2.30) implies the previous equation can be recast as follows:
(βθ)Etw
∗
t+1 =w
∗
t − (1− βθ)
(
wt − xt|t − 1
1 + ϕ
µˆt
)
+ (βθ)Etνt+1.
We recall from the wage indexation expression in (2.4 ) given in the main part of this work
thatxt|t = 0. Noting this, the last expression can be rearranged to result in the following expres-
sion:
w∗t = βθEt(w
∗
t+1 − νt+1) + (1− βθ)(wt − (1 + ϕ)−1µˆt). (2.31)
Aggregate wages in the economy is assumed to be a weighted average of reset wages and in-
dexed wages (those not derived from optimizing). The expression for aggregate wages and the
loglinearized version is presented below:
Wt =
[
θ
(
Wt−1Xt|t−1
)1−
+ (1− θ)(W ∗t )1−
] 1
1−
W 1−t = θ(Wt−1Xt|t−1)
1− + (1− θ)(W ∗t )1−
(1− )W 1−(wt − w) = (1− )
[
W 1−θ[(wt−1 − w) + xt|t−1] + (1− θ)W 1−(w∗t − w)
]
wt − w = θ[(wt−1 − w) + xt|t−1] + (1− θ)(w∗t − w)
which after making the substitution νt = xt|t−1 leads us to this expression
wt = θ(wt−1 + νt) + (1− θ)w∗t . (2.32)
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Substitution of the above expression into that in 2.31 gives the following version of the NKWPC:
piwt − νt = βEt(piwt+1 − νt+1)− λµˆt λ =
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
(1 + ϕ)θ
. (2.33)
2.B.2 Reduced-form TV-NKWPC
Next we derive the reduced form TV-NKWPC. To do this, we introduce unemployment into
equation (2.33) by noting that µˆt = ϕuˆt as explained in the main part of this text. We assume
unemployment is an AR(2) process given as follows:
uˆt = φ1uˆt−1 + φ2uˆt−2 + vt vt ∼ N(0, σ2v).
Let Vt = piwt − νt, and δ = λϕ. We rewrite the expression (2.33) as follows:
Vt = βEtVt+1 − δuˆt.
To solve the difference equation we make an initial guess. We guess that Vt will be a function
of unemployment and its lag. Thus,
Vt = ψ0uˆt + ψ1uˆt−1.
We lead Vt by one time period and take expectation of the resulting expression. This derives the
following sets of equations:
βEtVt+1 = βψ0Et(uˆt+1) + βψ1uˆt
= βψ0(φ1uˆt + φ2uˆt−1) + βψ1uˆt
= (βψ0φ1 + βψ1)uˆt + βψ0φ2uˆt−1.
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We substitute the previous expression for βEtVt+1 into our initial guess Vt = βEtVt+1 − δuˆt to
obtain the following:
Vt = (βψ0φ1 + βψ1 − δ)uˆt + βψ0φ2uˆt−1.
Equating this expression to the initial guess Vt = ψ0uˆt + ψ1uˆt−1 results in the following simul-
taneous equation for the coefficients ψ0 and ψ1:
ψ1 = (βψ0φ2)
ψ0 = (βψ0φ1 + βψ1 − δ).
Solving the simultaneous equations above yield the following expressions for ψ0 and ψ1:
ψ0 = − δ
1− β(φ1 + βφ2)
ψ1 = − βφ2δ
1− β(φ1 + βφ2) .
After making the substitutions uˆt = (ut − un) and assuming the presence of a measurement
error ξt, the reduced form TV-NKWPC can be written as:
piwt = (1− γt)pip + (1− φ)piz + γtp¯ipt−1 + φpizt + ψ0(ut − un) + ψ1(ut−1 − un) + ξt. (2.34)
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2.C Tables and figures
2.C.1 Tables
Table 2.7: AR(2) process for unemployment (ut)
parameter const φ1 φ2 Adj R2
0.299** 1.470** -0.520** 0.953
std err (0.082) (0.054) (0.054)
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Table 2.8: Estimating αˆt = β0 + β1γˆt + εt
p¯ipt−1 = pi
(4)
t−1 p¯i
p
t−1 = pit−1
β0 β1 R
2 β0 β1 R
2
estimate 1.375 ** -0.217 ** 0.167 1.566 ** -0.497 ** 0.584
std err 0.02 0.03 0.0179 0.0351
1 This table estimates the correlation between the time-varying parameters αˆt and γˆt ob-
tained from rolling regression estimates of Equation (2.14a).
2 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Table 2.9: Autocorrelation in ˆ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ˆt−1 0.18** 0.21** 0.14* 0.20**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062
const 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
Adj-R2 0.029 0.042 0.016 0.036
AIC 1.815 1.792 1.77 1.752
Estimation of ˆt = ζ0 + ζ1ˆt−1 + vt
Standard errors of estimates are indicated in parenthesis.
* p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.11: Robustness: Estimating version (2.21a) of the TV-NKWPC
Estimated Coefficients
ut γt ϕ4 ln(σ
2
ε) ln(σ
2
η) AIC
Austria -0.422** -1.253** 4.062** 0.568** -5.249** 3.633
(0.098) (0.377) (0.502) (0.089) (1.257)
Belgium -0.313** 1.236 4.005** -0.372* -4.291** 3.020
(0.100) (0.717) (0.807) (0.150) (0.379)
Canada -0.303** 1.683* 3.252** 0.266 ** -5.758** 3.432
(0.088) (0.766) (0.829) (0.095) (0.654)
Finland -0.121* 0.504 2.463** 0.665** -5.494** 3.806
(0.073) (1.127) (0.727) (0.059) (0.783)
Germany -0.211** -0.880** 3.085** -0.614** -4.549** 2.513
(0.036) (0.288) (0.319) (0.107) (0.645)
Japan -0.701** -0.345** 3.252** 0.742** -1.772** 4.085
(0.184) (0.096) (0.687) (0.119) (0.510)
Netherlands -0.3373** 3.565* 4.728** -0.321* -5.112** 3.145
(0.144) (1.700) (0.957) (0.141) (0.652)
Norway -0.593* 0.280 4.051** 1.001** -3.247** 4.261
(0.302) (0.668) (0.958) (0.096) (0.564)
Sweden -0.187* 2.787 3.156** 0.029 -6.598** 3.261
(0.085) (2.362) (0.680) (0.137) (1.226)
UK -0.106 2.33* 4.737** 0.418** -4.527** 3.800
(0.132) (0.968) (0.835) (0.143) (0.617)
the US -0.11* 9.782 0.281 -1.159** -9.616** 2.046
(0.043) (8.569) (1.359) (0.101) (1.662)
1 Standard errors of estimates are indicated in parenthesis
2 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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2.C.2 Figures
Figure 2.7: Smoothed estimates for γt: Model (2.21a)
(a) Austria (b) Belgium (c) Canada
(d) Finland (e) Germany (f) Japan
(g) Netherlands (h) Norway (i) Sweden
(j) UK (k) US
Figure 2.8: Smoothed estimates for γt: Model (2.21b)
(a) Austria (b) Belgium (c) Canada
(d) Finland (e) Germany (f) Japan
(g) Netherlands (h) Norway (i) Sweden
(j) UK (k) US
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Chapter 3
Implications of Random Wage Indexation
Outcome
‘One man’s wage increase is another man’s price increase’.
–Harold Wilson
3.1 Introduction
Wage indexation links wages to the evolution of some underlying variables which are typically
unobservable when the base contracts are negotiated. The main motivation behind indexing
wages is to reduce the incentive for monetary authorities to create surprise inflation. Indexation
to cost of living (inflation) is widespread in the US. It is implemented in various ways and at
different levels across EU member countries. In terms of coverage for instance, all workers in
Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are entitled by law to have wages indexed to inflation.
In Spain, wage indexation is present in every collective agreement, even though not required by
law (see Mongourdin-Denoix and Wolf (2010)).
Given the widespread nature of wage indexation, it is not surprising to find a substantial
portion of literature devoted to this topic. Two fundamental assumptions made in theoretical
studies on wage indexation and its effect on optimal monetary policy are that the elasticity of
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indexed wages to prices is constant and that policy makers can directly influence this elasticity.
Under these assumptions, results in the seminal paper of Gray (1976), among others, conclude
that optimal wage indexation attenuates the effects of nominal shocks while exacerbating the
effects of real shocks. Empirical evidence documented in Holland (1986) and Ascari et al.
(2011) among others however suggest a time-varying process for the degree of wage indexation.
Furthermore, there is no direct empirical evidence in support of the use of wage indexation by
policy makers as a policy tool.
The first of the two objectives of this paper is to attempt to give a theoretical explanation for
the time variation in the degree of wage indexation. In pursuit of this objective, this study adopts
a different approach to wage indexation than that implied by the assumptions mentioned above.
It is assumed that wage indexation is a bargaining or negotiation outcome between two unions
rather than a potential instrument used by a policy maker in the conduct of optimal monetary
policy.
The main motivation for this approach is based on the following result from Caju et al.
(2008): ‘...With regard to elements entering wage negotiations, prices are the most important
determining factor...’. In other words, wage indexation to prices constitutes the foremost reason
for wage negotiations. Given that mixed strategies are part of the generalized solution sets to
bargaining problems and other games, wage indexation outcome does not necessarily need to be
constant. An implication of non-constant wage indexation as a bargaining outcome is the diffi-
culty policy makers might face in its use as a policy instrument. Therefore any optimal monetary
policy can only take into account the properties of the distribution of wage indexation. This is
especially the case when policies are formulated before the realization of the wage indexation
outcome. The bargaining outcomes derived in this study imply continuous distributions for the
degree of wage indexation.
The second objective of this study is to investigate within a small theoretical macro model
the implications of the bargaining outcomes regarding wage indexation. To this end, we derive
an AS curve that differs from the standard Lucas supply curve in that it exhibits a Brainard type
multiplicative uncertainty. It is subsequently shown that the popular linearized solution around
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the deterministic steady state can differ wildly from the truly stochastic stationary solution. As
Woodford (2003, p.142) aptly writes: ‘But my interest in the present study is in the identification
of better monetary policies within the class of policies under which inflation is never great. In
fact, I make extensive use of approximations that are expected to be accurate only for the analysis
of policies of that kind’. We show that even in our simple macro model the usual linearization
dramatically alters the stochastic properties of the macro variables. This result echoes that of
Babus and de Vries (2010). Even though it is standard practice in macroeconomics to use linear
approximations, we show that it is also very important to consider the effects of linearization on
the stochastic properties of the model solution.
This study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 derives wage indexation as a bargaining or
negotiation outcome. Section 3.3 derives the AS curve based on the random wage indexing
outcome derived. Section 3.4 investigates the implications of random wage indexation for the
conduct of optimal monetary policy and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Wage indexation as a bargaining outcome
Early applications of game theory to bilateral bargaining have been motivated by the alternating-
offer game, first suggested by Stahl (1972). Kennan and Wilson (1988) compare the theoretical
characteristics of wage bargaining games to the empirical properties of strike data. They con-
clude that while attrition models appear to fit Canadian data better, the properties of US data are
best described by screening models. In this work we consider two main settings under which
wage indexation bargaining occurs: one requires the presence of an arbitration party while the
other does not.
The number of independent wage indexation negotiations in an economy can vary, depend-
ing on how centralized and regulated the wage bargaining system is. The aggregate wage index-
ation outcome will be a weighted average of all the outcomes from the individual negotiations.
Let xi be the wage indexation outcome from an individual negotiation. Assume there are m
bilateral negotiations conducted. Further assume that aggregate wage indexation is simply the
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average of all individual indexations. The aggregate indexation is as follows:
x =
1
m
m∑
i=1
xi
The aggregate indexation is in itself, a random variable with its expected value the expectation
of the individual indexation. Its variance is given as follows:
V ar(x) =
1
m
V ar(xi)
From the previous expression it can be seen that the variance of aggregate wage indexation is
decreasing in number of negotiations. In other words, a relatively centralized and regulated
wage bargaining system has a larger variance in wage indexation outcome.
In each of the bargaining processes considered in this study, we assume that the value of the
object is public information. For instance, if bargaining is done over the deviation of inflation
from its expected value, the value of this differential is known and is the same to both bargaining
parties .
Bargaining with arbitration
Theoretical and empirical studies on wage negotiations in the presence of arbitration reveal
two main sources of uncertainty in the negotiation outcomes. One source of uncertainty is the
random element of an arbitrator’s preferred settlement as found in Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984)
and Bloom (1988). The other source is the inherently random offers and counteroffers from the
two parties involved in the negotiation. The bargaining with arbitration model in this part of our
work falls under the latter class of models. We describe the bargaining setting in the presence of
arbitration in what follows.
Consider the bargaining setting under which workers unions and employers unions bargain
over the degree of indexation. The workers union prefers a full indexation (i.e. when wage
indexation is 1). The employers union prefers a zero wage indexation. Thus, the outcome of
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the bargaining process lies within the interval [0, 1]. Both bargaining unions have to inform the
arbitrator of their respective offers to each other.
Let ω and  represent the offers of the workers union and employers union respectively.
Furthermore, let the payoff from the bargaining process be pw and pe for the workers union and
the employers union respectively. Based on offers made by each of the negotiating parties, the
arbitrator awards the following payoff to the workers union (pw)1:
pw(ω, ) =
 1− (ω − ) if ω > −(ω − ) if ω <  . (3.1)
Thus, if the employers union is more generous than the workers union, the latter receives the
differential between the former’s bid  and the its own bid ω. In other words, the degree of
wage indexation in this case becomes ( − ω). By implication, the employers get 1 − ( − ω).
Conversely, if the workers union is the more generous party, then it accomplishes a 1− (ω − )
degree of wage indexation. The employers retain (ω − ).
This payoff structure ensures that neither party can be too generous with its offer since the
resulting payoff might be very little. Also, neither party can offer too little to the other since
doing so might make them worse off. These two repelling forces give rise to a mixed strategy
equilibrium under which the parties draw from the following uniform distribution:2
F (ω) = ω ω ∈ [0, 1]. (3.2)
Here, ω is the symmetric mixed strategy bid offered by a bargaining party. Let A be the bar-
gaining outcome (payoff) for the workers union (i.e. A = pw(ω, )). It is is shown in Appendix
1A symmetric payoff structure applies to pe.
2See Appendix 3.A.1 for the derivation of the mixed strategy equilibrium.
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3.A.1 that
FA(a) = a.
Averaging the bargaining outcome across the m number of independent negotiations, one
derives the following distribution for the aggregate bargaining outcome.
Pr[A¯m ≤ a] = 1
m!
∑
i
(−1)j
(
m
j
)
(ma− j)m+ . (3.3)
The above class of distributions have expected value 1/2. The special case m = 1 yields the
uniform distribution, which has the highest variance.
War of attrition
Strikes and other forms of industrial actions are known to occur when labour negotiations break
down. War of attrition models are frequently used to describe strike data (see Geraghty and
Wiseman (2008) for example). In this game, we assume that strikes are used by unions to force
concessions from each other. We briefly describe the setting of the second bargaining setup in
what follows in this section.
Consider a setting under which the workers union resorts to strikes in order to achieve any
degree of wage indexation. Assume each party bears costs proportional to the duration of the
strike. Further assume that each union’s cost is private information. The duration of holdouts
for each of the unions involved depends on the maximum costs it is willing to incur, hereinafter
referred to as the union’s bid. The union that bids the highest wins the value of the differential
between 1 and the losing union’s bid. The losing union loses the value of its bid (cost).
Let the bids of workers union and employers unions be respectively ω and . The payoff
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structure of a striking workers union is:
pw(ω, ) =
1−  if ω > −ω if ω <  . (3.4)
The payoff structure in (3.4) implies each union has the incentive not to concede given that it
does not concede right at the beginning (when bid is 0). However, the strike cannot continue
indefinitely since the bid (cost) eventually outweighs the value contested (i.e. 1). This gives
rise to a mixed strategy equilibrium concerning the amount of bid (cost) to lose. While some
pure equilibrium strategies exist for this bargaining setup, our interest lies in the mixed strategy
equilibrium.
It is worth noting that the payoff structure in (3.4) allows for negative payoffs even for the
winning union. Imagine a situation in which both unions have a common but incorrect valuation
of the inflation differential (which has been normalized to 1) during the strike. In particular, if
the actual value of the inflation differential is much less than the perceived value, a union’s bid
can exceed the actual inflation differential. This implies that there is a possibility of negative
wage indexation even if the workers union wins concessions.
It is shown in Appendix 3.A.2 that the solution to this game involves a mixed strategy over
an exponential distribution and is as follows:
F (ω) = 1− e−ω. (3.5)
Let B be the payoff to the workers union under war-of-attrition type bargaining (i.e. B =
pw(ω, )). In Appendix 3.A.2, we derive the following distribution of B:
FB(b) =
[
1
2
+
e2b−2
2
]
1(0<b≤1) +
[
e2b−2
2
+
e2b
2
]
1(b≤0)
The above distribution is a mixture distribution with a mean of 0. The support suggests that
a negative wage indexation bargaining outcome is possible. Also, this outcome is bounded from
72 Implications of Random Wage Indexation Outcome
above. In the absence of over-indexation, the upper limit to the wage indexation bargaining
outcome is 1. This value is obtained when the employers union immediately concedes to the
workers unions, such that  = 0.
Algebraically deriving the distribution of the average bargaining outcome of m indepen-
dent negotiations (B¯m) is rather tedious. However, simulations show that a normal distribution
approximates it as as m increases.
From bargaining outcome to wage indexation
In the subsequent part of this study, it is assumed that wages are indexed to inflation. If indexa-
tion results from bargaining in the presence of an arbitrator, then the outcome is between 0 and
1. However the possibility of indexing to output could cause wages to change more than the
change in inflation from its expected value upon which contracts were previously negotiated.
Furthermore, high observed inflation could serve as a trigger for workers to demand wage in-
creases more than the deviations of inflation from their expected values. To account for these
possibilities, we define aggregate wage indexation in the two cases of bargaining considered
above as follows:
xt = κaA¯m κa ≥ 1 (3.6)
xt = 1 + κw − B¯m κw ≥ 0, (3.7)
The random outcome of wage indexation in our model only partially explains the origins of
the randomness in the wage indexation parameter, but does not explain its persistence as would
be suggested by Holland (1986). Again, according to our model, only exogenous forces drive the
randomness, which might not be fully representative of real world observations. For instance, it
is known that workers agitate for indexed wage contracts when inflation is observed to be persis-
tently high in the economy. In addition to acknowledging the just mentioned observations, we
maintain that this study offers an exploratory glimpse into the effects of the random component
of wage indexation. In the subsequent sections, we examine the implications of random wage
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indexation on optimal monetary policy.
3.3 Macroeconomic model
Indexed wage contracts allow wages to be automatically adjusted in the event that actual inflation
differs from the expected. Wage indexation was modeled as a bargaining or negotiation outcome
in the previous section. Following this result, we assume it is an iid random process. The
adaptive indexation rule is as follows:
wt = Et−1w∗t + xt(pt − Et−1pt), (3.8)
where wt, w∗t , pt and Et−1 denote the log levels of the indexed wage rate, the labour market
clearing wage rate, the price level and the expectation operator respectively. The xt denotes the
iid random degree of wage indexation with mean x. This variable reflects the uncertain outcome
of the bargaining process, which is here taken exogenous to the model. Thus all labour contracts
earn a wage rate equal to the expected market clearing rate Et−1w∗t plus an extra compensa-
tion proportional to the difference between the actual inflation rate and expected inflation. The
indexation rule (3.8) is a slightly modified version of that found Gray (1976) in that it is time
varying instead of constant.
Assume that output Y is produced by a fixed coefficient Ricardian technology Y = ZNa,
where a < 1 reflects diminishing marginal returns to scale. Productivity shocks are captured
by the iid random variable Z, where z = lnZ has a zero mean. Further assume that industry
is perfectly competitive, so that profits are zero. Labour demand then derives from the profit
optimization condition equating the real wage with the marginal productivity of labour:
Wt
Pt
= aZtN
a−1
t .
Let small case letters denote the log values of their upper case counterparts. Solving for labour
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demand gives
ndt =
ln a
1− a −
1
1− a(wt − pt) +
1
1− azt
= δ0 − δ1(wt − pt) + δ1zt, (3.9)
where δ0 = (ln a) / (1− a) and δ1 = 1/ (1− a). The labour supply function derives from
household’s optimization problem. Without further ado we assume that labour supply is upward
sloping in the real wage rate:
nst = β0 + β1(wt − pt). (3.10)
In the absence of any nominal rigidity, solving (3.9) and (3.10) gives the labour market clearing
wage rate w∗t and equilibrium employment n
∗
t . These are written below:
w∗t =
δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+ pt +
δ1
δ1 + β1
zt (3.11)
n∗t =
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+
δ1β1
δ1 + β1
zt. (3.12)
Equilibrium log output y∗t is then derived by substituting( 3.12) into the following expression for
log output: yt = andt + zt. The resulting expression for the market clearing equilibrium output
is
y∗t = a
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+
(
aδ1β1
δ1 + β1
+ 1
)
zt. (3.13)
Due to wage indexation, the labour market may not clear. The aggregate supply function
can then be obtained by substituting the expression for the indexed wage into the labour demand
function and defining the output gap as yt − y∗t . Appendix 3.B gives a detailed derivation of the
following aggregate supply function under wage indexation:
yt − y∗t = At(pit − Et−1pit) + czt (3.14)
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where c = aδ21/(δ1 + β1) and the slope of the ‘Lucas style’ supply curve is
At = aδ1(1− xt) = a
1− a(1− xt). (3.15)
Note that the slope in (3.15) is not fixed but random due to the random degree of wage indexation
x. Also, it is possible to have a negatively sloping AS curve when there is over-indexation (i.e.
κa > 1).
The aggregate supply curve with a random coefficient has less restrictions than the one with
a constant coefficient.3 One implication of expression (3.15) is the possibility that aggregate
supply could become vertical in the short run, mimicking the long run aggregate supply curve,
when xt = 1. For example, if wages are fully indexed, xt = 1, as can be the case in Belgium,
then the real wage rate equals the expected labour market clearing real wage rate. The expected
output gap in this case is zero and does not depend on the level of inflation.
3.4 Wage indexation and optimal monetary policy
This section investigates the conduct of monetary policy in the presence of an AS curve with a
random slope. Brainard (1967) conducts a similar analysis on the effects of the random slope
parameter on the conduct of policy. The analysis contained in this section differs from that in
the aforementioned study in one main respect: there is no uncertainty in the dependence of the
output gap on our policy instrument (interest rate). We however view the analysis contained in
this section as complementary to that by Brainard (1967).
3.4.1 FED versus ECB
The result from the analysis performed in this part of the study is not a direct consequence of
time variation or the random nature of wage indexation. Nevertheless, we find it interesting to
3The idea of a time-varying Phillips coefficient is not new. Aside the investigation of the effect of time-varying
Phillips coefficient by Brainard (1967), Cogley and Sbordone (2008), Swamy and Tavlas (2007) and Hondroyiannis
et al. (2009) also estimate the New Keynesian Phillips Curve with time-varying coefficients.
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investigate optimal monetary policy in the presence of both forward looking expectations and
lagged expectations. In the previous section we derived the following AS schedule with lagged
expectations for the output gap gt:
gt = yt − y∗t = At(pit − Et−1pit) + µt (3.16)
where µ = czt. We complete the macro model with the following NK type IS curve:
gt = −B(it − Etpit+1) + γgt−1 + εt, (3.17)
where i is the nominal interest rate. Note that the NK version of the IS curve, in contrast to the
supply schedule, has forward looking expectations. Except for the random coefficient At and
the lagged expectations Et−1pit in the AS schedule, our model is a textbook NK macro model.
We turn to discussing policy rules that are generated by alternative objectives.
The Maastricht treaty dictates that the ECB targets an inflation level pˆi. A second order
approximation to welfare makes the policy loss function quadratic in missing the target. Thus,
the ECB loss function is given by
L = Et−1
[
(pit − pi)2
]
.
The treaty gave discretion to the ECB and left pi open. The ECB has decided pi = 2%. We
assume that interest rates are used as intermediate targets to stabilize inflation at its optimal
level in the case of inflation targeting. Quite a different objective applies to the FED. By law
the FED is required to minimize a weighted average of the squared deviation of output and
inflation from their respective targets. Assuming equal weights on inflation stabilization and
output stabilization, the loss function can be written down as in the following:
L = Et−1
[
(gt − ĝ)2 + (pit − pi)2
]
.
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These are the standard types of objective functions found in most macro textbooks. Interestingly,
while one often finds a treatment with the inflation objective being given zero weight, the other
extreme of the ECB objective with zero weight on the output gap is much less common.
Before we can solve for the optimal rule, we state the assumptions on the distributions of the
innovations µt, εt and At. All three are iid innovations that are also cross sectionally indepen-
dent. The additive terms µt and εt have zero mean. For now it suffices to assume that E [A] > 0
and finite, while it also holds that E [1/A] 6= 0 and E [|1/A|] < ∞, E [1/A2] < ∞, i.e. the
inverse also has a finite first and second moment.
We derive the optimal interest targeting rate rule under the FED type objective and ECB
inflation objective. Consider the following Taylor type interest rate rule:
it = pi +
γ
B
gt−1. (3.18)
By the IS curve (3.17) and AS curve (3.16), this rule implies that
Et−1
[
gt
At
]
= Et−1
[−B(pi − Etpit+1) + εt
At
]
= Et−1
[
1
At
]
B (Et−1pit+1 − pi)
= Et−1
[
At(pit − Et−1pit) + µt
At
]
= 0.
Given the above expression for the expected output gap and the assumption made regarding
distribution of the noise terms, we know the following holds:
Et−1pit+1 = pi
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Moreover, Equation (3.17) implies that
Et−1 [gt] = Et−1 [−B(pi − Etpit+1) + εt]
= B (Et−1pit+1 − pi) = 0.
Thus, the output gap is a pure white noise which is the following:
gt = εt.
The time shifted IS curve implies
pit+1 = Etpit+1 +
εt+1 − µt+1
At+1
.
Given that Et−1pit+1 = pi, it follows that Et−1pit = pi is model consistent, i.e.
pit = pi +
εt − µt
At
. (3.19)
With these expressions at hand, the loss function of the FED can be written as
L = Et−1
[
(gt − ĝ)2 + (pit − pi)2
]
= Et−1
[
ε2t + 2ĝεt +̂2]+ Et−1 [(pit − Et−1pit)2]+ (Et−1pit − pi)2
= σ2ε + ĝ
2 +
(
σ2ε + σ
2
µ
) (
σ21/A + E[1/A]
2
)
One shows that no other targeting rule can lower this loss level.
Interestingly, it directly follows from (3.19) that the same targeting rule also minimizes the
ECB objective. The two targeting rules coincide due to the fact that under the rule (3.18), the
output gap is pure white noise. The deeper reason is that the IS curve has forward looking
expectations so that current shocks and policy actions are taken into account by the public,
eliminating the scope for discretionary policy actions. Thus while the Maastricht treaty has
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provided a commitment device against dovish central bankers, it serves no purpose since the
public is forward looking on the demand side.
3.4.2 Stochastic properties of equilibrium inflation
We showed in the foregoing analysis that interest targeting under the ECB objective or the hybrid
FED objective requires the same targeting rule and leads to the same equilibrium inflation rate
in (3.19). We repeat this equation below:
pit = pi +
εt − µt
At
.
We now proceed to investigate the stochastic properties of this solution. But first we note that
in case of the more traditional fixed coefficient specification for the AS curve, with At = A¯ for
instance, the same targeting rule (3.18) is optimal and implies
pit = pi +
εt − µt
A
. (3.20)
Under the ECB objective it is apparent that it = pi+(γ/B) gt−1 is optimal asL =
(
σ2ε + σ
2
µ
)
/A
2
.
The fixed coefficient specification also follows from the linearization of the wage indexation rule
(3.8) around the deterministic steady state. The latter practice is commonly used in solving more
complex DSGE models. However, this practice is not innocuous as we now intend to argue.
Consider the first moment of (3.19) and (3.20). Taking expectations directly reveals that
Et−1pit = pi under either specification. Moreover, for the variance
σ2pi =
(
σ2ε + σ
2
µ
) (
σ21/A + E[1/A]
2
)
in the case of (3.19), while (3.20) implies
σ2pi =
(
σ2ε + σ
2
µ
) 1
A
2
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which is not much of a material difference except for the fact that we expect the variance of
inflation under the random aggregate supply slope to be larger than the linearized version.
Nevertheless, the fluctuations in inflation are not necessarily well captured by the first two
moments. To see this, assume a specific distribution for At. Suppose that At follows a beta
distribution on [0, 1]4 such that
P{At ≤ x} = xα, α > 2.
The slope of the AS curve varies between the diagonal and a vertically positioned curve. The
fact that zero is in the support makes it possible that the AS curve assumes its long run position.
Furthermore, note that the m-th central moment of A equals (α + 1) / (m+ α + 1).
The distribution of the inverse of At can then be derived as follows:
Pr
{
1
At
≤ q
}
= Pr
{
At ≥ 1
q
}
= 1− Pr
{
At ≤ 1
q
}
= 1− 1
qα
.
The last expression is a Pareto distribution with support [1,∞). By assuming that α > 2, it read-
ily follows that the moment conditions assumed earlier are satisfied, i.e. E [1/A] = α/ (α− 1)
and E [1/A2] = α/ (α− 1)2 (α− 2). This not withstanding, all moments m > α are un-
bounded. Thus 1/A has fat tails and can easily take on large values.
Since inflation is a function of the inverse ofAt, inflation also follows a fat-tailed distribution.
This is different for the output gap, which was shown to equal white noise εt; as long as εt is well
behaved, this is transferred to gt. But even though At itself is nicely behaved, in the sense that it
has all moments bounded, this is different for the inverse. A fat-tailed distribution for inflation
4While this assumption might appear somewhat arbitrary, it should noted that a beta distribution approximates
the distribution of the wage indexation outcome derived in 3.3 under some conditions. For instance, consider
aggregate wage indexation as an outcome of the bargaining with arbitration process outlined in Section 3.2. Further
assume that κa = 1 and a = 1/2 . The resulting distribution for At for m → ∞ is symmetric around 1/2 and
resembles a beta(m,m) distribution. Furthermore, it is a bounded distribution on the unit interval.
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implies that the economy experiences relatively high inflation more often than is predicted under
the assumption that inflation is for instance normally distributed (which most linearized models
implicitly do). Moreover, similar to Babus and de Vries (2010), it follows that the behavior
of inflation derived from the linearized version (3.20) is quite different as only the stochastic
properties of εt and µt would matter.
3.5 Conclusion
In spite of empirical evidence pointing to the contrary, most studies on wage indexation are based
on the assumption that wage indexation is constant. In this study, we derive wage indexation
as a mixed strategy bargaining outcome. It is subsequently shown that both the exponential
distribution and the uniform distribution are possible outcomes regarding the distribution of
wage indexation. The resulting AS schedule derived differs from the standard ones in that it has
a random slope coefficient. Using this AS relation, we subsequently investigate the effects the
random nature of wage indexation has on the conduct of policy.
We also show how a FED based hybrid objective and an ECB type inflation goal imply the
same interest rate targeting rule in the context of our model. Strictly speaking, this is not a direct
consequence of the random nature of wage indexation. Rather, it is a consequence of having
both forward looking expectations and lagged expectations in the macro model we constructed.
We also show how the stochastic properties of inflation implied by a linearized AS schedule
differ dramatically from those of the true stationary solution. While the stationary distribution
of inflation from the true model implies quite extreme fluctuations in inflation, the linearized
model smoothens this feature away. As the recent financial crisis has shown us, the effects of
extreme fluctuations in economic variables cannot be ignored. However, as shown in this work,
this is precisely what is implicitly done by linearizing models.
Even though this study is to the best of our opinion the first to attempt to explain the source
of the randomness in wage indexation, it has some shortcomings. The study models wage in-
dexation as an exogenous process whereas it is empirically established that wage indexation (as
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proxied by COLA adjusted contracts) depends on the level of inflation. Furthermore, it is plau-
sible that variables pertaining to the labour market institutions do affect the distribution of wage
indexation. The derivation in this study however does not incorporate this fact. We hope to pick
these issues up in a future research.
3.A Derivation of mixed strategy equilibrium
3.A.1 Bargaining under arbitration
Consider the following payoff structure under bargaining in the presence of an arbitrator.
pw(ω, ) =
 1− (ω − ) if ω > −(ω − ) if ω < .
Suppose F is the mixed-strategy equilibrium with density f(ω), the expected payoff of a party
who offers ω against the other party’s mixed strategy is5
EU(ω) =
∫ ω
0
pw(ω, )dF () +
∫ 1
ω
pw(ω, )dF ().
It holds that the offer ω maximizes the above expression given that F is a mixed strategy equi-
librium. Hence, the following expression should hold:
∂EU(ω)
∂ω
= 0.
After substituting the expressions for the payoff functions into the expected payoff function, we
get the following expression:
EU(ω) =
∫ ω
0
(1− ω + )dF () +
∫ 1
ω
(−ω + )dF ().
5See Baye et al. (2009) for a formal definition of symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
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By noting that F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1 and by the use of integration by parts, the above
expression can be easily rendered as follows:
EU(ω) = F (ω) + (1− ω) +
∫ 1
0
F ()d.
Maximizing this expression with respect to ω yields the simple differential equation
f(ω) = 1,
which after considering the boundary conditions F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1 has the same solution
as indicated in Section 1 of the text:
F (ω) = ω. (3.21)
Distribution of payoff
The payoff pw is dependent on the difference between the bids offered by the bargaining parties.
Let Z be the difference between the workers union’s bid and that of the employers union. In
other words,
Z = ω − 
Given the unit uniform distributions for ω and , it follows that Z has the following density
function:
fZ(z) = (1 + z)1{−1≤Z≤0} + (1− z)1{0<Z≤1}.
The symbol 1 denotes the indicator function which takes on a value of 1 if the statement in the
subscript holds true and 0 otherwise.
Let A be the payoff of the workers union from the bargaining game. It should be noted that
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the payoff structure implies that A is always positive and lies within the unit interval. Therefore,
in the absence of over-indexation, this payoff is the individual wage indexation outcome. A can
be expressed in terms of Z as follows:
A = (−Z)1{−1≤Z≤0} + (1− Z)1{0<Z≤1}.
The distribution of A can be derived from the distribution of Z since the former variable is a
function of the latter variable. A step-by-step derivation of the distribution of A is as follows:
Pr(A ≤ a) = Pr(−Z ≤ a)1{−1≤Z≤0} + Pr(1− Z ≤ a)1{0<Z≤1}
= Pr(Z ≥ −a)1{−1≤Z≤0} + Pr(Z ≥ 1− a)1{0<Z≤1}
=
∫ 0
−a
(1 + z)dz +
∫ 1
1−a
(1− z)dz
= a− a
2
2
+
a2
2
FA(a) = a.
Thus, it can be concluded that the individual wage indexation bargaining outcome is uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, 1].
3.A.2 War of attrition
Assume that the negotiating parties (a and b) bid ω and  respectively. The payoff structure to
this war of attrition game can be written as follows:
pw(ω, ) =
1−  if ω > −ω if ω < .
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The expected utility under a mixed strategy equilibrium with distribution F is given by the
following expression:
EU =
∫ ω
0
f()d− ω
∫ ∞
ω
f()d
=
∫ ω
0
f()d− ω[1− F (ω)].
Maximizing this with respect to ω and equating to 0 allows us to derive the first order condition
as follows:
f(ω)
1− F (ω) = 1.
Solving the above equation while taking into consideration that F (0) = 0, we arrive at the
following solution:
F (ω) = 1− e−ω. (3.22)
Distribution of payoff
The payoff for the workers union under the war-of-attrition type bargain is distributed on the
support −∞ ≤ pw ≤ 1. In deriving the distribution of the payoff, it is worth to note that a
particular realization of the payoff depends on the difference between the workers union’s bid
and that of the employers union (ω − ). Let B be the payoff to workers. The expression for B
is as follows:
B = (1− )1ω> + (−ω)1>ω
In order to derive the probability distribution function for B, we first derive the distributions
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under the following case: ω > .
Pr(B ≤ b) = Pr(1−  ≤ b, ω ≥ )
= Pr( ≥ (1− b), ω ≥ )
=
∫ ∞
1−b
e−
(∫ ∞

e−ω dω
)
d.
Solving the integral above yields the following distribution function ofB on the support [B ≤ 1]:
FB(b) =
e2b−2
2
Similarly, a distribution function for B when  ≤ ω is derived in the following equations.
Pr(B ≤ b) = Pr(−ω ≤ b,  ≤ ω)
= Pr(ω ≥ −b,  ≤ ω)
=
∫ ∞
−b
e−ω
(∫ ∞
ω
e− d
)
d.
Solving the integral above yields the following distribution of B on the support [B ≤ 0].
FB(b) =
e2b
2
Summing up the respective distributions under the two cases, one derives the following mixture
distribution for the random wage indexation bargaining outcome (B):
FB(b) =
1
2
[1 + e2b−2]10<b≤1 +
1
2
[e2b−2 + e2b]1b≤0
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3.B The Aggregate supply schedule
We derive the AS schedule (3.14) from the main text. The expected market clearing wage rate
follows from (3.11) in the main text. It is as follows:
w∗t =
δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+ pt +
δ1
δ1 + β1
zt.
By taking expectations and recalling the zero mean assumption regarding productivity shocks
zt, we obtain the following expression:
Et−1w∗t =
δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+ Et−1pt.
Substitute this into the expression for wage indexation rule (3.8) to get:
wt = Et−1w∗t + xt(pt − Et−1pt)
=
δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+ Et−1pt + xt(pt − Et−1pt).
Hence the real wage rate is:
wt − pt = (xt − 1)(pt − Et−1pt) + δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
.
Given that the labour market does not clear at this real wage rate, the rationed level of
employment follows from substitution into the labour demand schedule (3.9)
ndt = δ0 − δ1(wt − pt) + δ1zt
=
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
− δ1(xt − 1)(pt − Et−1pt) + δ1zt.
The output gap then follows from the above and the expression for market clearing output (3.13)
y∗t = a
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+
(
aδ1β1
δ1 + β1
+ 1
)
zt.
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as follows
yt − y∗t = gt = andt + zt − y∗t
= a
β1δ0 − β0δ1
δ1 + β1
− aδ1(xt − 1)(pt − Et−1pt) + aδ1zt + zt − y∗t
= −aδ1(xt − 1)(pt − Et−1pt) + aδ1zt −
(
aδ1β1
δ1 + β1
)
zt
= aδ1(1− xt)(pt − Et−1pt) + a δ
2
1
δ1 + β1
zt.
The final expression gives us the expression for the aggregate supply relation:
yt − y∗t = At(pt − Et−1pt) + czt,
where At = aδ1(1− xt), and c = aδ21/ (δ1 + β1).
Chapter 4
Random Wage Indexation and Monetary
Policy
‘Accepting that the world is full of uncertainty and ambiguity does not and should not stop
people from being pretty sure about a lot of things’.
–Julian Baggini
4.1 Introduction
The bulk of the literature on wage indexation assumes a constant degree of indexation. While
this assumption might describe the empirical reality during the recent periods of low and stable
inflation, the degree of wage indexation has been observed to exhibit a substantial amount of
time variation. For instance, the percentage of contracts in the US with cost-of-living-adjustment
(COLA) clauses has been observed to rise from 31% in the mid 1960s to 61% in the mid 1970s
(see Weiner (1996)). Given that percentage COLA coverage is a widely accepted proxy for the
degree of wage indexation, one can conclude that the degree of wage indexation is not constant.
Furthermore, results from recent studies provide evidence in support of the time variation in
the degree of wage indexation. Analysis by Holland (1986) and Ascari et al. (2011) show that
the degree of wage indexation is positively correlated to inflation uncertainty. Empirical studies
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documenting substantial time variation in inflation uncertainty imply a substantial time variation
in the degree of wage indexation.
Even though the assumption of a constant degree of wage indexation may describe the be-
haviour of wage indexation only for recent times, the effects of wage indexation under this
assumption have nevertheless been shown to be quite consequential. The seminal study on wage
indexation, Gray (1976) examines the effect of wage indexation on the conduct of monetary
policy. Results of this paper show that wage indexation insulates the real sector of the economy
from nominal or monetary shocks, but tends to make the effects of real shocks worse. Jadresic
(1998) also investigates the effects of constant wage indexation. The indexation rule employed
in the aforementioned study differs from that of previous studies in that it assumes an indexation
to lagged inflation scheme. It is shown that indexation to lagged inflation destabilizes output.
It is conceivable that the time variation in the degree of wage indexation adds another di-
mension to the implications of wage indexation for macroeconomic stability. The purpose of
this study is to theoretically investigate the additional implications that come with time vari-
ation in wage indexation. In particular, we investigate the macroeconomic consequences of
independent and identically distributed (iid) shocks to the degree of wage indexation. Empirical
estimates either imply an autoregressive (AR) process or a near random-walk process for the de-
gree of wage indexation which contrasts with the iid assumption regarding wage indexation we
make in this study. We nevertheless work with iid shocks to wage indexation in order to obtain
preliminary insights into the effects of time variation in the degree of wage indexation. Attey
(2015) estimates the time-varying degrees of wage indexation for 11 OECD countries. Figure
4.1 presents the country specific estimates and their 95% confidence bounds. The estimates
reveal three main properties of the degree of wage indexation.
First, there is a substantial time variation in the degree of wage indexation in all countries.
This observation provides further evidence for the time-varying nature of wage indexation. Sec-
ond, the empirical estimations do not give a conclusive view on whether the distribution of wage
indexation is bounded or not. The process assumed for the degree of wage indexation implies
an unbounded distribution for this variable. However, it can be seen from Figure 4.1 that es-
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timates of the degree of wage indexation do not generally stray much from the unit interval.
Thus, one cannot conclusively rule out the possibility of bounded distributions for wage index-
ation. Finally, the estimates of the degree of wage indexation can lie outside the unit interval.
For instance, the estimates of the degree of wage indexation were significantly less than 0 for
the Netherlands since the beginning of the 1980s. Also, the estimates show that the degree of
wage indexation for Belgium was above 1 during the mid 1970s. It is also worth noting that
wage moderation was sometimes agreed upon during periods of stagflation, thus resulting in the
negative correlation between lagged inflation and wage inflation.1 These two observations stand
in contrast to conventional wisdom that wage indexation should be on the unit interval.
Key among the results of this study is that the unconditional distributions of inflation, the
output gap and the interest rates can potentially exhibit heavy-tailed characteristics. This result
relies on the assumption that wage indexation is random and can lie outside the unit interval.
Thus it is implied that countries with full indexation schemes are more likely to have heavy-
tailed distributions of variables than countries with a degree of wage indexation which lies within
the unit interval. Also, a Taylor rule targeting current inflation outperforms a rule that targets
past inflation regarding the minimization of the loss function. The analysis employed in deriving
this study’s results assumes that wage indexation is iid uniformly distributed. While this implies
taking a definite stand on the boundedness of the distribution of wage indexation, assuming
otherwise does not qualitatively alter the main results.
Recent empirical studies including Grier and Perry (1996), Chang (2012) and Caporale et al.
(2012) employ the use of various versions of GARCH models to estimate inflation and inflation
uncertainty. The relatively good fit of these models imply that the unconditional distribution
of inflation exhibits tails heavier than that of a normal distribution. Furthermore, Fagiolo et al.
(2008) conclude that in the majority of OECD countries, the distribution of output growth ex-
hibits tails heavier than those of the Gaussian distribution. Contrary to this empirical evidence,
the class of new Keynesian models commonly used for macroeconomic analysis typically imply
that inflation and the output gap have normal unconditional distributions.
1The so-called Wassenaar Agreement in the Netherlands in 1982 is a widely known example of this case.
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This study can be seen as an attempt to theoretically explain the source of the heavy tails in
the aforementioned macroeconomic variables. Other approaches to explaining the presence of
heavy tails involve the assumption of Student-t distributed error terms (see Curdia et al. (2012)
and Chib and Ramamurthy (2011) for example). De Grauwe (2012) criticizes this exogenous
approach of introducing the fat tail, maintaining that it does not shed light on how endogenous
clustered volatility can be generated. The approach in this study involves a multiplicative shock
similar to that first espoused by Brainard (1967) and later adopted by Attey and de Vries (2011).
Following the latter study, it is assumed that the random degree of wage indexation is the source
of the multiplicative shocks. The role of these multiplicative shocks is to amplify extreme real-
izations of the lag of inflation. This results in tails heavier in the unconditional distribution of
inflation than would be expected under the normal distribution.2 These heavy tails are passed on
to the distribution of the output gap and the interest rate.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 derives the Phillips curve
under the assumption of random degree of wage indexation. Section 4.3 investigates optimal
monetary policy. Section 4.4 investigates monetary policy under two alternative policy rules.
The performances of these policy rules are subsequently compared to that of optimal monetary
policy under random wage indexation. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Wage indexation and the Phillips curve
The representative firm has a fixed coefficient Ricardian production technology with labour as
the sole input.3 Assuming diminishing marginal returns to labour, the expression for output, Yt,
is:
Yt = AtN
α
t 0 < α < 1,
2The inflation process derived under random wage indexation exhibits a random AR coefficient.
3 McCallum and Nelson (1999) argue that modeling variations in capital stock as exogenous is largely consistent
with empirical observation.
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where Nt is the amount of labour employed in production. The logarithmic level of total factor
productivity, At, follows a stationary AR process. The process is given below:
logAt = at = ρaat−1 + εat,
Figure 4.1: Degree of wage indexation in selected OECD countries. Source: Attey (2015)
(a) Austria (b) Belgium (c) Canada
(d) Finland (e) Germany (f) Japan
(g) Netherlands (h) Norway (i) Sweden
(j) UK (k) US
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where the iid random variable εat, has the following distribution: N(0, σ2a). Firms maximize
profit with respect to labour inputs. Thus, marginal productivity of labour should be equal to
real wages. Let δ0 = logα/(1−α) and δ1 = 1/(1−α). The following equation gives the labour
demand in log values:
nt = δ0 − δ1(wt − pt) + δ1at. (4.1)
Labour supply in micro-founded models is typically derived from the optimization condi-
tions of the representative household. Let the labour supply relation be given as follows:
nt = β0 + β1(wt − pt) β1 > 0,
where the parameters β0 and β1 are functions of the parameters governing household prefer-
ences. The market clearing wage implied by the labour supply and labour demand relations
is:
w∗t =
δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+ pt +
δ1
δ1 + β1
at. (4.2)
The corresponding market clearing output is obtained by substituting this expression into the
labour demand (or the labour supply) relation and again substituting the resulting expression in
the expression for aggregate output. This gives the log market clearing output (y∗) as:
y∗t = α
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+
(
1 + α
δ1β1
δ1 + β1
)
at.
4.2.1 Wage indexation
Fischer (1988) among others argues that informational lags make it impossible to index wages
to current inflation. At a particular point in time, any available information concerning inflation
relates to either inflation forecasts or lagged inflation, and not current inflation. In view of this,
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we consider an indexation scheme with indexation to a period’s lagged inflation as follows:
wt = w
∗e
t + xt(pit−1 − pˆi), (4.3)
where wt, w∗t , and xt are respectively the nominal wages, market clearing nominal wages and
time-varying wage indexation respectively. Inflation is denoted by the variable pit. The super-
script e in the model denotes the expectations of private agents. It is assumed that the inflation
target announced by the policy maker (pˆi) effectively captures the expected inflation on which
basis wage contracts are set a period in advance. While this assumption may come across as
ad hoc, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) constant target of 2% can be cited as evidence in
support of our assumption.
The wage indexation variable xt effectively captures the elasticity of wages to lag of prices.
Some of the country-specific estimates for xt provided in Figure 4.1 suggest the possibility of
over-indexation (when xt > 1). We therefore assume that xt ∼ U(0, κa), where κa > 1, in order
to allow for this possibility.
Wage indexation under a rule given by (4.3) may even exacerbate the destabilizing effects
of monetary shocks. This runs contrary to the finding in Gray (1976) that wage indexation
insulates the economy from monetary shocks. The reason behind the differing results lies in the
way wages are indexed. Gray (1976) considers an indexation scheme under which wages are
indexed to current inflation while we assume that wages are indexed to lag of inflation. This
implies that real wages are flexible most of the time.
Take expectations of the market clearing wage in (4.2) and substitute the resulting expression
into (4.3). This gives the following expression for real wages in the presence of wage indexation:
wt − pt = δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+
δ1
δ1 + β1
aet − (pt − pet ) + xt(pit−1 − pˆi). (4.4a)
It is worth noting that (pt − pet ) = (pit − piet ). Following our earlier assumption, the expected
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inflation is equal to the target inflation, i.e. piet = pˆi. This implies that (4.4a) can be rewritten as:
wt − pt = δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+
δ1
δ1 + β1
aet − (pit − pˆi) + xt(pit−1 − pˆi). (4.4b)
4.2.2 Aggregate supply or the Phillips curve
The aggregate supply is derived by substituting out real wages in (4.1) with (4.4b). This gives
the log labour demand as a function of inflation, lagged inflation and productivity. The output
is subsequently computed by noting that yt = αndt + at. Section 4.A.1 gives a more detailed
derivation of the aggregate supply equation.
Let λ1t = αδ1xt and λ2 = αδ1 . Further assume that the output gap is defined as the
deviation of log output under wage indexation from the log market clearing output level , i.e.
gt = (yt − y∗t ). The expression for the AS curve is:
gt = −λ1tp˜it−1 + λ2p˜it + ut, (4.5)
where ut = [αδ21/(δ1 +β1)]εat. The variable p˜it is the deviation of inflation from target inflation,
i.e. pit − pˆi.
The aggregate supply relation in (4.5) implies a time-varying response of the output gap to
the lag of inflation. This is due to the assumption that wages are indexed to lag of inflation.
If the degree of wage indexation is positive (xt > 0), the lag of inflation has a negative effect
on the output gap. In other words, indexation just increases the labour cost thereby decreasing
output. A negative indexation resulting from a wage moderation response to high levels of
lagged inflation implies a positive effect of the lag of inflation on output. This suggests that
wage moderation as a response to high levels of lagged inflation increases output beyond the
level determined by total factor productivity shocks (ut) and current inflation.
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4.3 Monetary policy
This section derives inflation, the interest rate and the output gap under optimal monetary policy
and two interest rate rate rules. The set-up adopted in solving for optimal monetary policy is
similar to that of Clarke et al. (1999). A major distinction between our model and Clarke et al.
(1999) lies in the slope parameter of the Phillips curve. The Phillips curve in our model has a
random slope coefficient as opposed to the conventional constant slope Phillips curve employed
in the the study by Clarke et al. (1999).
We earlier on assumed that the degree of wage indexation is an iid random variable dis-
tributed as follows: x ∼ U [0, κa], where κa > 1. While the uniform distribution suggested
as the distribution of the degree of wage indexation might seem ad hoc, Attey and de Vries
(2013) show that it can be a mixed equilibrium outcome of wage indexation bargaining under
arbitration.
4.3.1 Optimal monetary policy
We now investigate the effect of random wage indexation to lagged inflation. The interest rate is
introduced into the model by incorporating the aggregate demand or the IS curve. The aggregate
demand relation is given as follows:
gt = yt − y∗ = −φ(it − p˜iet − r) + vt vt ∼ iid N (0, σv), (4.6)
where r corresponds to the natural rate of interest which is assumed to be constant and vt is a
demand shock uncorrelated with productivity and the random wage indexation.
In deriving the optimal monetary policy, we make the following assumptions: the policy
maker uses the interest rate (it) as an instrument, all bargaining with regards to wage indexation
in the economy are concluded at the beginning of the current time period, and private agents
do not observe the aggregate wage indexation outcome. For all purposes, the aggregate wage
indexation outcome can also be viewed as a supply shock, uncorrelated to productivity shocks.
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The use of the interest rate as the instrument requires the policy maker to observe the supply and
demand shocks in order to react before the private sector does. The expected inflation can be
derived from the expressions (4.5) and (4.6) to obtain the following:
p˜iet = −
φ
λ2 − φ(i
e
t − r) +
λ1
λ2 − φp˜it−1 λ1 = λ
e
1t
. (4.7)
Alternative forms of the expression (4.6) can be derived by expressing inflation and the output
gap in terms of the control variable it and state variables (pit−1 and the random shocks), as well
as substituting in (4.7) as follows:
gt = −φ(it − iet )−
φλ2
λ2 − φ(i
e
t − r) +
φλ1
λ2 − φp˜it−1 + vt (4.8a)
gt = g
e
t − φ(it − iet ) + vt. (4.8b)
Similarly, analogous expressions can be derived for the aggregate supply relation as follows:
p˜it = − φ
λ2
(it − iet )−
φ
λ2 − φ(i
e
t − r) + λ3tp˜it−1 +
1
λ2
(vt − ut) (4.9a)
p˜it = p˜i
e
t −
φ
λ2
(it − iet ) +
ηt
λ2
p˜it−1 +
1
λ2
(vt − ut), (4.9b)
where λ3t = φλ1/[λ2(λ2 − φ)] + λ1t/λ2 and ηt = λ1t − λ1 .
Optimization problem of the policy maker
It is assumed that the policy maker targets both inflation and the output gap. In particular, they
seek to stabilize both gt and p˜it at 0, albeit without necessarily placing equal weights on both
objectives. Let θ be the weight the policy maker places on inflation stabilization. The loss
function of the policy maker is:
Lt = g2t + θp˜i2t θ ≥ 0.
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We consider the case of optimal monetary policy under commitment, thus requiring the
policy maker to take into account the effect of its policy on the expectations of agents in the
economy. This requires the presence of another constraint in addition to (4.8a) and (4.9a) (or
alternatively (4.8b) and (4.9b)) as follows:
iet = Et−1it. (4.10)
The policy maker aims at minimizing all current and future losses stemming from deviations
of the output gap and inflation from their respective targets. Let β be the discount factor and
Et−1 be the expectation of the policy maker. The optimization problem of the policy maker is
given as follows:
max
it,iet
Et−1 −
∞∑
t=1
βtLt
s.t. (4.8a), (4.9a) and (4.10). (4.11)
The constraint (4.9a) is dynamic in p˜i. In stabilizing current inflation and the output gap,
one has to be mindful of the intertemporal effects of one’s actions on the subsequent period’s
inflation. Thus, we can conclude that the optimization problem is a dynamic one with p˜it as the
endogenous state variable. The Bellman formulation of the expression (4.11) is given as:
V (pit−1) = max
it,iet
Et−1
[−g2t − θp˜i2t + βV (p˜it)]
s.t. (4.8a), (4.9a) and (4.10). (4.12)
Following Clarke et al. (1999), we argue that since the problem is of linear-quadratic nature
as far as the endogenous state variable is concerned, and owing to the independence of the ex-
ogenous state variables ut and vt, the value function must also be quadratic. Thus, we conjecture
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the following value function:
V (p˜it−1) = γ0 + 2γ1p˜it−1 + γ2p˜i2t−1.
Let the variable Λt−1 be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the commitment con-
straint indicated by (4.10). We write down the first order conditions associated with the problem
as follows:
0 = 2φ[gt + p˜it(θ/λ2)− (γ1 + γ2p˜it)(β/λ2)]− Λt−1
0 = −2φ[get (1− λ2/(λ2 − φ)) + p˜iet (θ/λ2 − θ/(λ2 − φ)) + (γ1 + γ2p˜iet )(β/λ2 − β/(λ2 − φ))] + Λt−1.
The sum of the last two expressions derives the following expression:
0 = 2φ[(gt − get ) + (p˜it − p˜iet )(θ − βγ2)/λ2] + 2φ[λ2get + (θ − βγ2)p˜iet − βγ1]/(λ2 − φ).
(4.13)
Taking expectation of the above expression yields
0 = 2φ[λ2g
e
t + (θ − βγ2)p˜iet − βγ1]/(λ2 − φ). (4.14)
Substitute the expressions (4.8b) and (4.9b) into (4.13) to obtain an expression in terms of
the control variables. The derived optimal feedback rule after imposing (4.14) and subsequently
simplifying is given below:
0 = [−φ(it − iet ) + vt]
(
1 +
θ − βγ2
λ22
)
−
(
θ − βγ2
λ22
)
(ut − ηtp˜it−1). (4.15)
For the value function to be concave in p˜i, we require that γ2 < 0. Therefore, we know that
1 + (θ − βγ2)/λ22 6= 0. This implies that under optimal control, [−φ(it − iet ) + vt] is a function
of ut and ηtp˜it−1. We also know that iet − r (and p˜iet ) under optimal control must be a function of
the endogenous state variable , p˜it−1. Thus it follows from (4.9a) that under optimal policy, we
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can conjecture the following for the inflation process:
p˜it = a+ bp˜it−1 + δηtp˜it−1 + cut, (4.16)
where a, b, δ and c are parameters to be determined. For the value function to be concave,
and thus, for the existence of a solution to the maximization problem, it is required that β(b2 +
δ2σ2η) < 1. Appendix 4.A.2 derives the process for equilibrium inflation under optimal control,
which is
p˜it = b
(
1 +
ηt
λ1
)
p˜it−1 − b
λ1
ut, (4.17)
where
b =
[(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1]−
√
[(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1]
2 − 4β(λ1λ2)2(1 + σ2η/λ21)
2βλ1λ2(1 + σ2η/λ
2
1)
.
(4.18)
There are a few points worth noting about the behavior of the value representing the mean
persistence of inflation (b) under optimal monetary policy. First, this parameter is always pos-
itive and it is bounded from above by x¯. This implies that under random wage indexation to
lagged inflation, the mean persistence in equilibrium inflation is at most the mean of the aggre-
gate wage indexation. This maximum occurs when the weight of inflation stabilization in the
policy maker’s loss function is 0 (θ = 0). To see this, define a = (λ22+θ) and y = β(1+σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1
thus permitting the mean persistence to be written down as follows:
b =
(a+ y)−√(a+ y)2 − 4λ22y
4y
κa,
whereby we made the substitution λ2 = 2λ1/κa. Taking all other parameters as given, this
function assumes its extremum value when the derivative with respect to the variable y equals
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zero (∂b/∂y = 0). The expression for this derivative is
∂b
∂y
=
−a√(a+ y)2 − 4λ22y + a(a+ y)− 2λ22y
4y
√
(a+ y)2 − 4λ22y
κa.
Imposing the first order maximization condition and simplifying the above expression further
yields y2λ22(λ
2
2 − a) = 0. The necessary condition for maximization is therefore satisfied if any
combination of the following expressions holds: λ2 = 0 and a = λ22. Reasonable estimates of
the output elasticity to labour input in a Cobb-Douglass production function4 imply that α > 0,
thus ruling out the condition λ2 = α/(1− α) = 0.5 The remaining condition for maximization
implies θ = 0 at which b is at its maximum irrespective of the value of the variance of wage
indexation. We now show that the extremum value of b is indeed the maximum if θ = 0. In order
to do this, we show that for θ > 0 the following must hold: ∂b/∂y < 0. This requires that either
any or all of the following expressions must hold: λ2 < 0, y < 0, and λ22 < a. As indicated
earlier, all reasonable estimates in earlier studies imply that λ2 > 0. This rules out the first
condition. We know that the second condition is also ruled out since y = β(1 + σ2η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1 > 0.
This leaves us with the condition λ22 < a which implies θ > 0.
Second, b is strictly decreasing in θ. This can be seen from the partial derivative of b with
respect to θ. The derivative is
∂b/∂θ = (∂b/∂a)(∂a/∂θ) =
√
(a+ y)2 − 4λ22y − (a+ y)
4y
√
(a+ y)2 − 4λ22y
< 0.
The average persistence of inflation is therefore smaller when the policy maker attaches more
weight to inflation stabilization in their loss function and it is zero in the extreme case when the
policy maker targets only inflation (i.e. θ =∞).
Third, there are two cases in which the mean persistence of inflation assumes the highest
value: when the production function exhibits constant marginal returns to labour (α = 1) and
4The production function in this study can be considered as a Cobb-Douglass function with capital normalized
to 1.
5 Estimates from Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) give the value of 1−α to be between 0.339 and 0.35 while
values widely used in literature on Real Business Cycle range from 1/3 to 0.4.
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when the policy maker does not put any weight on stabilizing inflation (θ = 0). In the former
case, the effects of productivity and the output gap on inflation are zero, implying that the per-
sistence in inflation is solely determined by wage indexation. With regards to the latter case, an
intuitive explanation can be given as follows: in the absence of any commitment to inflation sta-
bilization, the expected persistence in equilibrium inflation is solely determined by how much,
on the average, economic agents index to past inflation. Therefore, in order to disinflate an
economy characterized by high persistent inflation, monetary authorities need to be committed
to an inflation stabilization policy. This is in line with the empirical observation that inflation
is less persistent under inflation targeting than under the absence of any form of commitment to
stabilizing inflation.6
Equilibrium inflation under optimal monetary policy
That inflation is a persistent phenomenon is a well known observation. Most new Keynesian
models incorporate inflation persistence by assuming that prices are indexed to lagged inflation.
Jadresic (1998) and Perez (2003), among others, introduce inflation persistence by indexing
wages to lagged inflation. The latter study concludes that persistence in inflation is higher, the
higher the proportion of labour contracts that include indexation clauses. There is one fun-
damental difference between our study and the last two studies cited: wage indexation in our
model is a random outcome rather than a given constant. The variance of the aggregate wage
indexation outcome also affects the mean persistence of inflation in the economy. Consider the
expression for expected equilibrium inflation:
p˜iet = bp˜it−1.
The expression for ∂b/∂y in the preceding section implies that the average persistence of in-
flation (b) is a decreasing function of the variance of wage indexation, σ2x = σ
2
η/λ
2
2. In other
words, on the average, past inflation is less important in explaining current inflation the higher
6Literature that report this finding include Gerlach and Tillman (2012) and Kuttner and Posen (2001).
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the variance of aggregate wage indexation. The conditional variance of inflation under optimal
control can be derived from (4.17) as follows:
σ2pi =
b2
λ21
(σ2ηp˜i
2
t−1 + σ
2
u). (4.19)
The expression above reveals that the conditional variance in inflation depends on three vari-
ables: the variance of wage indexation, lagged inflation and the variance of productivity shocks.
The effects of lagged inflation and the variance of productivity shocks are unambiguous; they
increase the conditional variance of inflation. However, no concrete conclusion can be drawn
with regards to the effect of the variance of wage indexation on the conditional variance of in-
flation under general conditions. Under the rather specific assumption that the lagged inflation
is at its target (i.e. p˜it−1 = 0), it can then be concluded that the variance of wage indexation has
a decreasing effect on the variance of inflation. To see this, one must first note that the higher
the variance in wage indexation (captured by the variable σ2η), the lower the average persistence
in inflation (b), and thus the lower the variance of inflation holding all other variables constant.
Interest rate under optimal monetary policy
The expression (4.56) substituted into (4.57) (both found in Appendix 4.A.2) gives an interest
rate rule to which a policy maker has to adhere when conducting optimal monetary policy. After
making the substitution a = 0 and further simplifications, the interest rate rule under optimal
monetary policy is given below:
it = r + bp˜it−1 +
λ1 − bλ2
λ1φ
(λ1tp˜it−1 − ut) + 1
φ
vt. (4.20)
As will be shown later, the expression above is reminiscent of the Taylor rule in that it contains
a sort of reaction function to inflation and the output gap. The expression for inflation under
optimal control as given in (4.17) and the implied output gap derived from (4.5) can be written
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as follows:
p˜it = (b/λ1)[λ1tp˜it−1 − ut]
gt = −(1− bλ2/λ1)[λ1tp˜it−1 − ut].
A substitution of the former of the above two expressions into (4.20) permits the rendition of the
interest rate rule under optimal monetary policy into a more recognizable form as follows:
it = r + bp˜it−1 +
λ1 − bλ2
bφ
p˜it +
1
φ
vt. (4.21)
The last expression indicates a reaction function of the interest rate to lagged inflation and cur-
rent inflation. In addition to the variables just mentioned, it also reacts to demand shocks vt as
per the assumptions made when solving the optimal control problem in Appendix 4.A.2. Given
reasonable values for the model’s structural parameters, the coefficients of p˜it and vt are all
greater than 1. This suggests an aggressive reaction to deviation of these variables from 0, thus
ensuring determinacy of the model under this rule.
4.3.2 Two simple interest rate rules
In what follows in this part, we examine monetary policy under two types of Taylor rules: one
that targets current inflation (hereafter denoted by CTR) and the backward looking Taylor rule
(hereafter denoted by BTR). These rules are given in the following expressions:
it = r + ωcp˜it (4.22)
it = r + ωbp˜it−1. (4.23)
The rules considered above are similar to those considered in Gali and Monacelli (2005). Be-
sides, as can be seen in the preceding paragraphs, the equilibrium output gap (gt) under optimal
control is a linear function of inflation thus permitting the interest rate rule to be expressed in
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terms of shocks and inflation only. In the case of the BTR, the policy maker reacts to lagged
inflation. A motivation for considering this version of the Taylor rule can be drawn from the
same reasoning as to why one should consider wage indexation to lagged inflation: policy mak-
ers may not have information on current shocks during policy formulation and implementation.
The other expressions needed for the analysis are the aggregate demand or the IS curve and the
aggregate supply or the Phillips curve equations. They are repeated here below.
λ2p˜it = λ1tp˜it−1 + gt − ut
gt = −φ(it − p˜iet − r) + vt.
After substituting the Taylor rule (4.22) into the IS equation, a compact representation of the
linear system is given below:
Ac
 p˜it
gt
 = Bc,t
 p˜it−1
gt−1
+Cc
 p˜iet
get
+Dc
 ut
vt
 , (4.24)
whereAc =
 λ2 −1
φωc 1
; Bc,t =
 λ1t 0
0 0
; Cc =
 0 0
φ 0
 andDc =
 −1 0
0 1
.
Let the vectorX be defined as [p˜itgt]′ and vector t be defined as [utvt]′. The above representation
can further be simplified to get the following
Xt = Fc,tXt−1 +GcEt−1Xt +Hct,
where Fc,t = A−1c Bc,t,Gc = A
−1
c Cc andHc = A
−1
c Dc. It is shown in Appendix 4.B that the
solution to the above system of equations is
Xt = Pc,tXt−1 +Hct, (4.25)
wherePc,t = [Fc,t +Gc(I−Gc)−1Fc]. The solution is basically an autoregressive system with
time-varying coefficients. Unlike its counterpart in extant literature investigating determinacy
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under a Taylor rule, the eigenvalue criterion for determinacy is not applicable. If the coefficient
matrix Pc,t were constant, then the obvious requirement for such a system to be determinate
will be that both eigenvalues of the matrix must lie within the unit circle. Given the random
nature of the coefficient matrix, the Kesten conditions are used to verify the existence of a stable
asymptotic unconditional distribution of both the output gap and inflation. Algebraic verification
of the Kesten conditions in the case of monetary policy under the two Taylor rules are rather
tedious. We therefore resort to numerical computations using the MATLAB programme to verify
the conditions.
The solution derived in (4.25) implies the following expressions for equilibrium inflation
and the output gap under the CTR:
p˜it = [λ1t/∆ + φλ1/(∆
2 − φ∆)]p˜it−1 + [1/∆]vt − [1/∆]ut (4.26)
gt = [−λ1t(φωc)/∆ + (φλ1λ2)/(∆2 − φ∆)]p˜it−1 + [λ2/∆]vt + [φωc/∆]ut, (4.27)
where ∆ = λ2 + φωc. Let Λ = φ(λ1 − φωb)/(λ2 − φ). A similar derivation procedure in the
case of the BTR permits us to derive the equilibrium process for inflation and the output gap as
follows:
p˜it = [λ1t/λ2 + Λ/λ2]p˜it−1 + [1/λ2]vt − [1/λ2]ut (4.28)
gt = Λp˜it−1 + vt. (4.29)
Comparing the equilibrium output gap under the CTR (4.27) with its counterpart under the BTR
(4.29) reveals a difference in the conditional distributions of the output gap under the two rules:
while the conditional distribution under the CTR is not normal, that under the BTR is normally
distributed if one assumes a normal distribution for vt.7 The CTR therefore comes closer to
mimicking the optimal monetary policy as far as conditional distribution of the output gap is
concerned. If the Kesten conditions are satisfied, the unconditional distribution of all variables
7To see this, note that Λ is a function of constant parameters. Thus the conditional distribution of gt under the
BTR depends only on the distribution of vt.
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are heavy tailed under both Taylor rules.
4.4 Evaluation of alternative policy rules
This section carries out a quantitative analysis of the two policy rules and compares the equi-
librium dynamics of inflation, the output gap and the interest rate obtained under these rules to
those obtained under optimal monetary policy in the previous section. The loss function used in
deriving the optimal monetary policy in Section 4.3 reveals a hybrid stabilization policy that tar-
gets both inflation and the output gap. In the new Keynesian literature, a similar welfare function
is derived as a second order approximation of the representative consumer’s utility function.8 In
such a case, the relative weight placed on inflation stabilization is a function of structural pa-
rameters in the new Keynesian model. We restate the objective function of the policy maker
below:
W = −
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
(
g2t + θp˜i
2
t
)
. (4.30)
In Gali and Monacelli (2005), it is noted that for β → 1, the loss function can be rewritten
in terms of the unconditional variances of the output gap and inflation. The logic behind the
expression of (4.30) in terms of these variances differs from that of Gali and Monacelli (2005).
Assume β → 1 and that the loss function can be approximated as a sum of instantaneous losses
over a finite time horizon. A step by step approximation of (4.30) is given below:
W ≈ −E0
T∑
t=0
βt
(
g2t + θp˜i
2
t
)
= −TE0
T∑
t=0
βt
1
T
(
g2t + θp˜i
2
t
)
≈ −T [var(gt) + θvar(pit)],
8Woodford (2003) contains such derivations.
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where T is an arbitrarily large number. Given the ordinal nature of the measurement of the loss
of the policy maker, any monotonic transformation of the last expression should be an adequate
measure for the loss of the policy maker. We therefore express the loss function as follows:
V = −[var(gt) + θvar(pit)]. (4.31)
The existence of stationary distributions for the output gap and inflation once Kesten conditions
are satisfied guarantees a finite variance. The version of the loss function contained in (4.31)
will be used to rank the rules and the performance of optimal monetary policy. The calibration
in this section is carried out with respect to the dynamics of the output gap, inflation and the
interest rate in the economy of the Euro area.
Recap of the calibrated models
We compare the dynamics of inflation, the output gap and interest rate under the optimal mon-
etary policy and the two Taylor rules. In order to get a lucid comparison of the distributions,
we include a version of the model under which inflation under optimal policy has a non ran-
dom persistence (OCW). In other words, we assume that λ1t = λ1 in the OCW model. Each
of the calibrated models can be summarized by the following three expressions: the aggre-
gate supply or the Phillips curve, the aggregate demand curve and the interest rate rule. Let
ϕ = (λ1 − bλ2)/(bφ). Table 4.1 gives a summary of the models employed in the calibrations.
It should be noted that the definition of the coefficient b given in (4.18) changes under the
OCW. Recall that wage indexation is assumed constant at its mean under the OCW. Thus, the
variance of wage indexation and by implication σ2η are both 0. The average persistence under
the OCW (b¯) and the corresponding value under the ORW (b) are stated below:
110 Random Wage Indexation and Monetary Policy
b¯ =
[(λ22 + θ + βλ
2
1]−
√
(λ22 + θ + βλ
2
1)
2 − 4β(λ1λ2)2
2βλ1λ2
b =
[(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1]−
√
[(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1]
2 − 4β(λ1λ2)2(1 + σ2η/λ21)
2βλ1λ2(1 + σ2η/λ
2
1)
.
Parameter values
We derive the values of the parameters used in the calibration exercise from three main sources.
They are Amisano and Tristiani (2010), Gali and Monacelli (2005) and our own estimations.
There are some cases in which directly corresponding values of certain parameters in the source
literature are not available. In these cases, we construct values based on a set of related parame-
ters obtained from the literature. The next three paragraphs give a more detailed explanation on
how some parameter values are set for the calibration.
The constant in the labour supply equation (β0) is set to 0. Using a different value does
not change our results in any significant way. Besides, there is no constant term in most mi-
cro founded derivation of the labour supply curve found in literature.9 It is assumed that the
policy maker places twice as much weight on output stabilization as they place on inflation sta-
bilization. Thus, we assume that θ = 0.5. Following Gali and Monacelli (2005), we set the
coefficients of inflation in both Taylor rules at 1.5 (ωc = ωb = 1.5).
The values of the interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand (φ), the standard deviation of
the aggregate-demand shocks (σv), and the wage elasticity of labour supply (β1) are not directly
available from the estimates in Amisano and Tristiani (2010). We express these parameters
as functions of available estimates under some plausible assumptions. Assume a power utility
function which is separable in both consumption and labour (or leisure). A micro founded
derivation of the aggregate demand (or the IS curve) implies that the interest rate elasticity is
9In these models, labour supply is typically given by the following (wt − pt) = log(MRSt) = log(−(Un))−
log(Uc). Assuming a power utility function then implies that real wages are increasing in labour hours and produc-
tivity after imposing equilibrium conditions. The log of the latter variable is typically assumed to be a stationary
AR(1) process around a 0 unconditional mean.
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the inverse of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) parameter. We therefore set φ = 1/γ,
where γ is the CRRA estimate from Amisano and Tristiani (2010). Under the same assumption,
it can be shown that the real wage elasticity of labour supply is a function of the labour share of
production (α), the disutility of labour , and the constant relative risk aversion parameter when
one assumes a power utility function. In particular, β1 = 1/(φ + αγ), where φ captures the
disutiltiy of labour in the model of the study just cited. Finally, we assume that demand shock
is the sum of the inflation target shock and the interest rate shock found in the literature. This
permits us to set σv =
√
σ2p¯i + σ
2
i where σ
2
p¯i, and σ
2
i are respectively the variances of inflation
target shocks and the interest rate shocks.
The wage parameter indicating the extent of over-indexation (κa) is fixed at 1.5. This value
is motivated by the estimates obtained from Attey (2015) for the case of Belgium. While there
are estimates found in other literature, those estimates are derived under the rather restrictive
assumption of a time-invariant degree of wage indexation. We carry out our own estimations to
estimate the parameters α, σa and ρa. Details concerning the estimation procedure are given in
section 4.C of the appendix. Table 4.2 gives a summary on the parameters and their correspond-
ing values used in the calibration exercise.
Table 4.1: Summary of models
Optimal policy
Constant index (OCW) Random index (ORW)

λ2p˜it = gt + λ1p˜it−1 − ut
gt = −φ(it − p˜iet − r) + vt
it = r + b¯p˜it−1 + ϕp˜it + [1/φ]vt

λ2p˜it = gt + λ1tp˜it−1 − ut
gt = −φ(it − p˜iet − r) + vt
it = r + bp˜it−1 + ϕp˜it + [1/φ]vt
Taylor rules
Current inflation (CTR) Lagged inflation (BTR)

λ2p˜it = gt + λ1tp˜it−1 − ut
gt = −φ(it − p˜iet − r) + vt
it = r + ωcp˜it

λ2p˜it = gt + λ1tp˜it−1 − ut
gt = −φ(it − p˜iet − r) + vt
it = r + ωbp˜it−1
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The existence of a stationary unconditional distribution
We conduct tests on the inflation processes presented in (4.17), (4.27), and (4.29) for the ex-
istence of heavy-tailed distributions. We do not need to conduct tests on the processes of the
output gap and interest rate since they are functions of inflation. Any heavy-tailed property of
the unconditional distribution of inflation is automatically passed on to the other variables. The
expressions for equilibrium inflation obtained under optimal monetary policy (4.17), the CTR
(4.26) and the BTR (4.28) imply that inflation can generally be represented by the following
univariate AR(1) process:
Xt = Vt +BtXt−1, (4.32)
where (Vt, Bt) are iid with absolutely continuous distribution functions. Equation (4.32) is an
AR process with random coefficient Bt. The Kesten conditions give the general conditions for
such a process under which the unconditional distributions of inflation, the output gap and the
interest rate under optimal monetary policy and the two interest rate rules are stationary.
Kesten Conditions: Consider a time-varying autoregressive process as in (4.32) above. If there
exists a κ > 0 such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• E log |B1| < 0
• E|B1|κ = 1
• E|B1|κ log+ |B1| <∞
• 0 < E|V1|κ <∞,
then a stationary distribution exists for the process X irrespective of how it is initialized. The
distribution is heavy tailed. For an AR(1) univariate process to have a heavy-tailed unconditional
distribution, it suffices to check only the second condition. In what follows in this section, we
investigate the conditions for the existence of stationary distributions of the inflation processes
under optimal monetary policy and the two Taylor rules.
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Optimal monetary policy
As already mentioned in Section 4.2 of this study, we assume a uniform distribution for the
degree of wage indexation. In particular, we assumed that xt ∼ U(0, κa) where κa > 1. The
implied process for inflation under both the OCW and the ORW are:
p˜it = b¯p˜it−1 − (b¯/λ1)ut (4.33a)
p˜it = 2bAtp˜it−1 − (b/λ1)ut, (4.33b)
where At ∼ U(0, 1).
The inflation process under the OCW is an AR(1) process with a constant coefficient b¯. The
existence of a stationary unconditional distribution hinges on the following assumption: |b¯| < 1.
Given the parameters in Table 4.2, this condition is satisfied since b¯ = 0.5859.10 Earlier on,
we assume that the productivity shock term (ut) is normally distributed. This implies that the
unconditional distribution of inflation under the OCW (4.33a) is normal.
Concerning inflation under the ORW, the first Kesten condition requires that the following
holds: b < e/2. If b is at its maximum (θ = 0), this condition translates to κa <
√
e. The
second condition implies solving for a κ which satisfies (2b)κ = κ + 1. A solution exists for
any b ∈ (1/2, e/2). The last two conditions can easily be verified, given that there exists a κ
that satisfies the second condition. For our set of parameters, b = 0.5551. This implies that the
Kesten conditions are satisfied since b = 0.5551 ∈ (1/2, e/2). This guarantees the existence of
a stationary heavy-tailed distribution for inflation, the output gap and the interest rate.
Remarkably, the mean persistence of inflation under the OCW is larger than that under the
ORW (i.e. b¯ > b). However, inflation under the latter model rather exhibits heavy-tailed prop-
erties. This observation proves the importance of multiplicative shocks such as random wage
indexation in generating heavy-tailed distributions.
10The computations for the calibration exercise were carried out in MATLAB.
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Monetary policy under CTR and BTR
We test whether the coefficients under the CTR and BTR satisfy the Kesten conditions using
MATLAB. The process for inflation under CTR as found in (4.26) in the main derivation can
respectively be expressed as follows:
p˜it = [ccmin + ccextAt]p˜it−1 + [1/∆]vt − [1/∆]ut, (4.34a)
where ccmin = (φλ1)/(∆2−φ∆) and ccext = λ2κa/∆. As in (4.26), the parameter ∆ = λ2+φωc.
Here again, At is a random variable uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Similarly, the
process for inflation under a BTR as found in (4.28) can be expressed as follows:
p˜it = [cbmin + cbextAt]p˜it−1 + [1/λ2]vt − [1/λ2]ut, (4.34b)
where cbmin = Λ/λ2 and cbext = κa.
From (4.33) and (4.34), the inflation processes can be given the following generic represen-
tation:
p˜it = [cmin + cextAt]p˜it−1 + µt. (4.35)
Earlier on, we asserted that one needs to only check the second of the Kesten conditions for the
existence of a heavy-tailed unconditional distribution. We nevertheless check both the first and
second of the conditions in our computations. As we will explain later, the first condition reveals
information about the average persistence in the inflation process. Given the inflation process
(4.35), the first two conditions can be derived using the following:
∫ cmax
cmin
log(|x|)
cext
dx < 0
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∫ cmax
cmin
|x|κ
cext
dx = 1,
where cmax = cmin + cext.
The Table 4.3 gives the results of the tests regarding the Kesten conditions. From the table,
the value of κ in the case of the CTR is 12.307 while that for the case of the BTR is 2.313. Thus,
it can be concluded that the unconditional distributions of inflation under both types of Taylor
rules are stationary and heavy tailed.
Table 4.3: Results from the Kesten tests
Condition OCW ORW CTR BTR
E log |B1| N/A -0.896 -0.549 -0.305
κ N/A 34.038 12.307 2.314
Distribution normal heavy tailed heavy tailed heavy tailed
1 Table gives results of the Kesten tests from calibrations N/A denotes that the
test is not applicable. Test conducted on the process Xt = BtXt−1 + Vt.
2 Calibrations were conducted in MATLAB
Interpreting E log |B1| and the parameter κ
The first Kesten condition requiresE log |B1| < 0 for the existence of a stationary unconditional
distribution of inflation. This condition can be seen as analogous to the condition that |b¯| < 1 un-
der the OCW. We can therefore deduce preliminary insights into the persistence of the inflation
process from the condition. It can be concluded from Table (4.3) that a stationary distribution
exists for the inflation process under each of the models. Also, one can again conclude that the
persistence in the inflation process is the highest under the BTR and the lowest under the ORW.
The persistence of this process under the CTR falls between those of the BTR and the ORW.
The presence of a heavy-tailed unconditional distribution of inflation depends on the exis-
tence of a κ > 0 that satisfies the second condition. The magnitude of this parameter indicates
how heavy the tails of the distribution are. In particular, κ is inversely related to the heaviness of
the tail: a higher κ denotes that the tails of the particular distribution in question are relatively
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less heavy. The intuition behind this inverse relationship is as follows. A distribution which
does not meet the second Kesten condition may have κ = ∞. Thus the further away κ is, the
more likely it is that that distribution will fail the requirements for the presence of heavy tails.
From Table 4.3, it can be concluded that the distribution of inflation under the BTR has
the highest persistence and the heaviest tails. We may prematurely conclude that variations
of variables under that model are most extreme and most undesirable. The inflation rate, output
gap, and interest rate have the least variances under the ORW (not counting the OCW). One may
therefore give the following ranking of the models based on loss minimization: ORW, CTR, and
BTR.
4.4.1 Time paths of variables
Figure 4.2 gives the time path of the various macroeconomic variables in this section based on
a simulation of 10, 000 observations. Noting that the unconditional distributions of variables
under OCW are normally distributed, the figure shows that extreme observations are more fre-
quent under the ORW model than those under the OCW model. It can therefore be concluded
that inflation, the output gap and the interest rate under the ORW model have heavy-tailed un-
conditional distributions.
Figure 4.2 also shows the dynamics of the three variables under the two Taylor rules. The un-
conditional distributions of both variables are heavy tailed since the processes of inflation under
these two Taylor rules satisfy the Kesten conditions. The figure also shows that the distributions
under the BTR are more heavy tailed than those under the CTR. This result was already implied
by the κ values.
4.4.2 Impulse responses to productivity shocks
The dynamic effects of productivity shocks are displayed in Figure 4.3 in the appendix. The
figure suggests that the three variables converge back to their steady states faster under the
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Figure 4.2: Time paths of variables
ORW model than the OCW model. However, this is the case only because of the particular set
of draws of the random wage indexation parameter λ1t. For other sets of draws, the variables
converge back to their steady states faster under the OCW than the ORW. Repeated simulations
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show that on the average, it takes 10 periods to converge back to the steady state after an initial
productivity shock. This is the same number of periods it takes for variables to converge back to
their respective steady states under the OCW. Thus, random wage indexation induces uncertainty
in the amount of time it takes for the three variables to converge back to their steady states.
Inflation has a higher initial response to productivity shocks under the CTR than under the
BTR. Given the same draws of λ1t, all variables converge faster to their respective steady states
under the CTR than under the BTR. The reason for this result lies in the implied processes of
inflation under the two models. From the expressions (4.26) and (4.28), the mean persistence
parameters prevailing under these models are:
E[λ1t/∆ + φλ1/(∆
2 − φ∆)] = λ1/(∆− φ) = 0.6706 (CTR)
E[λ1t/λ2 + Λ/λ2] = (λ1 + Λ)/λ2 = 0.8725 (BTR).
The computations above imply that on the average, the inflation process is more persistent under
the BTR than under the CTR.11 We therefore expect inflation to converge back to its steady state
faster under the CTR. Since the output gap and the interest rate are functions of the inflation
rate, they also converge back to their steady states quicker under the latter model.
4.4.3 Impulse responses to demand shocks
Table 4.4 presents the responses of the various variables to a one standard deviation shock in
demand vt. Under optimal monetary policy, inflation and the output gap are not impacted by
demand shocks. This is due to the assumption that the policy maker observes the demand shocks
and moves to offset their likely effects. The interest rate initially rises in response to demand
shocks, but converges back to its steady state in the subsequent period.
The responses of the output gap and inflation to a one-time demand shock are larger under
the BTR than under the CTR. The interest rate has a delayed response to demand shocks under
the BTR. All three variables converge back to their respective steady states faster under the
11The results from the tests of the first of the Kesten conditions already implied this.
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CTR than under the BTR. The reason for this is identical to the one provided for the case of
productivity shocks.
One can therefore conclude that compared to optimal monetary policy, a Taylor rule target-
ing only the inflation rate performs poorly when the economy is subject to demand shocks. This
conclusion hinges on the assumption that a policy maker can observe demand shocks immedi-
ately in order to react to them.
4.4.4 Losses from alternative policy rules
Table 4.4 presents the standard deviations and the implied loss under each type of monetary
policy considered in this work. Inflation is less volatile under the ORW than under the CTR
while the output gap is less volatile under the latter than the former. This contrast concerning
the volatility of the output gap and inflation under these two policies stems from their respective
interest rate rules. The ORW interest rate in (4.21) reacts to demand shocks and current inflation,
while the CTR interest rate in (4.22) targets only current inflation. Therefore, the excessive
volatility in the interest rate under ORW is transferred to the output gap under this policy regime.
However, it should be noted that the volatility of inflation increases when the interest rate
does not respond to current shocks. The following observations can be made about the various
interest rate policy rules: the BTR interest rate targets none of the current shocks, the CTR
interest rate targets only productivity shocks (embedded in current inflation), and the ORW
interest rate targets both productivity and demand shocks. As a result from the nature of the
interest rate rules, inflation is most volatile under the BTR and least volatile under the ORW.
Not surprisingly, the optimal monetary policy generates the lowest loss among the three types
of monetary policy considered, although the losses from the ORW and the CTR do not differ
that much in magnitude. Thus, given the parameters, a Taylor rule targeting current inflation
almost replicates optimal monetary policy. Of the two types of Taylor rules considered, the one
targeting current inflation (CTR) outperforms the lagged inflation targeting Taylor rule (BTR).
This comes as no surprise as it is already known that the CTR comes closest to mimicking the
interest rate rule under optimal monetary policy (see Woodford (2001)).
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Table 4.4: Standard deviations and loss
OCW ORW CTR BTR
sd% sd% sd% sd%
Inflation (pit) 1.16 1.16 1.34 4.67
Output gap (gt) 0.58 0.73 0.69 1.06
Interest rate (it) 1.99 2.27 2.01 7
Variance of variables in %
Inflation 0.0135 0.0135 0.0180 0.2472
Output gap 0.0033 0.0052 0.0047 0.0126
Loss (V) 0.0101 0.0120 0.0137 0.1362
4.5 Conclusion
This study investigates the effect of random wage indexation on monetary policy. Most of the
extant literature on wage indexation and its role in monetary policy is based on the assumption
that the degree of wage indexation is constant. However, recent empirical estimates suggest a
time-varying process for the degree of wage indexation. Drawing on the empirical properties of
the degree of wage indexation, this study investigates the conduct of monetary policy in the pres-
ence of random wage indexation. In particular, we investigate the conduct of monetary policy
under three interest rate rules: the rule implied by optimal monetary policy under commitment,
a current inflation targeting Taylor rule and a lagged or expected inflation targeting Taylor rule.
Our findings reveal that under the plausible scenario of wages being overly indexed to in-
flation, the unconditional stationary distribution of inflation, the interest rate and the output gap
do exhibit heavy-tailed characteristics under all of the three types of monetary policies consid-
ered. This implies that extreme observations in these variables are more likely to occur than as
would be predicted under current standard theoretical models. Also, inflation exhibits volatility
clustering with expected or lagged inflation having a positive effect on the conditional variance
of inflation. Finally, it is better to commit to a Taylor rule targeting current inflation rather than
one targeting lagged inflation.
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4.A Aggregate supply and optimal monetary policy
4.A.1 Deriving the aggregate supply (Phillips ) curve
It is assumed that the representative firm is perfectly competitive. The real wage is therefore
equal to the marginal productivity of labour. With the production technology assumed in the
main text, the expression for real wages is:12
Wt
Pt
= αAtN
α−1
t .
Let δ0 = (lnα))(1− α) and δ1 = 1/(1− α). The labour demand expression can be derived by
taking the log of the real wage expression just previously given. This is given below:
ndt =δ0 − δ1(wt − pt) + δ1at. (4.36)
The expression for labour supply can be derived from a representative household’s optimizing
behaviour. For the purposes of this study, we make use of the following ad hoc labour supply
relation:
nst = β0 + β1(wt − pt). (4.37)
By equating (4.36) to (4.37) , one derives the following expressions for equilibrium nominal
wage rate (w∗t ) and equilibrium labour (n
∗
t ):
w∗t =
δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+ pt +
δ1
δ1 + β1
at (4.38)
n∗t =
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+
β1δ1
δ1 + β1
at. (4.39)
12Lower cases of variables denote their log values. In discussing these variables, we omit the word’ ‘log’ for
convenience.
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The production function was already given in the main part of this study as follows: Yt = AtNαt .
Taking the log of this function permits us to derive an expression in terms of log variables as
follows:
yt = αnt + at. (4.40)
The expression for equilibrium output is then derived by substituting (4.39) into (4.40). We give
the equation for equilibrium output below:
y∗t = α
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+
(
αβ1δ1
δ1 + β1
+ 1
)
at. (4.41)
The (log) productivity shock term at is assumed in the main part of this text to follow the
stationary AR(1) process given below:
at = ρaat−1 + εat,
where εat is iid normal with a zero mean. The AR coefficient ρa is assumed to lie within the unit
internal to ensure stationarity of the AR process.
The wage indexation rule given in Equation (4.3) stipulates for wages to be adjusted if pre-
viously observed inflation deviates from the target inflation. The rule is repeated below:
wt = w
∗e
t + xt(pit−1 − pˆi).
From the expression (4.38), we can derive the expression for the expectation of the wage rate
prevailing at the competitive equilibrium. Let aet = at ≡ ρaat−1. The expectation of the
equilibrium wage rate is:
w∗et =
δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+ pet +
δ1
δ1 + β1
aet .
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Substituting the expression above into the expression for wage indexation we get the following:
wt =
δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+
δ1
δ1 + β1
aet + p
e
t + xt(pit−1 − pˆi).
The presence of indexation introduces nominal rigidity into the model. A trade-off between
inflation and the output gap can therefore be realized in the presence of wage indexation. Sub-
tracting prices from both sides of the equation, one derives the following expression for real
wages under wage indexation:
wt − pt = δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+
δ1
δ1 + β1
aet − (pt − pet ) + xt(pit−1 − pˆi).
We note that (pt − pet ) = pit − piet , where pit = pt − pt−1. Substitute the expression for the real
wage under wage indexation into the labour demand expression (4.36) to obtain the following:
nt =
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+ δ1(pit − piet )− δ1xt(pit−1 − pˆi) + δ1at −
δ21
δ1 + β1
aet .
We note that δ1at = δ1aet + δ1εat and also that pi
e
t = pˆi as per the assumption made in the main
text. Thus making this substitution into the labour demand equation previously written down
results in the following equation:
nt =
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+ δ1(pit − pˆi)− δ1xt(pit−1 − pˆi) + δ1β1
δ1 + β1
aet + δ1εat.
We can derive the output under wage indexation by using the log form of the production tech-
nology: yt = αnt + at. The output is given as follows:
yt = α
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+ αδ1(pit − pˆi)− αδ1xt(pit−1 − pˆi) + α δ1β1
δ1 + β1
aet + αδ1εat + at.
With the help of equation (4.41), we express the output under wage indexation as a function of
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equilibrium output prevailing under flexible wages (y∗t ). The resulting expression is as follows:
yt = y
∗
t + αδ1(pit − pˆi)− αδ1xt(pit−1 − pˆi) +
αδ2
δ1 + β1
εat.
Let the output gap(gt) be defined as the deviation of output from the output prevailing under
flexible wage equilibrium. Further assume the following: (pit − pˆi) = p˜it, αδ1 = λ2, and λ2xt =
λ1t. The aggregate supply relation is given as follows:
gt = −λ1tp˜it−1 + λ2p˜it + ut,
where ut = αδ21/(δ1 + β1)εat.
4.A.2 Optimal monetary policy
We assume that wages are indexed to lagged inflation. We assume that agents in the economy
fix their expectations equal to a target inflation which does not necessarily need to be 0. We give
the IS and the Phillips Curve as follows:
gt = −λ1tp˜it−1 + λ2p˜it + ut
gt = −φ(it − p˜iet − r) + vt.
We again assume that in conducting optimal monetary policy, the central bank uses the interest
rate and the expected interest rate (it and iet ) as instruments. Alternative ways of expressing
the Phillips and the IS expressions which will be useful for our optimization purposes are given
below:
p˜it = − φ
λ2
(it − iet )−
φ
λ2 − φ(i
e
t − r) + λ3,tp˜it−1 +
1
λ2
(vt − ut) (4.42a)
p˜it = p˜i
e
t −
φ
λ2
(it − iet ) +
ηt
λ2
p˜it−1 +
1
λ2
(vt − ut), (4.42b)
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where λ3,t = φλ¯1λ2(λ2−φ) +
λ1t
λ2
and ηt = λ1t− λ1. The expected inflation can easily be obtained by
taking expectation of the equation (4.42a). The expected inflation is:
p˜iet = −
φ
λ2 − φ(i
e
t − r) +
λ1
λ2 − φp˜it−1 λ1 = E[λ1t] (4.43)
gt = −φ(it − iet )−
φλ2
λ2 − φ(i
e
t − r) +
φλ1
λ2 − φp˜it−1 + vt (4.44a)
gt = g
e
t − φ(it − iet ) + vt, (4.44b)
The (endogenous) state variable in this model is inflation p˜it. Thus, we can write the value
function, assuming a zero output gap target as follows:
V (p˜it−1) = max
it,iet
Et−1
[−g2t − θp˜i2t + βV (p˜it)] . (4.45)
This is maximized subject to the constraints in (4.42a) and (4.44a) in addition to the expression
which must hold under commitment:
iet = Et−1[it]. (4.46)
Since the loss function is quadratic, the value function must be quadratic in the state variable.
We therefore conjecture the following expression for the value function:
V (pit) = γ0 + 2γ1p˜it + γ2p˜i
2
t . (4.47)
where the parameters γ0, γ1 and γ2 are parameters which are assumed to be functions of the
parameters in (4.42a) and (4.44a). Let Λt−1 be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the
commitment constraint (4.46). By the chain rule of differentiation, we can write down the first
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order conditions as follows:
0 =− 2gt∂gt
∂it
− 2θp˜it∂p˜it
∂it
+ β
∂V (p˜it)
∂p˜it
∂p˜it
∂it
− Λt−1 (4.48)
0 =Et−1
[
−2gt∂gt
∂iet
− 2θp˜it∂p˜it
∂iet
+ β
∂V (p˜it)
∂p˜it
∂p˜it
∂iet
+ Λt−1
]
. (4.49)
The expectation sign appears in the second of the first order conditions because the policy maker
does not directly control iet , but rather influences it through policy instrument it. From (4.42a)
and (4.44a), we derive the following:
∂gt/∂it = −φ
∂p˜it/∂it = −φ/λ2.
The conjectured value function in (4.47) implies that the derivative of the value function with
respect to inflation is:
∂V (p˜it)/∂p˜it = 2(γ1 + γ2p˜it).
We obtain the following derivatives of gt and p˜iet with regards to i
e
t :
∂gt/∂i
e
t = φ− φλ2/(λ2 − φ)
∂p˜it/∂i
e
t = φ/λ2 − φ/(λ2 − φ).
Substitute these expressions into the FOCs derived with respect to it and iet as given by (4.48)
and (4.49) to obtain the following equations:
0 = 2φ[gt + p˜it(θ/λ2)− (γ1 + γ2p˜it)(β/λ2)]− Λt−1
0 = −2φ[get (1− λ2/(λ2 − φ)) + p˜iet (θ/λ2 − θ/(λ2 − φ)) + (γ1 + γ2p˜iet )(β/λ2 − β/(λ2 − φ))] + Λt−1.
Adding the two equations just listed above derives an intermediate version of the optimal feed-
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back rule. This expression and a version derived by taking expectations are given below:
0 = 2φ[(gt − get ) + (p˜it − p˜iet )(θ − βγ2)/λ2] + 2φ[λ2get + (θ − βγ2)p˜iet − βγ1]/(λ2 − φ)
(4.50)
0 = 2φ[λ2g
e
t + (θ − βγ2)p˜iet − βγ1]/(λ2 − φ). (4.51)
We substitute the expressions (4.42b) and (4.44b) into (4.50) to obtain an expression in terms
of the control variables. The derived optimal feedback rule after imposing (4.51) and some
simplifications is as follows:
0 = [−φ(it − iet ) + vt]
(
1 +
θ − βγ2
λ22
)
−
(
θ − βγ2
λ22
)
(ut − ηtp˜it−1). (4.52)
The value function needs to be concave in the state variable to ensure the existence of a
solution to the dynamic optimization problem. It will later be shown that a necessary condition
for the value function to be concave in the state variable is the following:
β(b2 + δ2σ2η) < 1,
where b and δ are coefficients (to be later determined) governing the process of inflation under
optimal control. The other variables, β and σ2η are the discount rate and the variance of ηt
respectively. Given that the necessary conditions for concavity are satisfied, we know that 1 +
(θ− βγ2)/λ22 6= 0. This implies that under optimal control, [−φ(it− iet ) + vt] is a function of ut
and ηtp˜it−1.13
Thus gt is a function of ut and ηtp˜it−1. This observation coupled with the Phillips curve
expression gt = −λ1tp˜it−1 + λ2p˜it + ut, implies that inflation under optimal control assumes the
13It is assumed that the policy maker observes and reacts to the shocks in an interim period within which private
agents can neither observe those shocks nor react to them. The shocks are not observed by both parties ex-ante.
See Clarke et al. (1999) for detailed discussion on the implication of this assumption.
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following general form
p˜it = a+ bp˜it−1 + δηtp˜it−1 + cut, (4.53)
where a, b, δ and c are parameters to be determined. Noting that ηt = λ1t − λ1 is a zero mean
iid random variable, the expected inflation under this guess can easily be derived as follows:
p˜ie = a+ bp˜it−1.
However, noting that the original specification of the AS (Phillips curve) relation implies get =
λ1p˜it−1 + λ2p˜iet and substituting this expression into (4.51), we get the following expression for
expected inflation:
p˜iet =
βγ1
λ22 + θ − βγ2
+
λ1λ2
λ22 + θ − βγ2
p˜it−1. (4.54)
We can identify the parameters a and b in terms of value function parameters and the structural
parameters after comparing (4.54) to the expectation of (4.53) as follows.
a =
βγ1
λ22 + θ − βγ2
b =
λ1λ2
λ22 + θ − βγ2
. (4.55)
From the expression given for b, we can rule out that λ22[1 + (θ − βγ2)/λ22] = 0 as earlier on
claimed.14 This is a necessary condition for a stable inflation under optimal control process since
b is an AR coefficient. We substitute the expression for expected inflation into the expression
(4.43) to obtain the expected interest rate expression:
iet = r + [(λ1 − b(λ2 − φ))p˜it−1 − a(λ2 − φ)]/φ. (4.56)
The guess we made for equilibrium inflation under (4.53) implies that p˜it − p˜iet = δηtp˜it−1 + cut.
Substituting this into the expression (4.42b) implies the following expression for the interest rate
14The fact that λ1, λ2 6= 0 reinforces this claim.
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rule under optimal control.
it = i
e
t −
1 + cλ2
φ
ut +
1− δλ2
φ
ηtp˜it−1 +
1
φ
vt. (4.57)
This expression substituted into (4.52) implies that the parameters δ and c can be identified as
follows:
δ =
λ2
λ22 + θ − βγ2
c =
−λ2
λ22 + θ − βγ2
. (4.58)
To proceed further, we note once again that p˜iet = a + bp˜it−1. One can derive the following
expression for the deviation of expected real interest rate from the natural rate of interest as
follows:
iet − p˜iet − r = [(λ1b− λ2)p˜it−1 − aλ2]/φ. (4.59)
The interest rate equation in (4.57) implies the following expression for the deviation of the
interest rate from its expected value it − iet = [−(1 + cλ2)ut + (1 − δλe)ηtp˜it−1 + vt]/φ. Add
(it − iet ) to both sides of Equation (4.59). Using (4.57), make the necessary substitution at the
RHS of the resulting equation, to obtain the following:
it − p˜iet − r = [(λ1 − λ2b)p˜it−1 − aλ2 − (1 + cλ2)ut + (1− δλ2)ηtp˜it−1 + vt]/φ. (4.60)
The last expression implies that the output gap can then be expressed as a function of only the
state variables. The output gap given by (4.6) in the main part of this text can then be rewritten
as follows:
gt = −φ(it − p˜iet − r) + vt = aλ2 − (λ1 − λ2b)p˜it−1 + (1 + cλ2)ut − (1− δλ2)ηtp˜it−1. (4.61)
132 Random Wage Indexation and Monetary Policy
Deriving parameters of the value function
We have expressed both inflation and the output gap in terms of the state variables. These are
contained in equations (4.53) and (4.61) respectively. We now proceed to express the various
components of the value function in terms of the state variables. From (4.53) and (4.61), we
make the following derivations:
Et−1g2t = a
2λ22 − 2aλ2(λ1 − λ2b)p˜it−1 + (λ1 − λ2b)2p˜i2t−1 + (1 + cλ2)2σ2u + (1− δλ2)2σ2ηp˜i2t−1
Et−1p˜i2 = a2 + 2abp˜it−1 + b2p˜i2t−1 + δ
2σ2ηp˜i
2
t−1 + c
2σ2u
Et−1[V (p˜it)] = γ0 + 2γ1a+ γ2(a2 + c2σ2u) + 2b(γ1 + aγ2)p˜it−1 + γ2(b
2 + δ2σ2η)p˜i
2
t−1.
Substitute the three expressions above into (4.45) to obtain the following:
V (p˜it−1) = βγ0 + 2βγ1a+ (βγ2 − θ)(a2 + c2σ2u)− a2λ22 − (1 + cλ2)2σ2u
+ 2[βbγ1 + (βγ2 − θ)ab+ aλ2(λ1 − bλ2)]p˜it−1
+
[
(βγ2 − θ)(b2 + δ2σ2η)− [(λ1 − bλ2)2 + (1− δλ2)2σ2η]
]
p˜i2t−1.
Equating the coefficients to the ones in the expressions V (p˜it−1) = γ0 + 2γ1p˜it−1 + γ2p˜i2t−1, we
obtain the following systems of equations :
γ2 = −
[
θ(b2 + δ2σ2η) + λ
2
1(1− δλ2)2 + (1− δλ2)2σ2η
1− β(b2 + δ2σ2η)
]
(4.62)
γ1 = a
[
λ2λ1 − (λ22 + θ − βγ2)b
1− βb
]
(4.63)
γ0 =
[
2βγ1a+ (βγ2 − θ)(a2 + c2σ2u)− a2λ22 − (1 + cλ2)2σ2u
1− β
]
. (4.64)
Since the loss function, L = −g2t − θp˜i2t , is concave in p˜it−1, it holds that the value function
must necessarily be concave in that state variable. This implies that γ2 < 0, which holds only if
β(b2 + δ2σ2η) < 1.
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Solving for policy function parameters
The value for b as given by (4.55) implies that the numerator of (4.63) is 0. We can therefore
conclude that γ1 = 0. This implies the following:
a =
βγ1
λ22 + θ − βγ2
= 0. (4.65)
In order to solve for b, we begin by noting that δ = b/λ1 from (4.55) and (4.58). Substituting
out the δ in (4.62) and substituting (4.55) into (4.63) gives a quadratic equation for b. In order
to perform a step by step derivation of this quadratic equation, we begin by noting that an
alternative rendition of (4.62) is the following:
γ2 = −
[
[θb2 + (λ1 − bλ2)2](1 + σ2η/λ21)
1− βb2(1 + σ2η/λ21)
]
= −
[
[b2(λ22 + θ)− 2λ2λ1b+ λ21](1 + σ2η/λ21)
1− βb2(1 + σ2η/λ21)
]
.
The next step is to derive an expression for (λ22 + θ − βγ2) and note (4.55) implies that (λ22 +
θ − βγ2) = (λ1λ2)/b. The derivations corresponding to this step are given below:
−βγ2 =
[
[βb2(λ22 + θ)− 2βλ2λ1b+ βλ21](1 + σ2η/λ21)
1− βb2(1 + σ2η/λ21)
]
λ22 + θ − βγ2 =
[
[βb2(λ22 + θ)− 2βλ2λ1b+ βλ21](1 + σ2η/λ21)
1− βb2(1 + σ2η/λ21)
]
+ λ22 + θ
λ1λ2
b
=
[
(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1 − 2βλ1λ2(1 + σ2η/λ21)b
1− βb2(1 + σ2η/λ21)
]
.
The final of the previous expressions can be rearranged to obtain the following equation which
is quadratic in b:
0 = [β(λ1λ2)(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)]b
2 − [(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ2η/λ21)λ21]b+ (λ1λ2).
This equation has two roots on whose values the stability of the system of equations depends.
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The root that satisfies the condition β(b2 + δ2σ2η) ≤ 1 is
b =
[(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1]−
√
[(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1]
2 − 4β(λ1λ2)2(1 + σ2η/λ21)
2βλ1λ2(1 + σ2η/λ
2
1)
.
(4.66)
In what follows, we show that 0 ≤ b ≤ x¯. It is clear from (4.66) that b ≥ 0 since [(λ22 + θ) +
β(1 + σ2η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1] >
√
[(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1]
2 − 4β(λ1λ2)2(1 + σ2η/λ21). The derivation
of the upper bound on this parameter is given below:
b =
[(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1]−
√
[(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1]
2 − 4β(λ1λ2)2(1 + σ2η/λ21)
2βλ1λ2(1 + σ2η/λ
2
1)
=
[(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1]−
√
[(λ22 + θ)− β(1 + σ2η/λ21)λ21]2 + 4βθ(λ21)(1 + σ2η/λ21)
2βλ1λ2(1 + σ2η/λ
2
1)
≤
[(λ22 + θ) + β(1 + σ
2
η/λ
2
1)λ
2
1]−
√
[(λ22 + θ)− β(1 + σ2η/λ21)λ21]2
2βλ1λ2(1 + σ2η/λ
2
1)
=
λ1
λ2
= x¯.
From (4.58) it is obvious that c = −δ. We are therefore able to solve for the remaining
policy function parameters as follows:
δ =
b
λ1
(4.67)
c = − b
λ1
. (4.68)
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4.B Solution to a linear system with rational expectations
Consider the linear system given below as given in Section 4.3 of the main text:
Xt = FtXt−1 +GEt−1Xt +Ht. (4.69)
We guess the solution is of the form Xt = PtXt−1 + Qt which implies that GEt−1Xt =
GPXt−1 where Et−1Pt = P. A substitution of this guess into 4.69 allows us to solve the
system by the method of undetermined coefficients. This is illustrated in a step by step manner
below:
PtXt−1 +Q = FtXt−1 +GPXt−1 +Ht
= (Ft +GP)Xt−1 +Ht.
By comparing the coefficients, we know that that the following should hold true:
Q = H (4.70)
Pt = Ft +GP. (4.71)
Let Et−1Ft = F. Taking expectation of the second equation, we obtain the following:
P = F+GP
(I−G)P = F
P = (I−G)−1F.
Substitute the last expression into 4.71 to obtain the following expression for Pt:
Pt = Ft +G(I−G)−1F. (4.72)
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4.C Productivity parameters
In this section, we derive alternative values for the parameters regarding productivity. We do this
by first computing the Solow residual for 3 countries, namely, France, Germany and the UK. We
then estimate the AR coefficient of productivity and the standard deviation of the productivity
shocks.
We obtained the real income growth and growth in labour hours data from the OECD data
base. Data on capital stock was obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data on FRED
St.Louis website. We now proceed to discuss our estimations in detail. Consider the following
Cobb-Douglass function
Yt = ZtN
α
t K
1−α
t . (4.73)
where Zt is productivity, Nt is capital and Kt is labour supplied. To allow for growth in the
long-run, we assume that productivity has two components: one that follows a deterministic
trend and the other which is stationary. In other words,
Zt = A
τ
tAt A
τ
t = A0 exp
υt. (4.74)
Let log values of the variables be represented by small case versions of the relevant letters.
Take the natural log of (4.73) to obtain the following:
yt = a0 + υt+ αnt + (1− α)kt + at. (4.75)
We proceed by first noting that a differenced version of (4.75) gives the growth version of (4.73).
The difference version of (4.75) is
∆yt = υ + α∆nt + (1− α)∆kt + ∆at. (4.76)
The equation (4.76) can be easily estimated by a constrained OLS if one assumes ∆at is the
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error term. This error term should be stationary, albeit, possibly serially correlated.
The next procedure is to obtain the estimated residual ˆt = ∆aˆt from the first estimation.
Now, assume the following AR(1) structure for at:
at = ρaat−1 + εat, (4.77)
where εat ∼ N (0, σ2a). It follows that both the AR coefficient ρa and the variance of the produc-
tivity shock σ2a can be estimated using the following state-space specification:
ˆt = at − at−1
at = ρaat−1 + εat
εat ∼ N (0, σ2a).
(4.78)
We used the version 8 of the EVIEWS statistical package to estimate equation (4.78). Table 4.5
provides the estimates of (4.76) for the three countries and Table (4.6) estimates for ρa and σ2a
for the same countries.
The estimates of α for Germany and the UK are similar to the estimates obtained from other
literature. That of the UK however is outside the generally accepted range for α. In the main
part of this study, we set α = 0.64 for the calibration exercise to reflect a notional average of
the estimates for α. It can be seen from Table (4.6) that the country specific estimates for both
ρa and σ2a do not differ that much. The estimates suggest that productivity shocks are highly
persistent, albeit stationary. We will therefore set ρa at 0.9 for the calibration. Finally, from the
estimates, the country specific standard deviation of productivity shocks σa lies between 0.0121
and 0.0151. We will set σa = 0.013 for the calibration.
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4.C.1 Tables
Table 4.5: Cobb-Douglass (4.76)
Country υˆ αˆ R2
France 0.005 0.366** 0.50
(0.004) (0.098)
Germany 0.013** 0.675** 0.57
(0.003) (0.107)
UK 0.015** 0.64** 0.50
(0.004) (0.124)
1 Standard errors in parenthesis
2 * p > 0.05, **p > 0.01
Table 4.6: Productivity (4.78)
Country ρˆa ln(σˆ2a) AIC
France 0.922** -8.818** -5.86
(0.12) (0.194)
Germany 0.978** -8.713** -5.77
(0.099) (0.134)
Uk 0.945** -8.379** -5.42
(0.129) (0.221)
1 Standard errors in parenthesis
2 * p > 0.05, **p > 0.01
4.D Figures 139
4.D Figures
Figure 4.3: Impulse response to productivity shocks
Figure 4.4: Impulse response to demand shocks
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Chapter 5
Wage Indexation Negotiations and
Inflation Volatility
‘The methods by which a trade union can act alone, are necessarily destructive; its organization
is necessarily tyrannical’.
– Henry George
5.1 Introduction
That the volatility of inflation exhibits time variation is a fact first established by Engle (1982)
and later by Bollerslev (1986). Since then, a number of theoretical and empirical studies have
investigated the causes of the time variation in inflation volatility. The aim of this study is to
investigate the role of labour market institutions in explaining the volatility of inflation. For the
purposes of this study, the terms inflation variance and inflation volatility are used interchange-
ably.
Three main categories of causes of the time variation in inflation volatility can be identified
from the existing literature. The first category of causal variables can be linked to the macroe-
conomic policy actions on the part of policy authorities. A considerable amount of studies have
shown that fiscal and monetary policy actions affect the volatility or uncertainty of inflation.
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Examples of such studies include those by Ball (1992) and Rother (2004). Ball (1992) gives a
theoretical explanation as to how an inflationary policy raises the level of inflation uncertainty,
while Rother (2004) finds a positive relationship between inflation volatility and the standard
deviation of changes in fiscal stance.
The second category of causal variables that explain inflation volatility are exogenous shocks
such as Total Factor Productivity (TFP) shocks and oil price shocks. Standard models employed
in studies typically imply that equilibrium inflation is a function of these shocks. It therefore
follows that the variance of inflation is a function of the variance of these shocks.
The final category of variables that influence the volatility of inflation are labour market
institutional variables and other political economic variables. The relative importance of the
labour market institutional variables in stabilizing the economy is conveyed by the following
quote: ‘...wage setting may be as important as government policy for macroeconomic perfor-
mance. Today it is commonplace to explain the diverse experiences of countries with reference
to differences in wage-setting institutions’ (Calmfors and Driffill (1988)).
Our interest lies in the third category of variables that explain inflation volatility: the labour
market institutional variables. Among this set of variables, the degree of wage centralization of
wage bargaining (hereinafter referred to as centralization) has received the most attention from
researchers. Perhaps, the contradicting hypotheses concerning the effect of centralization on
inflation make it an interesting academic topic. One hypothesis posits a negative relationship
between centralization and wage increases. This hypothesis hinges on the view that centraliza-
tion guarantees that wage setters will recognize broader interests. The other hypothesis posits
more restrained wage increases if wage bargaining is decentralized.1
Empirical evidence by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and Daniels et al. (2006) basically de-
scribe an inverse U-shaped relationship between centralization (or coordination) of wage bar-
gaining and wage inflation (inflation). This result is subject to two interpretations concerning
the implications of centralization on inflation volatility. The first interpretation, which is the
widely held one in empirical literature, posits a negative relationship between the degree of
1See Calmfors and Driffill (1988) for a detailed discussion of these hypotheses.
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centralization and inflation volatility. The intuition behind this position is as follows: a highly
centralized bargaining process will recognize a broader range of issues and will therefore be
prone to less volatile wage increases. The results of the analysis by Rumler and Scharler (2011)
and Barbier-Gauchard et al. (2014) confirm this interpretation. The other interpretation implies
an increased volatility of inflation as the wage bargaining process becomes more centralized.
This implication is consistent with the view that the democratization of the wage bargaining
process leads to more restricted increases in wages on the average. The results of Campolmi and
Faia (2011) confirm this view.
We agree with the assertion that centralization has implications for inflation volatility. How-
ever, there are some caveats to be taken into consideration when extending the analysis in Calm-
fors and Driffill (1988) to making predictions regarding the relationship between centralization
and inflation volatility. Firstly, an increase in wages does not necessarily imply an increase in
inflation volatility. Secondly, any analysis on the effects of centralization on inflation volatility
should account for the fact that government is more likely to intervene in a centralized bargain-
ing process. Thus, any decrease in inflation volatility associated with increased centralization
might rather reflect the effect of government intervention if the effect of the latter variable is not
controlled for. Finally, any negative correlation between centralization and inflation volatility
may be spurious if one does not control for the bargaining power of parties involved in the nego-
tiation. A centralized bargaining process will most likely yield restricted wage increases if the
labour unions have weak bargaining power. Thus, a decreased inflation volatility might rather
reflect weak bargaining power on the part of unions.
Due to the aforementioned caveats, the conclusion by Barbier-Gauchard et al. (2014) that
strengthening the power of unions helps stabilize inflation might be misleading. In their analy-
sis, they assume the presence of a policy maker whose goal is to stabilize inflation. However,
the stabilization of inflation may be the result of the presence of the policy maker rather than
the bargaining power of unions. Therefore, their conclusion might be flawed. In another re-
lated study, Rumler and Scharler (2011) conclude that increased coordination of the wage bar-
gaining process (hereinafter referred to as coordination) stabilizes inflation. This implies that
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increased centralization stabilizes inflation. In their analysis, they control for union bargaining
power. However, they leave out government intervention. Also, the variable used as a proxy
for bargaining power only indicates the bargaining power of labour unions. It is conceivable
that employers with strong bargaining powers might drive down wages without the intervention
of the government. One can therefore argue that employers’ bargaining power also increases
inflation volatility. Thus, proxy variables for bargaining power should include measures of the
bargaining power of employers as well.
Given the conflicting theories and evidence on the effect of centralization on inflation volatil-
ity, one may wonder whether a theory that unambiguously predicts the effect of centralization
on inflation volatility exists. In this study, we attempt to show that under some conditions one
can derive an unambiguous effect of centralization and other labour market institutions on infla-
tion volatility. The novelty of our approach lies in the fact that we are able to derive and test a
hypothesis concerning other labour market institutional variables as well. The crucial assump-
tion we make in deriving this theory is that the aggregate wage indexation is a simple average
over all independent wage indexation outcomes. In this case, we can show that the variance of
aggregate wage indexation is decreasing in the number of independent negotiations or bilateral
bargaining processes that result in wage indexation.
Testing this hypothesis presents a challenge as the number of negotiations or bilateral bar-
gaining that result in wage indexation are typically unobservable. To deal with this problem,
we break down the number of independent negotiations into two conceptual dimensions. These
are the number of negotiations and the independence of negotiations. The theoretical predic-
tion proposed in this study unambiguously implies a negative correlation between the number
of negotiations and the independence of negotiations on the one hand and inflation volatility on
the other hand. It also predicts a positive relationship between bargaining power and inflation
volatility.
In order to test the empirical validity of this prediction, we use data of the following selected
OECD countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US. These countries are included in
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the panel based on the availability of relevant data. While most other related studies propose
only one proxy variable for bargaining power and independence of negotiations, we propose
two for each of the categories of variables. Centralization (or coordination) is included in the set
of variables employed as proxies for independence of negotiations. In particular, the other proxy
variable proposed for bargaining power captures bargaining power of both employers and labour
unions. The effects of variables depicting deliberate policy actions of government, exogenous
shocks, government intervention and bargaining power on inflation volatility were controlled
for when testing our hypotheses. We find some evidence for the negative correlation between
independence and number of negotiations on the one hand and inflation volatility on the other
hand. Our results also indicate a positive correlation between the two proxies for bargaining
power and inflation volatility.
The crucial assumption made in deriving our hypotheses is that wage indexation is a random
outcome from a bargaining or a negotiation process. While this assumption permits us to set
a clear hypothesis concerning the effect of labour market institutional variables on inflation, it
might come across as arbitrary. However, it is pointed out by Caju et al. (2008) that prices (or
inflation rates) are the most important factors determining elements that enter wage negotiations
(or wage bargaining). Also, previous studies have pointed out the time-varying nature of wage
indexation (see Holland (1986) and Ascari et al. (2011)). We view these observations as evidence
in support of the assumption that aggregate wage indexation is an outcome of negotiation or
bilateral bargaining processes.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents a theoretical model
from which the hypothesis on the relationship between labour market institutional variables and
inflation is derived. Section 5.3 gives a description of the data used to test the hypothesis and
discusses the result of the estimation performed. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes.
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5.2 Theoretical model
This section provides a summary of the model used in Attey and de Vries (2011). The key
result in this model is then formulated in a way so as to clarify the relationship between inflation
volatility and labour market institutional variables.
Consider a setting under which there are several simultaneous negotiations regarding wage
indexation. Let the wage indexation outcome associated with each negotiation i be xit. Assum-
ing that there are m negotiations conducted independently and that the aggregate wage indexa-
tion outcome is a simple average of all independent2 outcomes, the aggregate wage indexation
xt is
xt =
1
m
m∑
i=1
xit. (5.1)
For the purpose of this paper, we assume that each individual wage indexation outcome is
an independent and identically distributed (iid) random variable. No further assumptions re-
garding the distribution of the random wage indexation variable are necessary. Since individual
negotiation outcomes are time-varying, it follows that the aggregate wage indexation is also
time varying. The variance of the aggregate wage indexation given the number of independent
negotiating units m can then be expressed as follows:
var(xt) =
var(xit)
m
. (5.2)
It is important to note that this variance is decreasing in the number of independent negotia-
tions or bargaining units that engage in wage indexation bargaining. Thus, whenever m varies,
the variance of wage indexation also varies as well. Writing var(xt) = σ2x, the following ex-
pression is implied to hold when the number of independent negotiations or bilateral bargaining
2In this work, independence should be interpreted as independence conditional on common factors such as
macroeconomic volatility that drive negotiations.
5.2 Theoretical model 147
m is allowed to vary:
σ2x = f(m, ξ)
∂f
∂m
< 0. (5.3)
The variable ξ contains a set of variables specific to the individual unions involved in the bar-
gaining processes. We also assume that it contains other variables that affect the distribution
of the individual bargaining or negotiation outcome. For example, a higher bargaining power
of one of the negotiating parties might result in a higher variance of the individual negotia-
tion outcome. Furthermore, higher levels of inflation following periods of lower inflation will
most likely reinforce the bargaining power of unions when negotiating for the degree of wage
indexation thus resulting in a higher variance in aggregate wage indexation.3
5.2.1 Random wage indexation and equilibrium inflation
Following Attey and de Vries (2011) we assume that wage indexation is the only source of
nominal rigidity in the economy. Let the expectation of private agents at time t−1 be represented
by the superscript e. We consider the following indexation rule:
wt = w
∗e
t + xt(pt − pet ), (5.4)
where wt, pit and pt are log of nominal wages, inflation and log of prices prevailing in the
economy. The log of the flexible equilibrium wage rate is indicated by w∗t . The variable xt is the
aggregate wage indexation given in (5.1). The expression for wage indexation in (5.4) allows
for a time-varying degree of wage indexation.
Output Yt is produced by a fixed coefficient Ricardian technology with labour (Nt) as a sole
input Yt = ZtNat . Here, a < 1 reflects diminishing marginal returns to scale and Z represents
technological shocks, which are assumed to be iid normal distributed.4 Labour supply is an
3The effect of inflation in this context is to create some level of dependence among bargaining unions. Therefore,
we can work with conditional independence in the context of this study.
4Allowing for log(Zt) to follow an AR process as normally assumed in the literature does not qualitatively
change our results in any way.
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increasing function of the real wage. The expression for labour supply is
nst = β0 + β1(wt − pt).
It can be shown that the expressions for wage indexation, output and labour supply imply the
following expression for the Phillips curve (see Appendix 5.A.1 for a detailed derivation):
gt = λt(pˆit − pˆiet ) + ut, (5.5)
where ut = log(Zt), and ut ∼ N(0, σ2u). The time-varying parameter λt = (a/(1− a))(1− xt)
captures the time-varying response of the output gap (gt) to changes in inflation (or in this
case, the deviation of inflation from its target, pˆit). The variable pˆit (pˆiet ) denotes the deviation
of inflation (expected inflation) from the target inflation rate. This target inflation is assumed
constant (i.e. pˆit = pit − pi∗). The Phillips curve in (5.5) above differs from the conventional
curves found in other literature in that it allows for time variation in the slope coefficient.
It is assumed that the monetary policy authority uses the interest rate as an instrument in
the conduct of optimal policy.5 The use of the interest rate as an instrument necessitates the
introduction of the IS relation. This relation is given below:
gt = −φ(it − pˆiet − r − pi∗) + vt, (5.6)
where it is the nominal interest rate and r is the natural interest rate. The random variable vt
captures the demand shock which is assumed to be iid distributed as follows vt ∼ N(0, σ2v).
A crucial assumption made is that monetary policy is conducted under rational expectations.
One therefore expects the expectations concerning all variables of all agents within the model to
be identical. The objective of the monetary policy authority is to minimize the expected squared
deviation of inflation from its target. Let the expectations operator of the policy maker be Et−1.
5Assuming the use of money supply as an instrument does not qualitatively change our results.
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The objective function of the policy maker is therefore the following:
min
i
Et−1[pˆi2t ]. (5.7)
The detailed optimal solution to this monetary problem is contained in Section 5.A.2. The
expression for equilibrium inflation under optimal monetary policy in the presence of the random
degree of wage indexation scheme considered in (5.4) is as follows:
pˆit =
vt − ut
λt
. (5.8)
The expression (5.8) above indicates that equilibrium inflation also depends on the random
degree of wage indexation variable. Noting that the variable λt = [a/(1 − a)](1 − xt)], one
notices that equilibrium inflation rate explodes when one approaches full indexation xt = 1.
Also, (5.8) implies that the variance of equilibrium inflation is influenced by the variance of
the random degree of wage indexation. It can be shown that the distribution of the equilibrium
inflation resulting from this optimal monetary policy exhibits heavy tail characteristics under
some realistic assumptions.6 It turns out that the variance of the equilibrium inflation as given
in (5.8) is
σ2pi = (σ
2
v + σ
2
u)(σ
2
1/λt + E[1/λt]
2). (5.9)
The equilibrium inflation process in (5.8) depends on the degree of wage indexation. It
follows that the variance of the equilibrium inflation process should also depend on the variance
of the random wage indexation process. To see this, first note that the random Phillips curve
slope parameter λt is a function of aggregate wage indexation xt. Thus, moments of [1/λt]
should be functions of the moments of xt.
6See Attey and de Vries (2011) and Attey and de Vries (2013) for more detailed discussions.
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5.2.2 Number of independent negotiations and inflation volatility
For the purpose of this paper, the volatility of inflation is proxied by the conditional variance
of inflation. We derive an approximation to the variance of equilibrium inflation in Appendix
5.A.3. The resulting expression is
σ2pi ≈
(
1− a
a
)2 [
1
(1− x¯)2 + 3
σ2x
(1− x¯)4 +
σ4x
(1− x¯)6 + ...
]
(σ2v + σ
2
u). (5.10)
That the volatility of equilibrium inflation increases in the variance of demand and supply
shocks is a result which is readily obtainable from conventional monetary models. From expres-
sion (5.10) above, another variable that influences the volatility of inflation is the variance of
the degree of wage indexation. The apparent neglect of this variable in models explaining infla-
tion volatility stems from the assumption of a constant degree of wage indexation made in these
models. However, we will show later that the variance of wage indexation plays a significant
role in explaining inflation volatility.
It is worth noting that since (σ2pi) is increasing in (σ
2
x) and (σ
2
x) is decreasing in total number
of independent negotiations m (as indicated by Equation (5.2)) , σ2pi should be decreasing in
m. Differently put, the more the number of independent negotiations, the lower the variance of
aggregate (weighted average of) wage indexation and the lower the variance of inflation.
In order to establish the link between inflation volatility and industrial relations variables,
it is worthwhile to reiterate that the variance of aggregate wage indexation is dependent on the
number of independent negotiations (m) and other variables that affect the individual negotiation
outcomes regarding wage indexation (i.e. σ2x = f(m, ξ)). Thus, the equation for the variance of
wage indexation in (5.10) can be summarily recast as follows:
σ2pi = f(σ
2
v , σ
2
u, σ
2
x) = f(σ
2
v , σ
2
u,m, ξ),
where (∂σ2pi/∂σ
2
v) ≥ 0, (∂σ2pi/∂σ2u) ≥ 0 and (∂σ2pi/∂m) ≤ 0.7
7Given that σv, σu σpi and ∈ R+, these conditions can be derived: (∂σpi/∂σv) ≥ 0, (∂σpi/∂σu) ≥ 0 and
(∂σpi/∂m) ≤ 0.
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The last inequality stems from the observation that the volatility of inflation is increasing in
the variance of the degree of wage indexation which is decreasing in the number of independent
wage indexation negotiations conducted. An intuitive reason as to why an increase in the number
of independent negotiations (m) should lower the variance or volatility of equilibrium inflation
is as follows. The wage indexation outcome is more volatile if it is a bargaining outcome of only
one negotiation. However, if it is the average over several independently conducted negotiations,
the variance of wage indexation decreases due to the law of large numbers.
5.2.3 Empirical specification
In order to make our model easily applicable to the panel data, we assume that ξ also includes
country specific variables that explain the variations in the variance of inflation. Assuming that
a linear equation approximates the function for variance of inflation, one derives the following
regression when there exist time variations in the explanatory variables:
σpiit = δ0 + δ1mit +
n∑
j=1
αjbpowj,it +
k∑
j=1
γjcontj,it + it, (5.11)
where the bpowj’s are variables serving as proxies for the bargaining power of negotiating units
and contj’s are other control variables. The variable t may be a sum of country specific effects
which affect inflation volatility and approximation errors.
While we do agree that the constant term δ0 is arbitrarily imposed, it can be argued that this
parameter captures the time and cross-section invariant aspects of the variance of demand and
supply shocks. Since the countries contained in the panel are Western European OECD coun-
tries, it is plausible to assume the existence of constant mean time invariant volatility of these
shocks. The letter i indexes the countries included in the panel. The parameter αj is the coeffi-
cient of the jth bargaining power variable while γj captures the effect of the jth control variable.
If the number of independent negotiations mt is readily observed, the regression equation in
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(5.11) will give rise to the readily testable hypothesis as follows:
αj > 0 ∀j (5.12a)
δ1 < 0. (5.12b)
The major difficulty one faces in testing the hypothesis in (5.12) above is the fact that the
number of independent negotiations is typically unobservable. Thus, one cannot easily mea-
sure the variable mt. To deal with this problem, we ‘break down’ the number of independent
negotiating pairs (mt) into number of negotiations and independence of negotiations.
Here, we attempt to distinguish between the concepts number of negotiations and indepen-
dence of negotiations. Consider the following two types of labour regulations: one guaranteeing
freedom of negotiations to unions and the other mandating all unions to abide by the terms of the
settlement from the first successful negotiation. It is likely that the first regulation increases the
number of negotiations, ceteris paribus. However, it does not give any indication of the depen-
dence between the negotiation outcomes. The second regulation will most likely decrease the
independence between the negotiation outcomes, ceteris paribus. A conclusion regarding the
number of negotiations will be difficult to reach on the basis of the second regulation alone. The
two concepts considered together may roughly indicate changes in the number of independent
negotiations.
The total number of independent negotiations is increasing in total number of negotiations
and independence of negotiations. Let the variables indjt and numjt be the independence of
negotiations and number of negotiations respectively for country j at time t. Incorporating the
just mentioned variables into the regression model, the main specification is:
σpiit = α0 +
n∑
j=1
αjbpowj,it +
p∑
j=1
θindj,it +
q∑
j=1
βjnumj,it +
r∑
j=1
γjcontj,it + εit, (5.13)
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where εt is a random variable capturing the effects of possible measurement and approximation
errors, and is iid distributed as follows: εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε). It is assumed that an increase in one
of the variables indicating the two dimensions in the equation (5.13) holding the other constant
increases mt. Thus, one would expect the following conditions to hold:
αj > 0 ∀j (5.14a)
θj < 0 ∀j (5.14b)
βj < 0 ∀j. (5.14c)
The hypothesis in equations (5.14) will be tested by using a panel data estimation methodology.
The next section gives details on the estimation method and the type of data used for the analysis
of this work, after which the results obtained are discussed.
5.3 Data and empirical analysis
This section conducts empirical tests on the alternative versions of the hypothesis in (5.14) using
a panel data methodology. The panel consists of the following 15 OECD countries: Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US. The panel data spans the period from 1960 to 2011. The
countries were chosen on the basis of availability of relevant data for the purposes of this study.
For instance, data for post-Soviet countries begin from 1990. Also, variables for some countries
do not vary over the 50 year period which the data spans. Data regarding the countries for which
the above situations are applicable are omitted from the panel.
The analysis in this study uses three datasets namely: inflation, productivity and labour
market institutional data. The monthly inflation data is obtained from the OECD’s statistical
database. The Purchasing Power Parity Converted GDP Laspeyres per hour worked by em-
ployees is used as a proxy for productivity for all countries but Germany. The proxy used in
Germany’s case is the manufacturing output per hour. The two measures of productivity are
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taken from the Federal Bank of Saint Louis Database. Finally, the Amsterdam Institute for Ad-
vanced Labour Studies (AIAS) compiles data on industrial relations spanning 1960 to 2011 for
OECD member countries. The data on industrial relation variables are obtained from the AIAS’
ICTWSS database.
5.3.1 Data
The average monthly inflation volatility is the dependent variable. A substantial number of
explanatory variables are labour market institutional variables. These variables are grouped into
three categories. The first category includes proxy variables indicating bargaining power of
employers and labour unions involved in wage (indexation) negotiations. The second category
includes proxy variables that indicate the independence of negotiations regarding wage or wage
indexation. The final category comprises proxy variables that indicate the number of wage
negotiations. The three categories of the labour market institutional variables can at best give
only a rough idea about the three observations that they are supposed to indicate. This is due to
the fact that direct information about the number of negotiations concerning wage indexation in
each year is unobservable. We provide further details on all variables used in the analysis.
Inflation volatility
We employ two alternative measures of inflation volatility. The first measure is the annual aver-
age of monthly volatility values obtained from GARCH(1,1) estimates. The mean equations are
modeled as AR(1) processes. The second measure uses standard deviations of monthly infla-
tion figures over a calendar year. Rother (2004) in a closely related study uses volatility figures
derived from GARCH(1,1) estimates on annual inflation. This measure might not adequately
capture the effects that labour institutional variables have on inflation volatility. In other words,
a higher frequency measure of inflation volatility might more readily pick up extreme volatility
caused by bargaining power, for instance. The lag of (log) inflation volatility will be employed
as an explanatory variable in the dynamic panel versions.
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Bargaining power
Two variables are included in the analysis to serve as proxies for bargaining power category.
The first variable, union density (ud) is defined as the net union membership as a proportion of
wage and salary earners in employment. It ranges from 0 to 100%. The second variable, sect
measures the strength of sectoral institutions representing employment relations. It takes the
value of 0 when there are weak or no institutions, 1 when there is a strong institution on one
side and 2 when there are strong institutions on both sides. In order to give an interpretation of
this variable which is more consistent with increasing bargaining power, we reorder the values
as follows: 0 when there are weak or no institutions, 1 when there are strong institutions on
both sides and 2 when there are strong institutions on only one side. We find this ordering
more plausible since weak institutions on both sides are likely to maintain the status quo while
a dominant institution on only one side is more likely to drive bargaining outcome into the
extremes. As already mentioned, we expect bargaining power to have a positive effect on the
variance of wage indexation.
Number of negotiations
We identify two proxy variables for the relative number of negotiations. The first of these
variables, bart, indicates whether there are legal restrictions placed on wage bargaining. Its
values range from 1 (when there are no constraints on bargaining) to 5 (when there are severe
limitations on additional bargaining on wages). A value of 0 denotes the absence or near absence
of negotiations of any form. In order to render the interpretation of this variable more consistent
with increasing number of negotiations, we reverse-order the values when they are between 1
and 5, while 0 still denotes the absence of any form of sectoral bargaining. The second variable
wage indicates the presence of a social pact concerning wages in a particular year. It takes the
value of 1 when there is a social pact and 0 when there is none.8
8There are other variables such as number of independent unions and total number of unions that could be
interpreted as falling under this category. We abstract from the use of these variables due the substantial amount of
missing observations.
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Independence of negotiations
The two proxy variables used for this category are coordination of wage setting (crd) and au-
tonomous negotiation of wages (auw). The values of crd range from 1 when there is fragmented
wage bargaining at plant level to 5 when there is a centralized nationwide bargaining. The val-
ues are reordered (in reverse order) to permit an interpretation more consistent with increasing
independence of negotiations. The variable auw is binary taking on the value 1 when there is
autonomous wage negotiations and 0 when there is none.
Control variables
It is plausible that labour market institutional variables may have indirect effects on inflation
volatility through inflation and variance of productivity shocks. In order to further isolate the
direct effects, we introduce inflation (pit) and variance of productivity shocks (σu,t) as control
variables. The latter of the aforementioned variables is estimated by use of GARCH(1,1) on the
productivity data. Following both theoretical and empirical findings in the literature on inflation
volatility, we hypothesize that inflation has a positive effect on inflation volatility. We also
hypothesize that the volatility of productivity shocks also has a positive effect on volatility of
inflation.
The variable indicating government intervention in wage bargaining (gvint) is also included
in the regression model as a control variable. The assigned values of this variable reflect an
increasing severity of intervention. The values range from 1 when there is no intervention to
5 when the government imposes wage settlements in the private sector. This variable can be
perceived as being negatively correlated with independence of negotiations, in which case it is
expected to have a positive effect on inflation volatility. However, an alternative hypothesis could
be derived from the observation that governments are more likely to intervene to stabilize the
economy. Thus one would expect the volatility of inflation to decrease with increasing severity
of government intervention.
Finally, we introduce a set of dummies to control for the effects of crises (dcr) and Eurozone
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accession of the member countries included in the panel (deu) on the volatility of inflation. The
following years are considered as crises years: 1973, 1974, 2008 and 2009. The former two
years are included to reflect the first oil crises while the latter two years are included to reflect
the global financial crises. The second oil crisis years are excluded due to the fact that their
impact was to a large extent limited to the US economy. We further include an interaction of the
dummies with the volatility of productivity shocks. This is because it is likely that the correlation
between volatility of inflation and variance of productivity shocks might be different under the
events indicated by the dummies. We expect a positive relationship between the volatility of
inflation and the crises dummy.
5.3.2 Empirical model
Various specifications are used to test the empirical validity of the hypothesis in (5.12). First, a
pooled OLS estimation is carried out on the panel data. Subsequently, panel data estimations are
conducted. For the purposes of the estimations carried out in the immediate part of this study,
inflation volatility (σpit) is defined as the standard deviation of monthly inflation figures. The
empirical model is summarized as follows:
yit = α0 + ϕ
′xit + γ′cit + νi + εit, (5.15a)
where y = ln(σpi), x=[∆ud sect bart wage crd auw]′, and ϕ is a 6 × 1 vector containing the
respective coefficients of the variables contained in x. The vector c contains the set of control
variables previously mentioned whose coefficients are the respective elements of the vector γ.
The variable εit is the error term assumed to be iid distributed as follows: εit ∼ N(0, σ2ε) and
the term νi is the country specific effect. The ∆ is the first difference operator. We use the
first difference of udt in our regressions due to the persistent fall in union density observed in
most of the countries in the panel.9 Two versions of (5.15a) are estimated in this study. The
first version estimated is basically a pooled OLS regression which assumes no country specific
9See Western (1995) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
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effects (i.e. νi = 0 ∀i). The second version estimates the country specific effects in addition to
other coefficients.
There are two problems one could potentially encounter in estimating the specification given
in (5.15a) above. First, it can be argued that the inflation level and the variance of productivity
are potentially endogenous. Second, given the low level of time variation in the institutional
variables, it can be argued that the correlation between the said variables and inflation volatility
might be spurious if volatility is autoregressive. We therefore introduce a specification which
includes the lag of volatility of inflation in the list of explanatory variables to control for persis-
tence. The resulting regression equation estimated is:
yit = α0 + ρyit−1 + ϕ′xit + γ′cit + νi + εit.
However, introducing the AR term results in a dynamic panel bias as yit is endogenous to
the country specific effect νi. We make use of an additional regression equation employing the
Arellano-Bond GMM (difference) estimator to deal with both the dynamic panel bias and the
potential endogeneity of inflation and productivity volatility. The differenced version of the last
previous equation is:
∆yit = ∆ρyit−1 + ϕ′∆xit + γ′∆cit + ∆εit. (5.15b)
It follows that the error term in the above equation, ∆εit, is an AR(1) process. Table 5.1 gives a
summary of the explanatory variables and the expected signs of their coefficients.
5.3.3 Results
Table 5.2 gives the results obtained under the pooled OLS estimation (columns (1) and (2)),
the panel with fixed effects estimation (columns (2) and (4)) and Arellano-Bond sytem GMM
estimation (columns (5) and (6)). We include pooled OLS estimations in our results in order
to get a preliminary idea about the effects of the labour market institutional variables on the
volatility of inflation.
Results shown in Table 5.2 indicate that five of the explanatory variables have significant
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Table 5.1: Categories and expected signs of coefficients
Variable Category Sign
ud bargaining power +
sect bargaining power +
bart number of bilateral bargaining/ negotiations −
wage number of bilateral bargaining/negotiations −
auw independence of bilateral bargaining/negotiations −
crd independence of bilateral bargaining/negotiations −
gvint control variable +/−
ln(σpi,t−1) control variable +
ln(σu) control variable +
ln(pi) control variable +
dcr ln(σu) control variable −
deu ln(σu) control variable −
dcr control variable +
deu control variable +/−
1 Expected signs of the various explanatory variables. dcr denotes dummy for crisis
periods while deu denotes the dummy for Eurozone accession.
effects on the volatility of inflation under all the estimations presented. The variables are, ud,
sect, ln(σpi) , ln(σu) and dcr. The results suggest that indeed, inflation and variance of pro-
ductivity shocks do consistently have relatively high significant effects on inflation volatility in
the direction as hypothesized. These results still hold even after correcting for possible endo-
geneity emanating from reverse causality. Also, the table indicates a significant autocorrelation
in inflation volatility. As hypothesized, inflation volatility increased during the crisis periods
1973, 1974, 2008 and 2009. Our results also suggest that Eurozone member countries experi-
ence higher inflation volatility when other variables are corrected for. At first, this may appear
counter-intuitive as one would expect a better stability in inflation levels, as is the goal of the
Maastricht treaty. However, the fact that maintaining stability in annual inflation might imply
relatively higher volatility in monthly inflation can explain this result.
It can be seen from the results that the correlation between the variance of productivity and
the volatility of inflation significantly reduced during the periods of crises and Eurozone acces-
sion. An explanation for this result stems from the fact that the structural dependence between
Table 5.2: ln(σpit): standard deviation of monthly inflation
Pooled OLS Panel (Fixed Effects) Arellano-Bond GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(σpi,t−1) 0.219*** 0.233***
(0.037) (0.036)
∆udt 0.0367*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.029** 0.025**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.054) (0.011) (0.011)
sectt -0.114*** -112*** 0.377*** 0.382*** 0.156* 0.168*
(0.031) (0.031) (0.053) (0.054) (0.094) (0.093)
bartt -0.018 -0.011 -0.08*** -0.078*** -0.056** -0.052***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024)
waget 0.021 0.003 -0.048 -0.059 -0.052 -0.057
(0.065) (0.065) (0.057) (0.057) (0.05) (0.05)
crdt -0.041*** -0.041*** 0.022 0.023 -0.032 -0.03
(0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
auwt 0.208*** -0.19*** -0.06 -0.055 -0.25*** -0.259***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.074) (0.073) (0.082) (0.082)
gvintt -0.019 -0.012 -0.017 -0.019 -0.004 -0.009
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
ln(pit) 0.246*** 0.226*** 0.209*** 0.211*** 0.19*** 0.199***
(0.02) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
ln(σu,t) 0.179*** 0.2*** 0.232*** 0.254*** 0.177*** 0.226***
(0.041) (0.046) (0.042) (0.046) (0.044) (0.049)
deu · ln(σu,t) 0.003 -0.046 -0.172**
(0.102) (0.089) (0.084)
dcr · ln(σu,t) -0.189 -0.251 -0.189*
(0.148) (0.125) (0.106)
deu -0.158* 0.025 0.258***
(0.082) (0.074) (0.072)
dcr 0.214** 0.249*** 0.194***
(0.108) (0.092) (0.078)
const -0.881*** -0.9*** -1.425*** -1.455***
(0.087) 0.087) (0.101) 0.104
1 Arellano Bond GMM estimates for dynamic panels in columns (5) and (6) . Sample period 1960-2011
2 ln(pi) , ln(σu), deu · ln(σu) and dcr · ln(σu,t) are treated as endogenous variables. Two to five periods
lagged values of the differences of the endogenous variables were used as instruments. All labour market
institutional variables as well as dummies or Eurozone accession and crises are treated as exogenous.
3 * p > 0.10, **p > 0.05 and ***> 0.01
4 Figures in parenthesis indicate the standard errors of the coefficients.
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productivity and inflation might have been attenuated during crisis periods. Also, accession to
the Eurozone requires member countries to place relatively more emphasis on inflation stabi-
lization. This places limitations on the use of inflationary policy to stabilize output hence the
decreased correlation between productivity volatility and inflation volatility.
Earlier in this paper, we hypothesized a positive effect of bargaining power of parties in-
volved in bilateral negotiations or bargaining on inflation volatility. The results obtained in
Table 5.2 support this hypothesis. Of the two proxy variables used to measure bargaining power,
the coefficient of sect has the higher magnitude. This is not a surprising result since the sect
gives a measure of bargaining power of both the labour and employers unions. In contrast, union
density ud measures the labour unions’ bargaining power. One would therefore expect varia-
tions in the relatively general measure sect, rather than the relatively specific measure (ud), to
better explain variations in inflation volatility.
Our results seem to stand in contrast to that of Barbier-Gauchard et al. (2014) who argue that
strengthening unions improves the efficacy of the monetary authority in stabilizing inflation.
However, that study assumes the presence of government intervention in addition to a high
degree of centralization and coordination among unions. It might be difficult to observe the
independent effects of bargaining power without controlling for the aforementioned variables.
We are therefore of the opinion that bargaining power of both employers and labour unions (as
proxied by ud and sect) considered alone destabilizes inflation.
Concerning the number of independent negotiations, our results indicate a negative relation-
ship between measures of independence and inflation volatility. For both measures (bart and
wage), the pooled OLS estimates do not yield significant estimates. However, the sign of bart is
as hypothesized. The effect of articulation of sectoral bargaining becomes significant when one
employs panel regression or the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation. It can therefore be concluded
that there is partial evidence in support of the hypothesis that inflation volatility is decreasing in
the number of bilateral negotiations when one controls for other variables.
The estimates for the coefficients of autonomous wage negotiation (auw) and coordination
of wage setting (crd) do support our hypothesis on the independence of negotiations, albeit
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weakly. After correcting for the effects of the lag effects of volatility, the estimates for the
effects of auw become significant. The magnitude of these estimates are among the highest, in-
dicating the relative importance of independence of negotiations for inflation volatility. Previous
estimations performed in Daniels et al. (2006) seem to confirm our results regarding indepen-
dence of negotiations. The authors show that inflation initially increases in centralization of
wage bargaining at low levels of centralization, then decrease as centralization increases. This
result implies that increasing centralization of negotiations (decreasing independence) results in
an increase in inflation volatility.
Rumler and Scharler (2011) show that highly coordinated wage bargaining systems have
a dampening impact on inflation volatility. Differently put, a higher level of independence in
wage bargaining or negotiation systems do have a positive impact on inflation volatility. This
apparent contradiction can be resolved when one notes that it is highly possible that highly coor-
dinated bargaining/negotiation systems might be subject to more government intervention. Any
policy maker will not be oblivious to the potentially destabilizing consequences of a coordi-
nated bargaining system and may be forced to intervene. Thus, any analysis on the impact of
coordination on inflation volatility should control for government intervention. This is done in
this study. We are therefore of the opinion that the destabilizing effects of interdependence in
bargaining/negotiation systems shown in this study better portray empirical reality.
In this section, we test the hypothesis on labour market institutional variables given in (5.14).
The hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between bargaining power of unions and infla-
tion volatility. It also predicts a negative relationship between number of negotiations/bilateral
bargaining and independence of negotiations/bilateral bargaining on the one hand and inflation
volatility on the other hand. Inflation volatility is defined as the annual log standard deviation
of monthly inflation. The results generally confirm the direction of correlation hypothesized.
Among the three categories of labour market variables considered, bargaining power has the
most unequivocal impact in terms of significance and magnitude. There is some evidence to
support the negative impact of independence and number of negotiations/bilateral bargaining.
In what follows in this section, we investigate how robust our findings are to another measure
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of inflation volatility. Under this measure, inflation volatility is defined as the annual average of
log monthly volatility derived from GARCH estimations.
5.3.4 Robustness
Table 5.3 shows results of estimations performed using annual average of monthly GARCH
volatility as the dependent variable. The results are comparable to those of the estimations us-
ing annual standard deviation of monthly inflation as a measure of inflation volatility in many
regards. Once again, the positive relationship between bargaining power of negotiating par-
ties and inflation volatility is significant under the panel with fixed effects estimations and the
Arellano-Bond GMM estimations. As before, the lag of log inflation volatility, inflation levels
and variance of productivity do significantly explain variations in inflation volatility. The results
also indicate a decreased correlation between volatility of productivity and inflation volatility
during crises and the period of being an Eurozone member. Finally, there is some evidence
in support of the hypothesis that the independence of negotiations or bilateral bargaining does
negatively impact inflation volatility.
However, a few differences exist between the two estimations. First, the lag of inflation
volatility plays a bigger role in explaining inflation volatility when the dependent variable is de-
rived from GARCH estimations. The fact that GARCH variances are modeled to be persistent
does explain this result. Also, none of the measures used for number of negotiations are statis-
tically significant in explaining variations in inflation volatility under the Arellano-Bond GMM
estimations. The variable bart does retain some significant explanatory power as hypothesized
under the panel-fixed-effects estimation and one of the pooled OLS estimations. Also, crd be-
comes the significant variable explaining inflation volatility (under the GMM estimation) when
one switches to using GARCH volatility as the measure of inflation volatility. These differ-
ences do not change our results materially. From Table 5.3, we can conclude that there is some
evidence in support of the hypothesis that inflation volatility varies positively with bargaining
power and negatively with number and independence of negotiations.
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5.4 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the role of labour market institutional variables in explaining the
volatility of inflation. We group the labour market institutional variables into three categories:
bargaining power, number of negotiations and independence of negotiations. Results by Attey
and de Vries (2011) imply a positive relationship between the variance of wage indexation and
the variance of inflation. By exploiting the relationship between labour market institutional
variation and the variance of wage indexation, we derive a readily testable hypothesis on the link
between volatility of inflation and labour market institutional factors. The hypothesis was tested
on the data of 15 OECD countries. The methodologies used include pooled OLS estimations,
panel estimation with fixed effects, and Arellano-Bond GMM estimation.
Similar to the findings in Rumler and Scharler (2011) we consistently find evidence to sup-
port the positive correlation between bargaining power and inflation volatility as measured by
annual standard deviation of monthly inflation. Union density (ud) and strength of sectoral in-
stitutions (sect) are used as proxies for bargaining power. The use of these proxies permits us to
measure not only the labour unions’ bargaining power (ud) but also that of the employers unions.
The magnitude of the coefficients of sect, a proxy for bargaining power is always higher than
that of the other proxy ud under the panel fixed effects and Arrelano-Bond GMM estimations.
This result still holds in the estimations performed to check the robustness of our results. This
suggests that the variable sect contains more information on bargaining power of both labour
and employers unions than ud.
Contrary to Rumler and Scharler (2011) who point to the stabilizing effects of a higher de-
gree of coordination, our results show that increased coordination and more generally increased
interdependence of negotiations or bargaining increase inflation volatility. Our results are robust
to alternative definitions of inflation volatility. We argue that the apparent contradiction stems
from the fact that the just cited work does not correct for government intervention which more
likely comes with coordination. It is also found in this study that the variable bart, which is a
proxy for the number of negotiations has significant power in explaining variations in inflation
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volatility as hypothesized. This finding is robust under the panel with fixed effect estimation
when one uses GARCH-derived volatility estimates as the dependent variable.
Finally, our results also suggest the importance of variables such as lag of inflation volatility,
inflation level, variance of productivity shocks, Eurozone accession and crises in explaining
variations in inflation volatility. The lag of inflation volatility has a bigger effect when inflation
volatility is derived from GARCH estimations than when it is derived from standard deviation
calculations. In particular, we find that the correlation between the variance of productivity and
inflation volatility decreases during the crisis periods. It also decreases when a country becomes
and remains a member of the Eurozone. As one would expect, inflation is more volatile during
crisis periods. A more surprising result is the fact that being a member of the Eurozone leads
to more inflation volatility. However, the fact that stabilizing annual inflation might be at the
expense of more volatile monthly inflation can explain this result.
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5.A The Phillips curve and optimal monetary policy
5.A.1 Deriving the Phillips curve
Given the output technology described in the main text, the labour demand can be derived from
the otpimizing behaviour of the representative firm. Under this behaviour, the first order condi-
tions dictate that wages be equal to the marginal product of labour, as indicated in the equation
below:
Wt
Pt
= aZtN
a−1
t . (5.16)
Let the smaller cases represent the natural log values of the upper cases. The expression for
labour demand is derived by taking the log of 5.16 and expressing the resulting equation in terms
of nt = logNt. Let δ0 = (ln a) / (1− a) and δ1 = 1/ (1− a). The expression below gives the
labour demand:
ndt =δ0 − δ1(wt − pt) + δ1zt. (5.17)
The expression for labour supply can be derived from a representative household’s optimizing
behaviour. For the purposes of this study, we make use of the following ad hoc labour supply
relation:
nst = β0 + β1(wt − pt). (5.18)
The production function was already given in the main part of this study as follows: Yt =
ZtN
a
t . Taking the log of this function permits us to derive an expression in terms of log variables
as follows:
yt = ant + zt. (5.19)
5.A The Phillips curve and optimal monetary policy 167
By equating (5.17) to (5.18), one derives the following expressions for equilibrium nominal
wage rate (w∗t ) and equilibrium labour (n
∗
t ). These expressions are as follows:
w∗t =
δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+ pt +
δ1
δ1 + β1
zt (5.20)
n∗t =
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+
β1δ1
δ1 + β1
zt. (5.21)
The expression for equilibrium output is then derived by substituting (5.21) into (5.19). We give
the equation for equilibrium output below:
y∗t = a
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+
(
aβ1δ1
δ1 + β1
+ 1
)
zt. (5.22)
Assume zt is an iid process distributed as follows zt ∼ N(0, σ2z). Taking expectations of equa-
tion (5.20) derives the expected prevailing equilibrium wage rate given below:
Et−1w∗t =
δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
+ pet . (5.23)
To proceed with the derivation of the Phillips curve (aggregate supply) relation, we need
to make an assumption about the source of nominal rigidity. We assume that wage indexation
indicates the extent of nominal rigidity in the economy. The expression for wage indexation has
already been given in equation (5.4) as follows:
wt = Et−1w∗t + xt(pt − pet ), (5.24)
where xt is the aggregate wage indexation. It is defined as an average of all individual indexation
outcomes. Making the substitution of expected equilibrium wages into the wage indexation
expression given in (5.24) and subtracting pt from both sides of the equation gives the following
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expression for real wages:
wt − pt = (xt − 1)(pt − pet ) +
δ0 − β0
δ1 + β1
. (5.25)
The presence of nominal rigidities (as governed by wage indexation rules) prevents the
labour market from clearing. The level of employment and output is therefore determined by
labour demand. Noting this, one derives labour demand in the presence of wage indexation by
substituting equation( 5.25) into (5.17) to obtain the following:
ndt =
β1δ0 − β0δ1
δ1 + β1
− δ1(xt − 1)(pt − pet ) + δ1zt. (5.26)
Recalling the expression yt = ant+zt permits one to derive the output prevailing in the presence
of wage indexation. The step-by-step derivation is given below:
yt = a
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
− aδ1(xt − 1)(pt − pet ) + aδ1zt + zt
yt = a
β1δ0 + β0δ1
δ1 + β1
+
(
aβ1δ1
δ1 + β1
+ 1
)
zt −
(
aβ1δ1
δ1 + β1
+ 1
)
zt + (aδ1 + 1)zt − aδ1(xt − 1)(pt − pet ).
Recognizing that the sum of the first two addends is simply the flexible price (or potential)
output, we can simply rewrite the final expression as follows:
yt = y
∗
t + aδ1(1− xt)(pt − pet ) +
aδ21
δ1 + β1
zt. (5.27)
To proceed with the derivation of the Phillips curve, we make use of the following definitions
for the output gap (gt), Phillips slope parameter (λt) and shock term (ut). In particular, let
gt = yt − y∗t
λt = aδ1(1− xt)
ut =
aδ21
δ1 + β1
zt.
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It is worth noting that the difference between actual log price level (pt) and a lag period’s ex-
pectation of the log price level (pet ) can be expressed in terms of inflation levels. Let the target
inflation level of the monetary authority be (pi∗).
pt − pet = (pt − pt−1)− (pet − pt−1)
= pit − piet
= (pit − pi∗)− (piet − pi∗).
Finally, define pˆi = pit − pi∗. After making relevant substitutions into the expression (5.27),
we obtain the following expression for the Phillips curve.
gt = λt(pˆit − pˆiet ) + ut. (5.28)
5.A.2 Optimal monetary policy
Consider a monetary authority whose policy goal is to stabilize inflation only at a specified rate
(pi∗) using the interest rate as an instrument. The optimizing problem faced by the monetary
authority is as follows:
min
it
Et−1(pit − pi∗)2 = Et−1(pit − Et−1pit)2 + (Et−1pit − pi∗)2
= σ2pi + Et−1(pit − pi∗)2
= σ2pi + [Et−1pˆit]
2.
The preceding optimizing problem requires the monetary authority to set interest rates at a level
that corresponds to expected inflation (Et−1pit or piet )
10 being maintained at a level equal to the
10Investigating the conduct of monetary policy under rational expectations implies that the monetary authority’s
expectations coincide with those of private agents.
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target inflation (pi∗). Consequently, the following expression is expected to hold in all periods.
Et−1pˆit = 0. (5.29)
To investigate the level at which interest rate should be set, we recall the aggregate demand
function. The expression is given as follows:
gt = −φ(it − pˆiet − r − pi∗) + vt.
Equating this expression to that of the Phillips curve in (5.28) results in the following relation-
ship between the interest rate and equilibrium inflation:
(pˆit − pˆiet ) =
vt − ut
λt
− φ
λt
(it − pˆiet − r − pi∗). (5.30)
The interest rate it is an instrument set by the monetary policy authority and thus always equal
to its expectation. Noting this and imposing the condition set by (5.29), one derives an interest
rate rule by taking expectation of the equation (5.30) above. The resulting interest rate rule is as
follows:
it = r + pi
∗. (5.31)
Finally substituting the first order condition and the interest rate rule in (5.31) into (5.30) derives
the equilibrium inflation rate under optimal monetary policy as follows:
pˆit =
vt − ut
λt
. (5.32)
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5.A.3 Inflation variance under optimal monetary policy
It follows from (5.32) that the variance of equilibrium under optimal monetary policy is as
follows:
σ2pi = (σ
2
v + σ
2
u)(σ
2
1/λt + E[1/λt]
2). (5.33)
Recalling that λt = aδ1(1− xt), we can conclude that the variance of inflation (σ2pi) should be a
function of the variance of wage indexation (σ2x). However, finding a closed form expression of
σ2pi in terms of the variance of wage indexation σ
2
x is difficult. We therefore resort to the use of
Taylor approximations of the function [1/λt] around the mean wage indexation x¯. The step by
step derivation of the approximation is as follows:
1
λt
=
1
aδ1
(
1
1− xt
)
≈ 1
aδ1
(
1
1− x¯ +
1
(1− x¯)2 (xt − x¯) +
1
(1− x¯)3 (xt − x¯)
2 + ...
)
.
By taking expectations of the last expression, one derives an approximation to the mean of
(1/λt). This is given in the equation that follows.
E
[
1
λt
]
≈ 1
aδ1
(
1
1− x¯ +
1
(1− x¯)3σ
2
x + ...
)
. (5.34)
If one ignores the terms above the first order in the approximation for 1/λt deriving the variance
is a matter of straight-forward computations. The equation below gives the variance.
σ21/λt ≈
1
a2δ21
(
σ2x
(1− x¯)4
)
. (5.35)
Substituting (5.34) and (5.35) into the expression for the variance of inflation as given in (5.33)
gives the following:
σ2pi =
1
a2δ21
[
1
(1− x¯)2 + 3
σ2x
(1− x¯)4 +
σ4x
(1− x¯)6
]
(σ2v + σ
2
u). (5.36)
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5.B Tables
Table 5.3: ln(σpit): annual average of monthly GARCH volatility
Pooled OLS Panel (Fixed Effects) Arellano-Bond GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(σpi,t−1) 0.807*** 0.813***
(0.017) (0.017)
∆udt 0.0368*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.008** 0.007**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
sectt -0.057** -0.057** 0.411*** 0.398*** 0.083*** 0.071**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.038) (0.039) (0.026) (0.026)
bartt -0.018* -0.01 -0.085*** -0.078*** -0.005 -0.003
(0.013) (0.01) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
waget 0.038 0.025 -0.038 -0.048 0.018 0.012
(0.053) (0.052) (0.041) (0.041) (0.015) (0.014)
crdt -0.022* -0.023** 0.024 0.022 -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006)
auwt 0.255*** -0.232*** -0.063 -0.055 -0.01 -0.004
(0.057) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.024) (0.024)
gvintt -0.018 -0.009 -0.014 -0.013 -0.015** -0.016***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006)
ln(pit) 0.24 *** 0.213*** 0.21*** 0.188*** 0.045*** 0.046***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
ln(σu,t) 0.129*** 0.155*** 0.211*** 0.233*** 0.047*** 0.066***
(0.033) (0.037) (0.03) (0.033) (0.013) (0.014)
deu · ln(σu,t) 0.027 -0.042 -0.071***
(0.081) (0.064) (0.025)
dcr · ln(σu,t) -0.098 -0.156* -0.09***
(0.118) (0.09) (0.03)
deu -0.19*** 0.071 0.071***
(0.065) (0.053) (0.021)
dcr 0.032 0.066*** 0.084***
(0.087) (0.066) (0.022)
const -0.695*** -0.704*** -1.241*** -1.231***
(0.069) 0.07) (0.074) (0.075)
1 System GMM estimates for dynamic panels in columns (5) and (6) . Sample period 1960-2011
2 All labour market institutional variables are treated as exogenous. ln(pi) , ln(σu), deu·ln(σu) and dcr ·ln(σu,t)
are treated as endogenous.variables. Two to five periods lagged values of the differences of the endogenous
variables were used as instruments.
3 * p > 0.10, **p > 0.05 and ***> 0.01
4 Figures in parenthesis indicate the standard errors of the coefficients
Table 5.4: Miscellaneous Tests on the Arrelano-Bond GMM Estimations in Table (5.2)
Tests (5) (6)
Autocorrelation Tests for ∆εit (H0: No Autocorrelation )
p− value : ∆εit−1 0.000 0.000
p− value : ∆εit−2 0.307 0 .289
Total number of instruments 565 575
Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (p− value) 0.016 0.048
Exogeneity of Instrument Subsets: Difference-in-Sargan Tests
Sargan test excluding group :p− value 0.013 0.048
Difference (null H = exogenous):p− value 0.670 0.371
Table 5.5: Miscellaneous Tests on the Arrelano-Bond GMM Estimations in Table (5.3)
Tests (5) (6)
Autocorrelation Tests for ∆εit (H0: No Autocorrelation )
p− value : ∆εit−1 0.000 0.000
p− value : ∆εit−2 0.000 0 .000
Miscellaneous
Total number of instruments 565 575
Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (p− value) 0.000 0.000
Exogeneity of Instrument Subsets: Difference-in-Sargan Tests
Sargan test excluding group :p− value 0.000 0.000
Difference (null H = exogenous):p− value 0.039 0.033
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Chapter 6
Summary
In this dissertation, I investigate the causes and the effects of time variations in the degree of
wage indexation. I address the following three questions. First, is there any empirical evidence
in support of the time-varying nature of the degree of wage indexation? Second, what are the
factors that account for the time variation in the degree of wage indexation? Finally, what are
the consequences of the time variations in the degree of wage indexation? The contribution
of this thesis to the literature lies in the three major questions it addresses. While there are a
few other studies on time-varying wage indexation, none has explored the topic to such a depth
as this dissertation. By developing and using a simple but effective methodology, Chapter 2
provides evidence and available measures for the time variation in wage indexation in 11 OECD
countries. The dissertation further provides explanations as to the causes of the time variations
in wage indexation in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Finally, the consequences of wage indexation
are explored in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The subsequent paragraphs of this summary
contain details on what each of the chapters entails.
Chapter 2 addresses the first question. In this chapter, I provide preliminary evidence in
support of the time-varying nature of wage indexation. I also provide a novel methodology to
measure the time variation in wage indexation. Estimates for wage indexation obtained from
this methodology are very similar to the values of the proportion of Cost-Of-Living Adjustment
(COLA) coverage in the US. This result gives a rough indication of the accuracy of the method-
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ology. I further estimate the time-varying wage indexation for 10 other OECD countries. The
results show that the degree of wage indexation in most of these countries rose during the mid
1970s to early 1980s and decreased thereafter. Chapter 2 also addresses the second question, but
mainly from an empirical standpoint. It is shown that trend inflation is the most important factor
influencing wage indexation in almost all of the countries. There is some statistical evidence in
support of the negative effects of productivity shock variances on wage indexation.
Chapter 3 addresses the second and third questions. In addressing the second question,
this chapter assumes that wage indexation is an outcome of negotiations or bargaining between
employers and labour unions. Under this assumption, I show that a random wage indexation out-
come arises as a result of mixed equilibrium strategies pursued by the bargaining parties. While
the number of independent negotiations does not affect the average wage indexation outcome, it
certainly influences the variance of wage indexation. Regarding the third question, I show that
under optimal monetary policy, inflation has a fat-tailed distribution. The key assumptions made
when obtaining this result are the following: wages are indexed randomly to inflation and the
interest rate is used as an instrument in the conduct of monetary policy. The fat-tail property
does not extend to the output gap under the assumptions made.
Chapter 4 investigates the effects of time variation in wage indexation on the conduct of
monetary policy. To this end, I consider a dynamic version of the Barro-Gordon model under
which wages are randomly indexed to the lag of inflation. The model is calibrated to the Euro
area using plausible parameter values. The results indicate that the distributions of inflation,
the output gap and the interest rate are heavy-tailed. Also, in the presence of a random wage-
indexation scheme, a Taylor rule targeting current inflation performs better than that targeting
the lag of inflation.
The final chapter addresses whether labour market institutions have effects on the volatility
of inflation. It draws on the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3 to derive a testable
hypothesis concerning the topic. The derived hypothesis is subsequently tested using panel
data of 15 OECD countries. The study in this chapter can be viewed as an indirect test on the
following result from chapter 3: wage indexation is a random bargaining or negotiation outcome.
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The results indicate that labour market institutions have significant effects on inflation volatility.
Inflation volatility rises when the bargaining power of negotiating parties rises. It falls when the
number of independent wage (indexation) negotiations rises. In particular, I show that when one
controls for bargaining power and government intervention, coordination of wage negotiations
increases inflation volatility. This result runs in contrast to findings in the related literature which
do not incorporate the above mentioned control variables.
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Chapter 7
Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in
Dutch)
In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik de oorzaken en gevolgen van tijdsvariatie in de mate van loonin-
dexatie. Ik stel de volgende drie vragen: Is er er enig empirisch bewijsmateriaal dat het ti-
jdsvarirend karakter van de loonindexatie ondersteunt? Wat zijn de factoren die de tijdsvariatie
in de loonindexatie bepalen? Wat zijn de directe en indirecte gevolgen van tijdsvariatie in de
loonindexatie? De bijdrage aan de literatuur ligt in de drie hoofdvragen die het proefschrift
behandelt. Hoewel er eerdere studies zijn gedaan naar tijdsvariatie in de loonindexatie, is het
onderwerp nog niet eerder zo uitputtend behandeld. Door het ontwikkelen en toepassen van
een simpele maar effectieve methodiek geeft hoofdstuk 2 een bewijs van en maatstaven voor
tijdsvariatie in de loonindexatie in 11 OESO landen. De oorzaken van de tijdsvariatie in de
loonindexatie worden vervolgens nader toegelicht in hoofdstuk 2 en 3, terwijl de gevolgen wor-
den besproken in hoofdstuk 3, 4 en 5. De hier volgende paragrafen bevatten details over de
inhoud van elk afzonderlijk hoofdstuk.
Hoofstuk 2 richt zich voornamelijk op de vraag of er enig empirisch bewijs is dat het ti-
jdsvarirend karakter van loonindexatie ondersteunt. In dit hoofdstuk wordt niet alleen het pre-
liminair bewijs naar voren gebracht, maar tevens toon ik een nieuwe methodiek aan om de ti-
jdsvariatie in de loonindexatie te meten. De schattingen voor loonindexatie die uit deze method-
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ologie worden verkregen, zijn vergelijkbaar met de waarden voor de prijsindexatie. Dit resultaat
geeft een globale indicatie van de nauwkeurigheid van de methodologie. Hiernaast schat ik de
tijdsvarirende loonindexatie voor 10 andere OESO landen. Hieruit blijkt dat de loonindexatie in
de meeste landen steeg gedurende het midden van de jaren zeventig tot het begin van de jaren
tachtig en daarna weer daalde. Het laatste gedeelte van het hoofdstuk richt zich op de factoren
die de tijdsvariatie in de loonindexatie bepalen. Dit gebeurt voornamelijk vanuit een empirisch
perspectief. Hierbij wordt aangetoond dat de inflatietrend in bijna alle landen de meest belangri-
jke factor is die de loonindexatie benvloedt. Er is enig statistisch bewijs ter ondersteuning van
de negatieve effecten van de variantie van productiviteitsschokken op de loonindexatie.
Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op de tweede en derde vraag. Bij het behandelen van de tweede vraag
veronderstelt dit hoofdstuk dat de loonindexatie het resultaat is van onderhandelingen tussen
twee vakbonden. Onder deze veronderstelling toon ik aan dat er een willekeurige loonindexatie
ontstaat als gevolg van de gemengde evenwichtsstrategien die door de onderhandelende partijen
worden gehanteerd. Hoewel het aantal onafhankelijke onderhandelingen geen invloed heeft
op de gemiddelde loonindexatie, is dit zeker van invloed op de variantie van loonindexatie.
Wat betreft de derde vraag laat ik zien dat onder een optimaal monetair beleid de inflatie een
kansverdeling met een dikke staart heeft. De belangrijkste veronderstellingen die gemaakt zijn
bij het verkrijgen van dit resultaat zijn de volgende: de lonen zijn willekeurig gendexeerd op
basis van de inflatie en de rente is het monetaire beleidsinstrument. Het kenmerk van de dikke
staarten strekt zich onder de gemaakte veronderstellingen niet uit tot de output gap.
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de effecten van tijdsvariatie in de loonindexatie op het monetair
beleid. Hierbij gebruik ik een dynamische versie van het Barro-Gordon model waarin de lonen
willekeurig gendexeerd zijn op basis van de inflatie in de voorgaande periode. Het model is
gekalibreerd met voor de eurozone plausibele parameterwaarden. De resultaten tonen aan dat
de kansverdeling van de inflatie, de output gap en de rente dikke staarten hebben. In het geval
van willekeurige loonindexatie presteert een Taylor regel, die is gebaseerd op de inflatie in de
huidige periode, beter dan een model dat is gebaseerd op de inflatie in de voorgaande periode.
Het laatste hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk 5, houdt zich bezig met de vraag of arbeidsmarktinstitu-
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ties invloed hebben op de volatiliteit van de inflatie. Dit hoofdstuk is gebaseerd op het theo-
retisch kader dat in hoofdstuk drie werd gepresenteerd met het doel een toetsbare hypothesis
met betrekking tot het onderwerp te formuleren. Het onderzoek in dit hoofdstuk kan worden
beschouwd als een indirecte test van het resultaat uit hoofdstuk drie: de loonindexatie is een
willekeurige onderhandelingsuitkomst. De resultaten geven aan dat de arbeidsmarktinstituties
een significante invloed hebben op de volatiliteit van inflatie. De volatiliteit van de inflatie
stijgt wanneer de onderhandelingspositie van de onderhandelende partijen sterker is. Echter,
deze daalt zodra het aantal onafhankelijke onderhandelingen over loon(indexatie) toeneemt. In
het bijzonder laat ik zien dat, wanneer er gecontroleerd wordt voor onderhandelingsmacht en
overheidsingrijpen, de volatiliteit van inflatie stijgt als gevolg van de coo¨rdinatie van de loonon-
derhandelingen. Dit resultaat is in strijd met de bevindingen in de bestaande literatuur waarin
de hierboven vermelde controlevariabelen niet worden gebruikt.
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